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Abstract
This thesis analyses different aspects of financial crises with a focus on the role of
pecuniary externalities.
The topics explored in these essays are as follows: Chapter 1 provides background
on issues of illiquidity and insolvency, and discusses how the two can interact.
Chapter 2 studies pecuniary externalities in a ‘bank run’ model where banks supply
credit in the form of marketable securities. An aggregate liquidity shock, which triggers ‘fire
sales’ of such securities, can lead to insolvency when their value falls. So, in this type of
model, a run on several banks can lead to insolvency driven pecuniary externalities.
Chapter 3 explores three explanations of the U.S. subprime crisis; insolvency due
to externalities, insolvency due to cheating, and illiquidity driven by panic. We argue that
these narratives should be treated as complements (rather than as substitutes), with each
playing an important role at different stages of the crisis.
Chapter 4 studies the reversibility of shocks in a general equilibrium model of com-
petitive markets with heterogeneous beliefs. I find that heterogeneous beliefs can amplify
shocks; and, due to asymmetric adjustment of risky asset prices, they can also lead to sys-





1.1 The social role of financial institutions
Before discussing the risks of illiquidity and insolvency facing financial institu-
tions, we briefly summarise the important social role such institutions play in
economies with incomplete contracts and borrowers with limited liability. According
to Kashyap et al. [2014a], the financial system contributes to economic efficiency in
three ways. First, it facilitates the extension of credit for productive investments,
which appear as loans on the asset side of bank balance sheets. Second, on the
liabilities side of bank balance sheets, liquid claims that facilitate financial transac-
tions are created, with the law of large numbers offering efficiency gains in supplying
liquidity insurance to depositors uncertain about the timing of their liquidity needs.
Third, with the choice of deposits and bank equity on offer, the financial system
facilitates risk sharing.
However, in serving the economy in these three ways, highly leveraged finan-
cial institutions are exposed to substantial risks of illiquidity and insolvency. These
may, in fact, not be easily separable because, as Kashyap et al. [2014a] point out, the
possibility of a bank run may be one of the mechanisms to ensure sound investments
by the bank.1 One problem to be discussed, however, is that this mechanism can
be triggered accidentally, by unjustified panic.
1Another mechanism discussed in Holmstrom and Tirole [1997] is that the bank keeps sufficient
‘skin in the game’ in the form of own equity financing.
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1.2 Liquidity crises
For the purpose of the analysis in this thesis, I classify a liquidity crisis as a panic-
based phenomenon not justified by the fundamental investment activities of bank-
ing.2 This, for example, includes the ‘sunspot’ bank run in the classic paper of
Diamond and Dybvig [1983] driven by coordination failures, where – in the absence
of deposit insurance – depositors ‘run’ on a bank simply because they expect others
to do so. Such liquidity shocks may, however, trigger insolvency (as will be discussed
below in connexion with Figure 1.1). Given the high leverage and maturity trans-
formation involved in banking, the supply of liquid assets is limited.3 This, absent
‘lender of last resort’ facilities, the recall of non-marketable loans before maturity
can cause insolvency.
In contrast to Diamond and Dybvig [1983], Allen and Gale [2004] assume
that bank lending takes the form of marketable securities. This would seem to solve
the problem of illiquidity, as the individual bank can simply sell some assets to pay
depositors. This is true for idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. But to the extent that
liquidity shock is spread more widely, this selling may trigger changes in the price
of these securities; such asset ‘fire sales’ may cause widespread insolvency, as will be
discussed in Chapter 2.
Gorton [2010] argues that panic phenomena may arise simply as a result of
the complexity of the financial securities involved. With regard to the U.S. sub-
prime crisis, in particular, he argues that it was ‘the loss of information’ involved in
securitisation and the ‘opacity’ of mortgage-backed securities in terms of the asset
backing that le-d to what he describes as ‘The Panic of 2007’. In discussing this
view in Chapter 3, we cite the contrary view of Holmstorm, who contends the flawed
business model being employed by the investment banks, not the ‘loss’ information,
that caused the crisis.
1.3 Solvency crises
For the purpose of this thesis, a solvency crisis is treated as one that originates on
the asset side of the bank balance sheet. There is a crisis when the value of the
bank’s asset falls so far below the value of its outstanding liabilities that it exhausts
2Allen and Gale [2004] distinguish such coordinated failure from ‘rational’ bank runs based on
the poor performance of bank investments.
3When the banks share correlated fundamentals, the failure of one bank can be viewed as a
‘sunspot’, in which depositors consider other banks’ failures as indicators of the fragility of their
own banks, leading them to turn to an equilibrium in which all depositors run.
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the equity buffer. (The issue of insolvency problems possibly leading to illiquidity
will be discussed in Figure 1.2.)
The value of a bank asset may be compromised in number of different ways.
An important case is a form of cheating in which the complexity of financial products
lies at the heart of the problem that is, when a bank uses the financial resources
at its disposal to invest in products that are much riskier than outsiders realise. As
discussed in Chapter 3, Akerlof and Shiller [2015] argue that this was in fact the case
for the U.S. subprime crisis. According to them, the credit rating agencies (CRAs)
‘mined their reputation’ to secure the fees from the investment banks by over-rating
the quality of the securities involved, so that a large number of subprime mortgage
securities were, in fact, rated as triple A. Once the risks concealed by the inflated
ratings issued by CRAs were discovered, the collapse was inevitable.
The tendency of investors to ignore certain unlikely outcomes, a behavioural
phenomenon that Gennaioli et al. [2012] have dubbed ‘neglected risk’, is worth
considering as well.. Empirical evidence in Foote et al. [2012] indicates that the
decline in housing prices during the crisis might have been an entirely neglected
scenario, rather than being considered as having low probability ex-ante. Neglected
risk is also consistent with the phenomenon discussed in Reinhart and Rogoff [2009]
as the so-called ‘this time is different’ mantra. Almost every crisis comes as a surprise
to the market because investors who ascribe to such a mantra fail to foresee a crisis
when it inevitably comes in a different form. These findings remind us about the
importance of unanticipated risk and so-called ‘zero probability’ events in economic
modelling.4
Instead of appealing to asymmetric information, an important strand of re-
cent literature emphasises the role of externalities as a potential trigger for insol-
vency. We focus on the model by Shin [2010], in which highly leveraged investment
banks responding to news about the quality of assets generate price effects that
greatly amplify the first-round effects. The details of the model and the calibration
are supplied in Chapter 3, but it may be useful at this point to discuss the nature
of such ‘pecuniary externalities’.
A recent paper by Da´vila and Korinek [2017] analyses pecuniary externalities
in some detail. To illustrate their argument, they use the model of Kiyotaki and
Moore [1997], in which there are no financial intermediaries; but the basis of the
analysis also applies to models such as that of Shin [2010], in which highly leveraged
financial institutions play a central role.
4See Lo [2017] for discussion of a new framework, the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis, in which
rationality and irrationality coexist.
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What they refer to as a ‘collateral externalities’ emerge when agents are sub-
ject to binding price-dependent financial constraints (e.g., borrowing constraints,
regulatory capital requirements, Value at Risk (VaR)). Such constraints also include
collateral constraints applied to farmers, the focus of study in Kiyotaki and Moore
[1997]; and the constraint that takes the specific form of the Value at Risk (VaR)
rules of Basel, applied to the investment banks in Shin [2010].5 However, a com-
mon feature to both constraints involves fire sales that induce externalities. There
is vast literature on fire sales including Allen and Gale [2004] and Diamond and
Rajan [2011]. In fact, such pecuniary externalities generate inefficiencies, resulting
in a situation in which ‘constrained Pareto improvements’ could be achieved by gov-
ernment intervention.6 Da´vila and Korinek [2017] specifically argue that actions to
increase liquidity reserves and reduce fire sales could achieve welfare improvement.7
1.4 How illiquidity and insolvency interact
As noted above, problems on the liabilities side of a bank’s balance sheet can lead to
insolvency. Likewise, problems with bank assets can trigger liquidity runs. Figures
1.1 and 1.2 illustrate this situation, and also distinguish the information assumption
used in the previously mentioned studies.
Figure 1.1 illustrates in schematic form how illiquidity can lead to insolvency
whether or not information is symmetric. For Diamond and Dybvig [1983], infor-
mation about asset quality is symmetric; but a problem of creditor coordination can
lead to insolvency if the bank does not have enough liquid assets, or if it cannot find
external financing to meet the withdrawals. Likewise, for Allen and Gale [2004] an
aggregate liquidity shock that triggers fire sales of marketable securities can lead to
insolvency when their value falls. But this is due to pecuniary externalities, and not
to an informational asymmetry. For Gorton [2010], the loss of information is key.
For him, information asymmetry generates panic in the asset market. The fall in
asset value could be enough to cause insolvency.
5For completeness, we should mention that Da´vila and Korinek [2017] discuss another case of
pecuniary externalities leading to constrained inefficient allocations; this case, the so-called ‘dis-
tributive externality’, emerges when agents have different marginal rates of substitution (MRS) as
result of incomplete markets in which the optimal allocation is not possible given the limited span
of assets in the economy.
6‘Constrained’ here refers to the government not having access to better information than market
participants.
7See Appendix A for more discussion of pecuniary externalities and amplification mechanisms
within financial systems.
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Figure 1.1: Preview of a familiar story (Diamond-Dybvig): illiquidity leading to
insolvency (Notes: Gorton, 2009; Krugman 2018)
In symmetric fashion, insolvency shocks can induce illiquidity problems when
deterioration in quality on the asset side of the balance sheet involves price falls
lowering asset value below outstanding liabilities with mark-to-market accounting.
This can occur whether or not information is symmetric. Figure 1.2 illustrates three
factors that can lead to insolvency.
For Shin [2010], information is symmetric, but because investment banks
hold no liquid assets, bad news about asset quality can trigger fire sales leading to
insolvency. In practice (though not part of the model), this can easily lead to a ‘silent
bank run’ in which creditors cease to roll over their lending. Likewise, for Fostel
and Geanakoplos [2012] (as discussed in Chapter 4), responses to bad news about
asset quality can also lead to substantial falls in asset prices as a result of pecuniary
externalities. For Akerlof and Shiller [2015], however, the information asymmetry
about asset quality leads to insolvency, as explained above and illustrated in Figure
1.2.
This interaction between shocks to the asset and liabilities side of the balance
sheet can, of course, play an important role in accelerating financial crises.
5
Figure 1.2: Preview of some new perspectives: insolvency leading to illiquidity
(Notes: Shin, 2010; Akerlof and Shiller, 2015)
1.5 Defaults
Bankruptcy and default are usually at the heart of both illiquidity and solvency
crises, and, in turn, financial crises. However, as mentioned in Goodhart and Tso-
mocos [2011], incorporating the possibility of default into the model is complex
because it is hardly consistent with a number of elements of theoretical models that
are currently in use, including complete markets, no aggregate uncertainty, and rep-
resentative agents. This also highlights the limitations of modern economic theory.
Moreover, this amplifies one reason why it is not surprising that the financial crisis
was not commonly anticipated.
Early attempts to model default in a general equilibrium framework date
back to Shubik [1973] and Shubik and Wilson [1977]. These studies are extended by
Goodhart et al. [2006]; and Tsomocos [2003b,a] to incorporate incomplete markets,
money, and default; and to highlight the trade-off between financial stability and
economic efficiency. In fact, financial fragility in Goodhart et al. [2006] and Tso-
mocos [2003b,a] refers to a substantial number of defaults, though not full-fledged
bankruptcy. In this sense, default is the strategic option. On the one hand, default
provides an advantage by allowing borrowers to avoid repaying whole amount of
their contractual obligations. On the other hand, it also induces welfare costs to the
economy.
The default could be also modeled on collateralised loans where assets are
pledged as collateral. This situation could occur when the equilibrium prices are
6
such that the collateral value is less than the obligated amount the borrowers need to
repay. This type of default is further discussed in Chapter 4. Allen and Gale [2004]
also show that insolvency and default can occur in equilibrium with the presence of
an aggregate liquidity shock, as mentioned above. Indeed, high demand for liquidity
could trigger a bank run, leading to an asset ‘fire sale’. The fall in asset value could
be such that the default is unavoidable. This type of default is further discussed in
Chapter 2.
1.6 What’s next
In summary, the following analysis of financial crises takes the form of three es-
says with an underlying focus on both the role of pecuniary externalities, and the
possibility of default.
Chapter 2 studies pecuniary externalities in a ‘bank run’ model in which
banks supply credit in the form of marketable securities. An aggregate liquidity
shock, which triggers ‘fire sales’ of such securities, can lead to insolvency when their
value falls. As a result, in this type of model, a run on several banks can lead to
insolvency-driven pecuniary externalities.
Chapter 3 explores three explanations of the U.S, subprime crisis; insolvency
due to externalities, insolvency due to cheating, and illiquidity driven by panic. We
argue that these narratives should be treated not as substitutes, but as complements,
with each playing an important role at different stages of the crisis.
Chapter 4 studies the reversibility of shocks in a general equilibrium model
of competitive markets with heterogeneous beliefs. I find that, due to asymmetric
adjustment of risky asset prices, heterogeneous beliefs can amplify shocks, and can






A common feature of many financial crises is the occurrence of bank runs. A key
issue is what might trigger such events. As noted in the recent survey by Kashyap
et al. [2014b];
‘In the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, a run can occur because of a pure
failure to coordinate by the patient depositors; in the jargon that is now popu-
lar, a random event like a “sunspot” could lead to a panic where all the patient
depositors decide to run (Cass and Shell, 1983).’
This “sunspot” bank run is an idiosyncratic rather than a systemic phe-
nomenon because a run on a particular bank depends on what its depositors expect
each other to do. This is not to deny that many banks could experience runs at
the same time, either by coincidence (perhaps by all observing the same sunspot),
or by contagion spreading from one bank to the other via the interbank market, as
discussed in Cifuentes et al. [2005] and [Allen and Gale, 2009, Chapter 10].
The Diamond-Dybvig approach emphasises the illiquidity of bank loans whose
value is considerably reduced if recalled early to meet unexpected depositor demand
so much so, indeed, that the bank may become insolvent when depositors panic,
and the bank is forced to recall good but illiquid loans.
By contrast,Allen and Gale [2004] assume that bank investments are trade-
able assets with endogenous liquidation values determined by the sales and purchases
of all banks. So, they are explicitly considering systemic behaviour. This leads to
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the possibility of insolvency due to ‘fire sales’ when a group of banks simultaneously
sell tradeable securities in response to a depositor run. Indeed, their model can
be interpreted to illustrate the role of securitisation when banks package loans into
saleable securities, and seemingly eliminate the illiquidity of their balance sheets.
While loans do indeed become saleable, this may not avert the risk of illiquidity if
many banks are trying to sell at the same time – as in the U.S. subprime crisis. It is
interesting to observe that this type of bank run can involve pecuniary externalities
operating through price-dependent financial constraints as defined in Da´vila and
Korinek [2017].
A bank run could also occur in the presence of credit risk, as shown in
Kashyap et al. [2017]. This study extends Diamond and Dybvig [1983] to incor-
porate endogenous credit and run risk, which interact with each other when banks
determine their asset portfolio and capital structure. The possibility of a run arises
as a result of maturity mismatch where the illiquid long-term loans are risky, being
subject to the uncertain payoff of borrowers’ projects. Credit risk arises because
borrowers could potentially default, depending on the project payoff; and because
borrowers’ defaults might result in the bank’s inability to repay depositors it can
trigger runs on the banks. The study shows that more than one regulatory tool
is needed to obtain the socially optimal allocations, and to correct distortions on
the asset side and on the liability side of banks’ balance sheets. This finding is also
consistent with Kashyap et al. [2014a], in which more than one regulation is required
to correct distortions associated with the possibility of a run.
The analysis in this chapter is related to the existing literature on bank runs,
summarised above and in Chapter 1. The principal contribution will be to show how
pecuniary externalities can play a role in cases of correlated or systemic crisis. Mo-
tivated by Allen and Gale [2004], I extend the model to introduce heterogeneity of
banks in a framework in which markets and contracts are incomplete. Uncertainty
in the demand of liquidity is also present in this framework as there are ‘aggre-
gate liquidity shocks’. Banks operate by offering deposit contracts to depositors
in exchange for their endowments, which can be used for investment in short- or
long-term assets. The deposit contract offers consumers an insurance against liquid-
ity shocks. However, the incompleteness of the contracts could induce a bank run,
leading to financial fragility.
I make two key modifications to the model of Allen and Gale [2004]. First,
there are two types of banks: safe banks and risky banks, which are subject to
different restrictions and commitments. Safe banks, which could be interpreted
as ‘narrow’ banks, are so called because they choose portfolios such that they can
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credibly promise depositors that there will be ‘no runs’, while the risky banks cannot
make this promise. To this end, safe banks are restricted in their use of depositors’
endowments, which they can only invest in short-term assets. In contrast, risky
banks can only invest in long-term assets. Secondly, although safe and risky banks
have different initial restrictions on the use of depositors’ endowments, they can
participate in an asset market to obtain their privately optimal portfolios. While
Allen and Gale [2004] focus on studying asset price volatility in response to a small
shock, the main focus of this chapter is in illustrating the source of inefficiency
associated with bank runs.
The modifications can be shown to have three consequences. First, assuming
that consumers cannot put their endowments into more than one bank, the amount
of liquidity in the economy is determined by the fraction of consumers who choose
to deposit their endowments into the safe banks. Second, in equilibrium, the safe
banks will always be holding ‘excess liquidity’ as needed to meet demand by the
risky banks. Because safe banks require a premium in supplying such liquidity,
however, this implies a discounted value of long-term assets in the state when the
aggregate demand of liquidity is high. Hence, as in Allen and Gale [2004], the
fixed supply of liquidity leads to asset price volatility, even when the shock to the
aggregate demand of liquidity is small. Third, given that available contracts are
incomplete, the asset price volatility could induce illiquidity and bank runs if price
falls trigger a sufficient number of depositors to withdraw at the same time. In
this model, however, risky banks fail to internalise the effect of price change due to
collective actions on the liquidation value of long-term assets given default. This
implies that there will be pecuniary externalities operating through binding price-
dependent financial constraints as discussed in Chapter 1. The contribution of this
chapter is to illustrate the source of inefficiency associated with bank runs, and to
demonstrate how inefficiency works in this type of bank run model.
The important role of pecuniary externalities has received attention in bank-
ing regulatory community regarding the need for international standards to address
procyclicality that is, the feedback mechanisms between the financial and real sec-
tors of the economy that could amplify the business cycle and potentially lead to
credit crunch in recessions. In fact, in responses to the global financial crisis of
2008 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 2010 introduced the
countercyclical capital buffer under the Basel III proposal to ensure that banking-
sector capital requirements take into account the macro-financial environment in
which banks operate. However, sources of procyclicality could be attributed not
only to the inherit nature of the financial system, but also to the regulatory stan-
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dards themselves. Since before the crisis, this critique has been discussed in the
literature. For example, Catarineu-Rabell et al. [2005] use a general equilibrium to
study the implication of new risk-based capital requirement proposed by the BCBS.
The proposal is based on a bank’s decision on a loan-rating scheme in determining
the default probability of a borrower, and whether the bank will make the capi-
tal requirement procyclical, countercyclical, or neutral. The study indicates that
while the bank will not choose a more stable approach, a procyclical approach is
a possible choice. Thus, it is important to provide incentives for banks to employ
more stable rating schemes. Repullo and Suarez [2013] use a dynamic equilibrium
model to study the trade-offs of capital requirements. In fact, on the one hand,
their primary microprudential role is to provide a buffer to contain banks’ risk of
failure. On the other hand, capital requirements potentially induce a procyclical
supply of credit, especially in bad times when a credit crunch is possible due to
seemingly high failure probabilities. The study indicates interesting findings: while
Basel II’s reliance on a risk-based capital requirement is more procyclical than Basel
I, in which the requirement is flat, Basel II makes banks safer. In addition, Basel III
seems to address the trade-offs by aiming at higher capital requirements with less
cyclical variation via the implementation of capital conservation and countercyclical
buffers. Borio et al. [2001]; Pederzoli et al. [2010]; and Behn et al. [2016] provide
further discussion on procyclicality.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model
setting and provides the basic ideas of economies in which there is no aggregate
uncertainty for demand of liquidity. Section 2.3 describes the efficient allocation in
the presence of aggregate uncertainty. Section 2.4 illustrates market equilibrium in
the economy without banks, and discusses determination of asset prices. Section
2.5 demonstrates banking equilibrium in the economy in which two types of banks
are distinguished by restrictions with respect to their investments, and by types
of deposit contracts. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter by providing numerical
examples and discussion.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 Dates and assets
There are three dates, t = 0, 1, and 2. At each date, there is a single commodity
that can be used for consumption or for investment, and it serves as a numeraire.
There are two types of assets: 1) short-term or liquid assets, with storage technology
in which one unit of the commodity invested yields one unit in the next period; 2)
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long-term or illiquid assets with productive investment technology, in which one unit
of the commodity invested at date 0, produces R > 1 units at date 2. Therefore,
the investment in long-term assets can be done only at date 0, while the investment
in short-term assets can be done at either date 0 or date 1. The returns of both
assets are assumed to be certain. The usual trade-off applies between liquidity and
returns, with longer-term investments providing higher return, but requiring longer
to mature.
2.2.2 Consumers
There are two types of continuum agents: consumers and banks. Consumers are
located along a continuum where the measure of consumers is normalized to unity.
Each consumer is endowed with 1 unit of consumption of a good at date 0, and
nothing else later. Consumers only have access to short-term technology. They
are uncertain about their time preference of consumption—whether they want to
consume only at date 1 or only at date 2 with probability λS and (1−λS) respectively.
λS depends on the state of nature and can be λH and λL having a probability pi
and (1 − pi) respectively and 0 < λL < λH < 1. All uncertainty is resolved at
date 1. The true state is publicly observed, and each consumer learns his type —
that is, whether he is an early or a late consumer. An individual’s type is private
information. The consumers’ expected utility is given by:
pi(λHU(C1H) + (1− λH)U(C2H)) + (1− pi)(λLU(C1L) + (1− λL)U(C2L))
where U(.) is a neoclassical utility function (increasing, strictly concave, twice con-
tinuously differentiable).
2.2.3 Banks
Banks exist to provide investment and liquidity services to consumers. Banks have
access to both short and long technology as a result of their ability to pool the
consumers’ resources and to invest these resources into short-term and long-term
assets. Banks can offer a better combination of risks and asset returns to consumers.
In addition, banks also have access to the asset market, while consumers do not.
So, banks can buy or sell long-term assets at date 0 and date 1. Banks compete
by offering deposit contracts (e.g. demand deposits) to consumers in exchange for
their endowments, and consumers respond by choosing the most attractive contracts
offered to them. The deposit contract promises a fixed amount of goods, (d1, d2).
If a consumer withdraws at date 1, he will receive d1 units of consumption goods,
12
and he will receive d2 units of consumption units if he withdraws at date 2. Free
entry ensures that the banking market is perfectly competitive and earns zero profit
in equilibrium. Therefore, deposit contracts offered by banks in equilibrium must
maximise the utility of consumers. As banks can do anything that consumers can
do, there is no loss of generality in assuming that consumers deposit their entire
endowment in a bank at date 0.
There are two types of banks: safe banks and risky banks. At date 0, safe
banks can only use goods from depositors to invest in short-term assets, while risky
banks can only use goods from depositors to invest in long-term assets. However,
both types of banks have access to the market at date 0. So, they can have access
to both technologies. In offering deposit contracts to depositors, a safe bank is
considered safe because it can commit no run, while risky banks cannot commit no
run at date 0. Consumers cannot diversify by putting their money into more than
one bank.
2.2.4 Uncertainty
There are two sources of uncertainty in the model. First, each consumer faces
the idiosyncratic uncertainty about their time preference of consumption, by which
they could be early or late consumers. Second, banks face an aggregate uncertainty
about the fraction of early and late consumers; this fraction depends on the state of
nature S. By pooling the consumers’ resources, the ‘law of large numbers’ suggests
that the fraction of early consumers in state S among banks is identically equal to
the probability λS .
2.2.5 Markets
There exist asset markets for banks at date 0 and date 1. Therefore, banks can use
the asset market at date 0 to achieve better risk sharing. However, they cannot
hedge against uncertainty in an aggregate demand for liquidity because the market
is incomplete while the state-contingent securities are not available. Banks will use
the market at date 1 when all uncertainty is revealed to obtain liquidity or to discard
excess liquidity as required. As such, the market is incomplete at date 0, and it is
complete at date 1, when all uncertainty is realised.
2.2.6 Economies without aggregate uncertainty
This section aims to point out the basic role of banks in offering a better combination
of risks and returns to consumers where there is no aggregate uncertainty. Let us
13
assume for now that a consumer has access to both short-term and long-term assets,
rather than having access only to short-term assets As noted here and in other
literature, in the absence of aggregate uncertainty, the banking solution is efficient
because consumers can use the market at date 1 to diversify the idiosyncratic risk
away. However, the market solution in the absence of banks in the economy is
efficient only in the specific case U(C) = ln(C). This is because the market provision
of liquidity is inefficient. For equilibrium to exist, consumers must be willing to hold
both assets at date 0. However, they will do so only when P = 1, because otherwise,
one asset is dominated by the other. As a result, the market at date 0 fails to reveal
how much investors would be willing to pay contingent on knowing their types. The
details about solutions in different cases could be described as follows:
The efficient solution is described as U
′(C1)





1−λ . If we assume that U(C) = ln(C), the planner’s solution is (y, C1, C2) =
(λ, 1, R). The allocation is efficient when the marginal benefit of liquidity in smooth-
ing the consumption, and the marginal cost of lower expected consumption are bal-
anced. The optimal liquidity at date 0 in this special case is equal to the probability
of being an early consumer λ. The optimal consumption of early and late consumers
is 1andR, respectively. With the assumption of U(C) = ln(C) or σ = 1 under the
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function, an interesting result is
that the optimal level of investment is equal to the probability of being an early
consumer λ, while the return on long-term assets plays no role in determining the
optimal y. This is because the optimal consumption plan matches the return of
short-term and long-term assets; this return is (C1, C2) = (1, R). In particular, the
optimal allocation doesn’t require the return on long-term assets to be shared with
the early consumer. Also, the return from investment in short-term assets will be
used only for the early consumer’s consumption, while the return from investment
in long-term assets will be used only for the early consumer’s consumption. As a
result, the planner will choose y = λ to satisfy the fraction, λ, of consumers who
are going to be early consumers and receive a consumption level equal to 1, which
matches the return on short-term assets.
In the Autarky economy, in which consumers are unable to trade as-
sets and have to consume the returns generated by their portfolio, the solution




R−1 , (1− λ)R). The solution is inefficient because a consumer
has no mechanism to transfer wealth when the uncertainty is resolved at date 1.
As shown in Appendix B.1, in the autarky economy, C2 = (1 − λ)R < R, while
C1 =
λR
R−1 , which can be greater or less than 1.
In the market economy, we further assume that a consumer also has access
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to the asset market in which consumers can trade with each other once uncertainty
is revealed at date 1. In equilibrium, the price of the asset at date 1, P , is equal to
1. The market equilibrium allocation would give (C1, C2) = (1, R). Given that the
consumer’s utility function belongs to the CRRA, the market’s provision of liquidity
is efficient only in a special case, when σ = 1. The market is inefficient if σ > 1,
when a risk-averse consumer values consumption smoothing more than when σ = 1,
given the same expected consumption. Therefore, the efficient solution in this case
would be C1 > 1 and C2 < R; that is, the efficient solution requires the higher
return of a long-term asset to be shared between the early consumer and the late
consumer. Similarly, the market is inefficient if σ < 1, when the consumer becomes
less risk averse, and prefers to increase the expected consumption. Thus, the efficient
solution requires C1 < 1 and C2 > R.
This reminds us about the trade-off between liquidity and return. In par-
ticular, it shows the benefit of smoothing consumption, and the cost of foregone
returns, which result in lower expected consumption. In other words, intertemporal
insurance against liquidity shock, in which consumer might need liquidity at date 1
with probability λ, is costly. In the efficient solution, higher risk aversion implies a
higher marginal utility of liquidity, λU ′(C1), which should be equal to the marginal
cost of liquidity in forgoing returns, λRU ′(C2).
It must be noted that the perfectly insured allocation becomes efficient when
the preference is Leontief, and σ → ∞. I will show later that when there exists
an aggregate uncertainty, perfectly insured allocation is also possible even if the
preference is not Leontief.
In the absence of aggregate uncertainty, the banking solution is obviously
efficient, since by pooling the consumers’ endowments, banks allow consumers to
share higher returns of long-term assets, thereby providing a better combination of
risks and returns. In particular, the banking problem becomes similar to the planner
problem.
To sum up, a consumer is better off when he has access to the asset market
rather than when he is in autarky. Since a consumer in autarky must consume the
returns generated by his portfolio, his constraints are C1 = y and C2 = y + (1 −
y)R for y ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, the maximum consumption for an early consumer is
obtained when y = 1 and C1 = 1, and the maximum consumption for a late consumer
is obtained when y = 0 and C2 = R. The autarky allocation is dominated by the
market allocation since the market allocation will provide greater consumption on
one date, and at-least-as-good consumption on the other date. As a result, access
to the asset market improves the expected utility of the consumer. However, the
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market solution is only efficient in a specific case – when σ = 1.
Proof. See Appendix B.1. for completeness.
2.3 The first best equilibrium
The planner’s problem is to maximise the utility of the representative consumer
by making investment decisions on short-term and long-term assets at date 0, and
determining the consumption at date 1 and date 2. At date 0, a planner decides
the allocation of a representative consumer with endowment of 1 unit of goods into
y units of short-term assets and 1y units of long-term assets, where y ∈ (0, 1).
The planner also assigns the consumption bundle, C = {CL, C2L, C1H , C2H}, to
a representative consumer. At date 1, the available consumption amount for the
representative consumer is given by the amount y invested in the short-term asset.
Given that λ represents a fraction of early consumers, the feasible allocation of the
planner is λSC1S ≤ y, where S ∈ {H,L}. At date 2, the available consumption
amount for the representative consumer is given by the return from investment for
the long-term asset, (1−y)R, and the remaining goods from date 1 , y−λSC1S . The
remaining goods is restored using short-term technology to transfer consumption to
a late consumer at date 2. Therefore, the available consumption amount at date 2
is given by (1−λS)C2S ≤ (y−λSC1S)+(1−y)R. The equation holds with equality,
as a strictly concave assumption implies that all available goods from investment
will be used up in equilibrium. The social planner’s problem is described by:
max
y
pi(λHU(C1H) + (1−λH)U(C2H)) + (1−pi)(λLU(C1L) + (1−λL)U(C2L)) (2.1)
subject to:
λHC1H = y (1− λH)C2H = (1− y)R
λLC1L ≤ y (1− λL)C2L = (1− y)R+ (y − λLC1L)
First, let us assume that the constraints in both the states are binding. Given
the optimal holding of liquidity, y, the efficient allocation across time provides
C1H < C1L and C2H > C2L as λH > λL. Then, if C1L < C2L, the consumption
bundle becomes C1H < C1L < C2L < C2H . If C1L ≥ C2L, then the consumption
bundle becomes C1H < C1L = C2L < C2H as the consumer will be better off by
postponing consumption from date 1 to date 2 until C1L = C2L. In the latter case,
the feasible constraint is not binding in state L, and consumers receive fully insured
consumption bundles regardless of their types. Fully insured consumption is equal to
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the depositor’s expected consumption y+(1−y)R. Therefore, the efficient allocation
across time ensures binding constraints in state H, while the constraint in state L is
either binding or not binding, depending on the optimal C1L and C2L. Intuitively,
it is never optimal for the planner to carry forward liquidity from date 1 to date 2
in both states, as the planner can do better by allocating more goods into long-term
assets, and can enjoy higher return and higher expected consumption. Also, the
efficient solution, where C2S ≥ C1S , provides an incentive-compatible outcome in
the sense that there are no incentives for the late consumer for pretending to be
an early consumer. Therefore, we can relax the assumption that a planner needs








C1L = min{ y
λL
, y + (1− y)R} C2L = max{(1− y)R
1− λL , y + (1− y)R}
(2.2)
From the solution above, we see that the aggregate liquidity will be used up
at date 1 to supply only for early consumers as λSC1S = y, except when C1L > C2L,
in which case the planner can do better by shifting some consumption to the late
consumers until C1L = C2L. Then, it is easy to show that a consumer obtains
higher expected utility in state L than that in state H due to the lower consumption
volatility in state L given that the same expected consumption of y + (1 − y)R.1
In sum, all these features are provided by the liquidity shock in terms of aggregate
uncertainty on demand for liquidity.
Second, the efficient allocation across states also suggests the optimal hold-
ing of liquidity, y, where the marginal benefit of y in state H is equal to the marginal
cost in state L. In particular, the increase in y results in a higher expected utility
in state H (positive marginal utility), but it comes with the cost of a lower ex-
pected utility in state L (negative marginal utility). As mentioned in the case
of without aggregate uncertainty, the optimal allocation, σ = 1, is described as
(y, C1, C2) = (λ, 1, R). Given that this is a benchmark for the economy with ag-
gregate uncertainty, the aggregate liquidity in state H emphasises the benefit of
expected consumption as C1H < 1 and C2H > R. In state L, the aggregate liquidity
in the market emphasises the benefit of intertemporal smoothing as C1L > 1 and
C2L < R, where the return of long-term asset is required to be shared with the
1Depositor’ expected consumption E[CS ] = λSC1S + (1− λS)C2S = y + (1− y)R
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early consumers. The efficiency requires the balance between the benefit in state
H (i.e. cost in state L) and in state L (i.e. cost in state H). This is the standard
phenomenon in this type of model in the economy in which the supply of liquidity is
fixed by the initial portfolio choices of liquidity y, but there are subsequent shocks to
the demand for liquidity. I will show that in market equilibrium (in Section 2.4) and
in banking equilibrium (in Section 2.5) that this fixed supply can cause substantial
asset-price volatility. In sum, increasing liquidity in the market results in greater
consumption smoothing, but with the cost of lower expected consumption.
The solution to the planner’s problem consists of a portfolio choice of, y∗, and
a consumption bundle, C∗ = {C∗L, C∗2L, C∗1H , C∗2H}, such that y∗ solves the portfolio
choice problem Eq(2.1), which is given by Eq(2.3), and the consumption bundle
satisfies Eq(2.2).
piU ′(C1H) + (1− pi)U ′(C1L)
piU ′(C2H) + (1− pi)U ′(C2L) = R (2.3)






2(R−1) if R ≤ Rˆ









y∗ + (1− y∗)R if R ≤ Rˆy∗
λL
if R > Rˆ
C∗2L =
y∗ + (1− y∗)R if R ≤ Rˆ(1−y∗)R
(1−λL) if R > Rˆ
where
Rˆ ≡ (1− λL)(piλH + (1− pi)λL)
λL(1− (piλH + (1− pi)λL))
and λL represents the probability of being an early consumer in state L, and piλH +
(1− pi)λL represents the probability of being an early consumer. In addition, there
exists a critical long-term asset return, Rˆ, such that if R is lower than the critical
value, C1L = C2L.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
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2.3.1 Comparative statics
When U(C) = ln(C), the comparative statics in Figure 2.1 suggests that in the
case of a binding feasible constraint, when no storage technology is being used at
date 1 and C1L < C2L, the optimal holding of liquidity in the economy increases
with pi, λH , and λL, while R plays no role in determining the optimal liquidity.
This is because the binding constraints in both the states imply that the optimal
allocation doesn’t require returns of each asset to be shared between the two types
of consumers. In other words, the returns from short-term assets will be delivered to
the early consumers, while the returns from long-term assets will be delivered to the
late consumers; this is similar to the efficient allocation when there is no aggregate
uncertainty. In case of the non-binding solution, when C1L = C2L, the optimal
holding of liquidity in the economy increases with pi and λH , and decreases with
R, while λL plays no role in determining the optimal liquidity because, in state L,
consumers receive fully insured consumption bundle regardless of their types equal
to the expected consumption, y + (1− y)R.
Figure 2.1: Consumption functions at date 1 and 2 as a function of R
Given: pi = 0.6; λH = 0.7; λL = 0.4; U(C) = ln(C)
2.4 Market allocation
This section examines the market solution in the absence of banks in the econ-
omy. I make two initial assumptions:first, a consumer has access to both short- and
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long-term technology at date 0, and, as usual, a consumer has access to the short
technology at date 0. Thus, he decides upon initial portfolio choices of short-term
asset, y, and long-term asset, 1−y, at date 0. Second, there also exists a market for
consumers to trade long-term assets with each other at date1 once the uncertainty
is revealed. In particular, early consumers can get rid of their holdings of long-term
assets, while late consumers can get rid of their holdings of short-term assets using
the market. Let PS denote the price of long-term assets at date 1 in state S, where





C1H = y + PH(1− y) C2H =
(




C1L = y + PL(1− y) C2L =
(





Constraints are binding with equality because an early consumer wants to
consume as much as possible at date 1, and a late consumer wants to consume as
much as possible at date 2. Therefore, an early consumer will sell all his long-term
assets at date 1, and his consumption will be equal to the present value of their
portfolio at date 1, which is y + PS(1 − y). And, the late consumer will use all of
the consumption goods to buy long-term assets at date 1, given that its return is
not less than the return of short-term assets. The late consumer’s consumption at
date 2 is, thus equal to
(
(1− y) + yPS
)
R.
2.4.1 Asset prices and market clearing
The price of long-term assets is determined by their demand and supply in the
market. Demand for long-term assets comes from late consumers who want to
consume at date 2, while early consumers will never want to hold on to long-term
assets since they only value consumption at date 1. At date 1, both asset returns are
certainly known since all uncertainty is revealed. The return of short-term assets
for one unit of goods invested is equal to 1, while the return from long-term assets is
equal to RPS . With access to storage technology at date 1, late consumers are willing
to exchange their goods, received from investment in short-term assets at date 0
and date 1, for long-term assets if the returns on the long-term assets are greater
than or equal to the return from short-term assets. In particular, if RPS < 1, the late
consumer will prefer short-term assets and there will be no demand for long-term
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assets. If RPS = 1, late consumers will be indifferent about holding short-term assets
and long-term assets, and the demand for long-term assets becomes perfectly elastic.
Since the total available goods in the economy coming from late consumers at date
1 can be used to buy the long-term assets is (1−λ)y, the upper bound of aggregate





> 1, the late
consumers will only want to hold on to the long-term assets and will inelastically
supply all their goods, exhibiting ‘cash-in-the-market pricing’. Aggregate demand




0 if RPS < 1






if RPS > 1
Early consumers will inelastically supply long-term assets at date 1 as there
is no incentive in carrying forward any long-term assets to date 2 because they
only value consumption at date 1. As fraction λ of consumers are late consumers,
and each of them holds (1 − y) units of long-term assets, the aggregate supply of
long-term assets is described by:
S = λ(1− y)
Combining the aggregate demand and the aggregate supply of long-term
assets, we can see that there are two possible equilibrium prices, which are (1)
P = R, when S ≤ D(R), in which excess demand for long-term assets is possible,
and late consumers are indifferent between short-term and long-term assets, and
(2) P = (1−λS)yλS(1−y) , when S > D(R). The latter case demonstrates the cash-in-the-
market pricing as mentioned earlier. The market clearing gives the following price








It is worthwhile to note that in this case where assets in the market represent
two technologies with trade-off between returns and investment maturity, excess
demand or excess supply are possible when consumers are indifferent between both
types of assets at date 1. In this case, when RPS = 1, the excess demand for long-term
assets in the market is equal to (1−λS)yPS − λS(1 − y), which can also be interpreted
as excess supply of short-term assets, and is equal to (1− λS)y − λS(1− y)R.
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Figure 2.2: Demand and supply of
long asset at date1
Figure 2.3: Price of long asset in state
H and L as a function of y
The market-clearing condition requires PH < 1 and 1 < PL ≤ R. For a
market to be clear at date1, both short-term and long-term assets must be held
by consumers at date 0. Given that the market-clearing condition gives PS =
min{R, (1−λS)yλS(1−y)}, where λH > λL, we know that PL > PH . Therefore, PH < 1
because if PH ≥ 1, then PL > PH ≥ 1. Then, the long-term assets dominate the
short-term assets at date 0, and no one wants to hold short-term assets. This cannot
be an equilibrium. In addition, 1 < PL ≤ R because if PL ≤ 1, then PH < PL ≤ 1.
Then, the short-term assets dominate the long-term assets at date 0, and no one
wants to hold long-term assets. This again cannot be an equilibrium. See Figure
2.3 for the prices of long-term asset as a function of aggregate liquidity, y.
2.4.2 Equilibrium
First, given the optimal holding of liquidity, y, the market allocation provides effi-
cient outcome across time because agents can price in their willingness to buy/sell
long-term assets given their types. As previously shown in the efficient allocation,
the market allocation across time ensures binding constraints in state H when there
exists cash-in-the-market pricing, that is PH =
(1−λH)y
λH(1−y) , while the constraint in state
L is binding (or not) depending upon the optimal C1L and C2L. If C1L < C2L, then
the constraint is binding, and there is cash-in-the-market-pricing in state L, that
is PL =
(1−λL)y
λL(1−y) . However, if C1L ≥ C2L, the constraint is not binding, and the
price reaches the upper bound, that is PL = R. In the former case, the consumption
bundle becomes C1H < C1L < C2L < C2H , while in the latter case, the consumption
bundle becomes C1H < C1L = C2L < C2H , in which consumers, regardless of their
types, receive fully insured consumption bundles in state L equal to the expected
consumption y + (1− y)R.
Second, the market allocation in states H and L determines an aggregate
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amount of liquidity in the market, y. The market provision of liquidity is efficient
when σ = 1, when the market outcome equalises marginal benefits of liquidity in
state H and the marginal costs in state L. However, when σ 6= 1, market provision
of liquidity is inefficient because the incompleteness of the market prevents efficient
risk sharing across states. Accordingly, market fails to price in agents’ willingness
to buy/sell long-term assets contingent on their types. However, if the market is
complete, and the consumer can trade contingent securities at date 0, the prices of
contingent securities should reveal the willingness of market participants to buy and
sell the long-term assets, and should allow efficient outcome across states.
Overall, the market provides efficient allocation across time given the holding
of y, since early consumers can liquidate long-term assets, while late consumers can
acquire more long-term assets at date1. However, the market provision of liquidity
is inefficient, except when σ = 1, because there are no state-contingent securities to
provide efficient risk sharing across states.
The market allocation consists of a portfolio choice, y, and a consumption
bundle, C = {C1L, C2L, C1H , C2H} such that y solves the portfolio-choice problem
Eq(2.4), which is given by Eq(2.7), and the consumption bundle satisfies Eq(2.5).
(piU ′(C1H) + (1− pi)U ′(C1L))− (piU ′(C1H)(1−λH1−y ) + (1− pi)U ′(C1L)(1−λL1−y ))
(piU ′(C2H) + (1− pi)U ′(C2L))− (piU ′(C2H)(λHy ) + (1− pi)U ′(C2L)(λLy ))
= R
(2.7)
where the price function is given by Eq(2.6).
2.5 Banking equilibrium
Banks exist to improve consumers’ welfare by offering them the deposit contracts
that provide a better combination between risks and returns. Given that the com-
petitive banking market ensures zero profit of the bank in equilibrium, without loss
of generality, I can assume that late consumers will be resident claimants who re-
ceive the residue of the bank’s assets at date 2. As a result, the deposit contract
offered at date 0 is characterised by the promised payment at date 1, d, and the
remaining assets, including the returns of long-term assets, will be the consumption
of the late withdrawer.
2.5.1 Safe bank
At date 0, the safe bank that has a ‘no run’ commitment offers a deposit contract that
specifies the promised payment at date 1, in exchange for consumption goods. The
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consumption goods received from consumers in exchange for the deposit contract
will be first invested in short-term assets by the safe bank; the safe bank can have
access to the long-term assets by participating in the assets market to share risk
with the risky bank at the end of date 0. Let yS denote the amount of short-term
assets held by the safe bank at the end of date 0. For every unit of consumption
goods deposited in a safe bank, the amount of long-term assets held by a safe bank
is described by 1−y
S
P0
, where P0 denotes the price at date 0 of the long-term assets.
At date 1, as the safe bank has a ‘no run’ commitment, it will deliver promised
payments of dS to consumers regardless of the state of nature. At date 2, the
deposit contract provides the consumer who withdraws at date 2 the residue of the













yS − λHdS + PH(1−ySP0 )
(1− λH)(PHR )
2.5.2 Risky bank
In contrast to a safe bank, a risky bank does not have a ‘no run’ commitment to a
depositor. The deposit contract offered by the risky bank at date 0 is characterised
by the promised payment at date 1, dR, and the remaining assets, including the
returns of long-term assets will be the late withdrawer’s consumptions. However,
goods received from consumers in exchange for the deposit contract will be first
invested in long-term assets, and the risky bank can have access to the short-term
assets by participating in the asset market at the end of date 0. Let yR denote
the amount of short-term assets held by the risky bank at the end of date 0. The
amount of long-term assets held by the risky bank is described by 1− yRP0 .
Since at date 1, the risky bank cannot make a ‘no run’ commitment, we will
explore under what conditions the bank will be forced to default on its promise to
depositors. In the event of bankruptcy, the risky bank is required to liquidate all its
assets in an attempt to provide the promised payment, dR, to the consumers who
withdraw at date 1. Unlike Diamond-Dybvig, in which the liquidation value of long-
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term assets at date 1 is exogenous, the liquidation value is endogenously determined
in equilibrium due to the presence of a competitive market in this model.2 The
liquidation value of the risky bank’s assets is, thus, described by yR + PH(1− yRP0 ).
Once all uncertainty is revealed at date 1, consumers learn their types, and
state S is realised. While an early consumer will withdraw at date 1 for sure (since
he only values consumption at date 1), a late consumer has an option of withdrawing
either at date 1 and using the short-term assets to transfer his consumption to date
2, or withdrawing at date 2. The former case generates the possibility of a bank
run if the late consumer prefers to withdraw at date 1, rather than waiting until
date 2. The late consumer is willing to do so if waiting until date 2 give him less









< dR, where S ∈ {H,L}. The left-hand side of
the inequality represents the consumption if late consumers withdraw at date 2. In
what follows, the no-default constraint is described by:
λSd
R + (1− λS)PS
R




In case of ‘no run’, the deposit contract provides the consumer who withdraws











yR − λLdR + PL(1− yRP0 )
(1− λL)(PLR )
CR1H =









if (2.9) is satisfied
yR + PH(1− yRP0 ) otherwise
The model setting is summarised in Figure 2.4 below.
2The presence of aggregate uncertainty in this model represents another difference from
Diamond-Dybvig.
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Figure 2.4: Model settings in banking economy
2.5.3 Market clearing
Safe and risky banks use the market at date 1 to obtain liquidity, or to discard
excess liquidity. The price of the long-term assets in state S is again denoted by PS ,
where S ∈ {H,L}. Let us assume that fraction ρ and 1− ρ of consumers put their
endowments into safe and risky banks, respectively.
Since a bank run is possible in equilibrium, I split the market clearing into
two cases: first, in equilibrium without a bank run, the market clearing requires
PL = R and PH < 1 in order to have both assets held by banks in the economy.
In this equilibrium, the amount of liquidity in the market is just enough to provide
banks’ promises to early consumers in state H. Therefore, there is excess supply
of liquidity in state L, and PL is bid up to R when the returns of long-term and
short-term assets are the same, and when a bank is indifferent between short-term
and long-term asset. For a market to be cleared at date 0, PH needs to be strictly
lower than 1; otherwise the long-term assets will dominate the short-term assets
at date 0. Since only safe banks can have access to short technology at date 0,
the aggregate supply of liquidity in the market is equal to ρ, while the aggregate
demand for liquidity in state H is equal to λH(ρd
S + (1− ρ)dR). I will show in the
next section that in equilibrium without run, the safe bank and the risky bank make
identical choices (y and d) at date 0, and they hold just enough liquidity to keep
their promise in state H. Although the asset market is not essential in this case, we
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will still need it in order for equilibrium at date0 to exist. The aggregate demand
for liquidity in state L is equal to λL(ρd
S + (1− ρ)dR), strictly less than aggregate
liquidity in the economy. Therefore, the inelasticity of demand and of the supply of
liquidity mean that small aggregate liquidity shocks can cause large fluctuations in
asset prices. I will show later that bank runs provide less volatile asset prices. The
market clearing conditions are described as follows:
Market clearing in state L PL = R
Market clearing in state H ρ(yS − λHdS) = (1− ρ)(λHdR − yR)
Market clearing at date0 ρ(1− yS) = (1− ρ)yR
(2.11)
Second, in equilibrium with bank run, the market clearing requires that
1 < PL ≤ R and PH < 1. In this case, the amount of liquidity in the market is just
enough to provide the banks’ promises to early consumers in state L, while there
is a bank run in state H. For the market to be cleared at date 0, any asset cannot
dominate the other. As λH > λL, we know that PL > PH . Therefore, PH < 1
because if PH ≥ 1, then PL > PH ≥ 1. Then long-term assets dominate short assets
at date 0, and no one wants to hold short-term assets. Also, 1 < PL ≤ R because if
PL ≤ 1, then PH < PL ≤ 1. Then, short-term assets dominate long-term assets at
date 0, and no one wants to hold long-term assets.
In state L, the supply of liquidity comes from the safe bank which supplies
the excess liquidity (yS − λLdS) to the risky banks, which lacks in liquidity and
demand (λLd
R − yR)to satisfy their early customers. In this case, the supply and
demand of liquidity are, thus, inelastic. In state H, the supply of liquidity also comes
from the safe banks who use the excess liquidity, (yS −λHdS), to buy the long-term
assets liquidated by risky banks at ‘fire sale’ prices. The total demand of liquidity,
given that risky banks need to liquidate all long-term assets, is, thus, elastic and
equal to PH(1 − yRP0 ). At date 0, the supply of liquidity coming from a safe bank,
which only holds liquidity in the economy, is equal to (1− yS), and the demand for
liquidity coming from the risky bank, which only holds the long-term assets in the
economy, is equal to yR. The market-clearing conditions are described as follows:
Market clearing in state L ρ(yS − λLdS) = (1− ρ)(λLdR − yR)




Market clearing at date0 ρ(1− yS) = (1− ρ)yR
(2.12)
Consumers must be indifferent between safe banks and risky banks in order
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1H) + (1− λH)U(CS2H)) + (1− pi)(λLU(CS1L) + (1− λL)U(CS2L))
= pi(λHU(C
R
1H) + (1− λH)U(CR2H)) + (1− pi)(λLU(CR1L) + (1− λL)U(CR2L))
(2.13)
2.5.4 Equilibrium without run
The private decision of a safe bank is described by the optimal amount of short-term
assets holding, yS , as in Eq(2.14) and deposit contracts, characterised by dS , as in
Eq(2.15).
yS =
(PH(PL − (1− pi)P0)− piPLP0)((PL − P0)λH + (P0 − PH)λL)
(PL − P0)(P0 − PH)(P0(λH − λL)− PLλH + pHλL)
+
(PH − PL)P0λHλL(PHpi − P0 + PL(1− pi))
(PL − P0)(P0 − PH)(P0(λH − λL)− PLλH + pHλL)
(2.14)
dS =
(PH − PL)(pi(λH − λL) + λL)
P0(λH − λL)− PLλH + PHλL (2.15)
The private decision of a risky bank is described by the optimal amount of
short-term assets holding, yR, as in Eq(2.16) and deposit contracts, characterised
by dR, as in Eq(2.17).
yR =
(piPHPL + (PH(1− pi)− pi)PLP0 − PHP 20 (1− pi))((PL − P0)λH − (P0 − PH)λL)
(PL − P0)(P0(λH − λL)− PLλH + pHλL)
+
(PH − PL)P0λHλL(PHpi − P0 + PL(1− pi))
(PL − P0)(P0(λH − λL)− PLλH + pHλL)
(2.16)
dR =
(PHPL − (1− PH)PLP0 + PHP 20 (1− pi))(pi(λH − λL) + λL)
P0(P0(λH − λL)− PLλH + PHλL) (2.17)
To describe the system of equations that characterise equilibrium, the equi-
librium without bank run is determined by the market-clearing condition, as in
eq(2.11), and the consumer-indifference condition, as in eq(2.13). With four un-
knowns and four equations, we can solve for (PH , PL, P0, ρ). We can then determine
(yS , dS , Y R, dR) accordingly.
In this equilibrium, safe banks and risky banks make identical choices (y and d).
Safe and risky banks hold just enough liquidity to satisfy their depositors in state
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H; that is, y = λHd. Therefore, the asset market at date 1 is not essential. However,
the role of price here is to ensure the optimal holding of y and d. The opportunity
costs of the commitment to “no run occur in state L, when both banks need to hold
excess liquidity and carry forward using storage technology from date 1 to date 2.
So, they need to forgo higher returns from holding more long-term assets in state L,
resulting in low expected consumption. This is the source of inefficiency in ensuring
‘no run’ in equilibrium. The market at date 0 is for risk sharing given restrictions
to access the technologies.
The comparative statics, shown in Appendix B.3, suggest that the aggregate
liquidity in the economy, as represented by ρ, increases with pi, λH , and λL, and
decreases with R. This is similar to the motives that underpin a bank’s optimal hold-
ing of liquidity (y) in equilibrium since both types of banks make identical choices.
These results are obvious, as the increase in the fraction of early consumers, repre-
sented by λ, encourages a bank to hold more liquidity to satisfy early consumers.
Also, an increase in the probability of state H means a higher chance of liquidity
shock, encouraging a bank to hold more liquidity. However, an increase in the re-
turn of long-term assets discourages a bank from maintaining liquidity, since the
long-term assets become more attractive.
The optimal deposit contract (d) increases with pi and λL, and decreases with
R and λH . As a higher probability of state H causes a bank to hold more liquidity,
this also results in offering an early consumer a higher deposit contract because the
liquidity will be used up in state H. In addition, the larger the liquidity shock (e.g.
increase in λH and decrease in λL), the lower the deposit contract offered to an early
consumer. An increase in the long-term assets’ return results in a deposit contract
that holds less appeal to an early consumer because long-term assets become more
attractive.
For the consumption bundle offered to a consumer, an increase in R makes
the long-term assets more attractive, and a bank will hold less liquidity and offer
less promise of a payoff to an early consumer. This will result in lower consumption
among early consumers, and greater consumption for late consumers. An increase in
the probability of state H, which means a higher chance of liquidity shock, encour-
ages a bank to hold more liquidity, and to offer deposit contracts with more promise
of a payoff to early consumers, resulting in greater consumption among early con-
sumers and less consumption among late consumers. The larger the liquidity shock,
the lower the consumption of both an early consumer, and a late consumer in state
L, and the higher the consumption of a late consumer in state H.
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2.5.5 Equilibrium with run
The private decision of a safe bank is similar to the case when there is no run, and
is described by the optimal amount of short-term assets holding, yS , as in Eq(2.14),
and deposit contract, characterised by dS , as in Eq(2.15).
The private decision of a risky bank when the incentive-compatibility con-
straint Eq(2.9) is violated, could be described by the optimal amount of short-term




PL − P0 −
(1− pi)PHP0
P0 − PH (2.18)
dR =
(1− pi)((1 + PH)PLP0 − PHPL − PHP 20 )
P0(P0 − PH) (2.19)
To describe the system of equations that characterise equilibrium, the equilib-
rium with bank run is determined by the market-clearing condition, as in Eq(2.12),
and the consumer-indifference condition, as in Eq(2.13). With four unknowns and
four equations, we can solve for (PH , PL, P0, ρ). We can then determine (y
S , dS , yR, dR)
accordingly.
In this equilibrium, a risky bank offers deposit contracts with greater amount
of promise a payoff to early consumers as compared to when there is no bank run,
dR > dS . Aggregate liquidity in the economy is just enough to satisfy early cus-
tomers in state L, while it is less than the aggregate demand in state H, resulting in
the run on risky banks. In this equilibrium, safe banks need to hold excess liquidity
even in state H in order to buy liquidated long-term assets at ‘fire sale’ prices, when
the long-term assets’ return in state is greater than R since PH < 1. This is to
compensate for the opportunity in state L, where a safe bank needs to hold excess
liquidity to rescue the risky banks when 1 < PL < R. Thus, there is no holding
of short assets from date 1 to date 2. The source of inefficiencies, in this case,
comes from the default cost associated with a risky bank which needs to liquidate
all its long-term assets early. However, there is an efficiency gain by increasing the
contingency of the contract.
The comparative statics shown in Appendix B.4 suggest that the aggregate
liquidity in the economy, as represented by ρ, increases with pi, λH , λL, and R.
In contrast to the equilibrium without run, aggregate liquidity in this economy
increases with R. Although the increase in long-term assets’ return provides more
incentive to hold less liquidity, an equilibrium requires greater holding of liquidity
for better outcomes, as shown in Appendix B.4. The reason behind this is that the
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increase in long-term assets’ return results in a higher opportunity cost of a safe
bank holding excess liquidity in state L. As a result, the safe bank needs to hold
even more liquidity to compensate for such opportunity cost by buying long-term
assets at ‘fire sale’ prices in state H. Therefore, a safe bank holds more liquidity, yS ,
at the end of date 0, while the risky bank holds less liquidity, yR. In terms of the
promise of optimal deposit contract, R doesn’t affect the decision of a safe bank,
but encourages the risky bank to offer higher consumption for early consumers, who
want to withdraw earlier.
The equilibrium prices, PH and P0, increase with R, pi, and λL, while they
decrease with λH . PL however increases with R, pi, and λH , while it decreases with
λL.
2.6 Numerical results and discussions
While in Diamond and Dybvig [1983], a bank run emerges as the result of a co-
ordination failure among depositors resulting in inefficient equilibrium, this study,
however, shows that a bank run occurs as a result of endogenous liquidation price,
as shown earlier in Allen and Gale [2004]. In particular, late depositors will ratio-
nally run on risky banks, when the long-term asset price is so low that the incentive
compatibility constraints are violated, and risky banks cannot meet their obligation
to pay the promise according to a deposit contract. In this sense, price-taking bank
defaults because of exogenous aggregate shocks on demand for liquidity, not because
of coordination failure which is unanticipated at date 0. When risky banks default,
they need to liquidate their holdings of long-term assets, which results in low asset
prices. This, in turn, causes a group of banks to default.
2.6.1 When is equilibrium with run better?
The numerical examples in Table 2.1 suggest that bank run equilibrium could pro-
vide better outcome than equilibrium without run. Given the contract is incomplete,
default can improve welfare by increasing contract contingency as shown in Zame
[1993]. In particular, the costs of insuring no run in holding excess aggregate liq-
uidity dominate the cost of consumption smoothing in holding more risky assets.
Depending on the parameter, the equilibrium without run can also provide a better
outcome as indicated in Table 2.2.
Intuitively, the comparative statics shown in Figure 2.5 indicate that equi-
librium with bank run is likely to provide greater outcome when the probability of
large shock, pi, are low, and when the payoff of long-term assets, R, is high. In
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Planner Banking Equilibrium














Table 2.1: Better outcomes in equilibrium with bank run
Given: pi = 0.35; λH = 0.9; λL = 0.85; R = 2; U(C) = ln(C)
Planner Banking Equilibrium














Table 2.2: Better outcomes in equilibrium without run
Given: pi = 0.35; λH = 0.8; λL = 0.75; R = 2; U(C) = ln(C)
addition, better outcomes are more likely when the probability of being an early
consumer in state L, λL, are low, while the probability of being early consumer in
state H, λH , are high. This indicates that with larger shocks, bank run equilibrium
becomes more preferable.
2.6.2 Identifying the source of inefficiencies
Pecuniary externalities play a role in the inefficiencies in this model. However, as
mentioned in Chapter 1, according to Da´vila and Korinek [2017], there are two types
of externalities: ‘distributive externalities’ as a result of an inequalised marginal rate
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Figure 2.5: Welfare comparisons, equilibrium with bank run over with no run
Given: R = 2;pi = 0.35; λH = 0.85; λL = 0.8; U(C) = ln(C)
of substitution (MRS), and ‘price-dependent constraint externalities’ as a result of
the binding price-dependent constraint. In this model, the first inefficiency works
through ‘distributive externalities’ as a result of incompleteness of the market. When
there is no market for banks to achieve efficient risk sharing in the absence of state-
contingent securities, the market at date 0 fails to reveal how much investors would
be willing to buy/sell assets contingent on knowing their types. As a result, the
market provision of liquidity in the initial portfolio choices of banks is inefficient.
In fact, the numerical results, as shown in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, indicate towards
‘excessive provision of liquidity’ in market equilibrium.
More importantly, this paper shows that in equilibrium with bank run, when
the asset price is so low that the incentive-compatible constraints are violated, there
arises the second inefficiency: ‘price-dependent constraint externalities’, working
through binding incentive-compatible constraints, emerge when risky banks fail to
internalise the effect of price change due to collective actions on the liquidation of
long-term assets given the default. As a result, the price of long-term assets at date
0 is greater than 1. Although safe and risky banks are restricted to different tech-
nologies, in the absence of price-dependent constraint externalities, having access to
the technologies at date 0 should result in the price of long-term assets at date 0
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being equal to 1, as we can see in equilibrium without run. As a robustness check,
we can vary the values of the parameters and illustrate that the price of long-term
assets at date 0 is greater than 1; this is shown in Appendix B.4 Figure B.5.3
In addition, excessive holdings of liquidity due to distributive externalities
usually result in more fluctuation of asset prices because the greater cost of having
excess liquidity in state L necessitates higher compensation for safe banks, which
buy long-term assets at ‘fire sale’ prices in state H. In other words, the first type of
externalities leads to lower prices in state H, which could introduce the second type
of externalities, when the incentive-compatibility constraints are violated. However,
the price of assets in state H in equilibrium with run is greater than in equilibrium
without run because the increasing contingency of the contract by run helps to
improve welfare by lessening the extent of over provision of liquidity.
3Other comparative statics of banking equilibrium are provided in Appendix B.3 and B.4.
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Chapter 3
Subprime Assets and Financial
Crisis: Theory, Policy and the
Law1
Joint With: Marcus Miller and Lei Zhang2
3.1 Introduction
That the period of macroeconomic stability known as the Great Moderation should
have ended in a financial cataclysm was a nasty shock – especially for those who
believed in the inherent efficiency of financial markets! But how to account for the
fact that the spark for the crisis came not from emerging markets but from within
the United States itself, where monetary affairs had, for many years, been in the
hands of Mr Greenspan, doyen of central bankers?
Earlier financial shocks and external factors doubtless played a role, with US
interest rates being cut after the high-tech bubble collapsed in 2000; and then kept
low as funds flowed in from the ‘savings glut’ in East Asia. But here we focus on
factors specific to US housing finance to see how subprime mortgage lending, spon-
sored by misguided policy and aided by febrile financial innovation, could undermine
the integrity of the US financial system.
The objective in revisiting these issues is not to allocate blame; rather to see
1Acknowledgements: for valuable comments we are grateful to George Akerlof, Robert Akerlof,
Sacha Becker, Huberto Ennis, Peter Hammond, Stephania Paredes-Fuentes, Herakles Polemar-
chakis, Alistair Milne, Peter Spencer and Yifan Zhang. An earlier version of this paper is available
as CEPR DP No 11533.
2Marcus Miller: Department of Economics, University of Warwick; Lei Zhang: The School of
Economics, Sichuan University
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how a repeat may be avoided. If the problem was essentially financial panic, for ex-
ample, as Gorton [2010] and others maintain, the remedy would be ample provision
of liquidity. But if, as Mian and Sufi [2015] contend, policy-makers were using the
provision of cheap credit as an elixir to cure growing income inequality and shadow
banks ‘joined the party’ with sophisticated products that would only work when
house prices were rising, then the analysis and policy response needs to go much
deeper. To set the scene, we begin with some institutional and policy background.
Housing finance: getting onto the housing ladder
The development of US banking in the late twentieth century, according to
Calomiris and Haber [2014], involved a ‘bargain’ between banks and society: banks
were permitted to merge and grow so long as they promoted home ownership for
low-income mortgage applicants.
“Once branching limits were removed, bankers had ambitious plans for merg-
ers. Their plans were, however, subject to a political constraint: they needed
to be judged good citizens of the communities they served in order to gain ap-
proval from the Federal Reserve Board. Good citizenship came to be defined
as being in compliance with the 1997 Community Reinvestment Act ...For ac-
tivist groups seeking to direct credit to their memberships and constituencies,
the good-citizenship merger criterion was a powerful lever in negotiations with
merging banks. The bankers and the activists forged a coalition that consol-
idated the American banking industry into a set of megabanks that were too
big to fail.” [Calomiris and Haber, 2014, p. 208].
Such a deal had the apparent advantage of helping to offset the stagnation
of median incomes and growing inequality as earnings at the top of the income dis-
tribution raced ahead. Instead of taxes and subsidies to redistribute income, the
idea was that those on lower incomes would borrow to get on the housing ladder
so – with time and house price appreciation – they could extract equity to increase
consumption.
As the authors go on to point out, however:
“Other partners had to be drawn into the coalition in order to make it sta-
ble. Banks would not make unlimited commitments to their activist partners:
Community Reinvestment Act loans implied higher levels of risk for the bank
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than traditional mortgage loans. Thus, under pressure from activist groups,
Congress began to place regulatory mandates on government-sponsored en-
terprises (GSEs) that purchased and securitised mortgages... Fanny Mae and
Freddie Mac, in particular, were required to repurchase mortgage loans made
to targeted groups (i.e. individuals who had low incomes or lived in urban
locations that were defined as underserved). In order to meet these targets,
Fannie and Freddie had to weaken their underwriting standards.” [Calomiris
and Haber, 2014, p. 209].
Under the Clinton and Bush administrations, the mandate on GSEs for low
income housing steadily increased, from 42% of assets in 1995 to 56% in 2004. In-
deed, it has been estimated that:
“by 2008, the mortgage giants, the FHA and various other government pro-
grams were exposed to about $2.7trillion in subprime and Alt-A loans, ap-
proximately 59% of total loans in these categories. ... As money from the
government-sponsored agencies flooded into financing or supporting low in-
come housing, the private sector joined the party. ... Unfortunately, the pri-
vate sector, aided and abetted by agency money, converted the good intentions
behind the affordable housing mandate and the push towards an ownership
society into a financial disaster.”
[Rajan, 2011, p. 38-39]
Despite substantial political pressure to extend home ownership by poorer
households, the subprime share of mortgage market remained around 10% until 2003.
With the development of private label securitisation (PLS), however, the subprime
experiment in ‘dynamic credit enhancement’ for low-income borrowers accelerated
sharply. As can be seen from Figure 3.1, the share of subprime mortgages rapidly
doubled to over 20% of all mortgage originations in 2006. But when the house price
bubble burst, the share of subprime mortgages fell precipitously, with virtually none
being securitised in 2008.
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Figure 3.1: U.S. Subprime mortgage originations.
Source: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report, p. 70, Figure 5.2.
Could policy makers and regulators not have stopped this vast expansion of
subprime lending - by changing the mandates, for example; or by imposing higher
prudential capital requirements on such loans? In the view of [Calomiris and Haber,
2014, p. 281]:
“they could ... but they chose not to do so. Instead, regulators stood by
and watched: in essence they subcontracted regulation of banking to private
firms that sold ratings and whose incentives were therefore aligned with those
issuers and purchasers, who wanted to have inflated ratings.”
If this is an accurate assessment of the policy and regulatory framework,
then the onset of financial crisis seems as inevitable as the fate of Santiago Nasar in
Marquez’s Chronicle of a death foretold.
Brief overview of some relevant literature
In a prescient paper delivered at the Jackson Hole Conference on The Greenspan
Era in 2005, Raghuram Rajan raised the issue of whether financial innovation was
making the world a riskier place. The focus of his concern was on leverage and
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asymmetric information in financial intermediation, and how distorted incentives
could lead to excessive risk-taking. Though Rajan’s concern was met with general
scepticism from other delegates, it was supported by Hyun Shin, on the ground that,
even with common knowledge, high leverage could lead to instability on account of
‘pecuniary externalities’. He used the internal dynamics of the Millenium Bridge to
illustrate how shocks can be greatly amplified in financial markets - ‘the supreme
example of an environment where individuals react to what’s happening around
them, and where individuals’ actions affect the outcomes themselves’. In another
influential paper delivered at Jackson Hole soon after the crisis broke,Gorton [2010]
argued that the lack of transparency in financial innovation could trigger financial
panic in the form of a bank run.
Fostel and Geanakoplos [2012] also stressed the role of financial development;
but, in marked contrast to the bank-focussed perspectives just discussed, theirs is
a general equilibrium approach. They stress the role of heterogeneous beliefs as
the driver for leverage as optimists borrow from pessimists; and how the sequential
introduction of financial innovations is, in and of itself, enough to cause boom and
bust.3 Another fast-growing branch of the literature, lying between detailed partial
equilibrium models of banking and ‘institution free’ general equilibrium, focuses on
adding ‘financial frictions’ to DSGE models cast in the Gali/Woodford tradition
of modern macroeconomics. We make no attempt to analyse these contributions
here. For a good illustration of the DSGE approach, with a helpful summary of
other papers in this burgeoning field, the reader may be referred to Coimbra and
Rey [2017]; and a concise version of the general equilibrium approach is provided in
Miller et al. [2016].
Goodhart et al. [2010] model a housing and mortgage crisis by incorporating
heterogenous financial intermediations and households. By allowing endogenous
credit and default, which are key features of many crises, the simulation results in
this study show a number of realistic outcomes, including: that the crisis becomes
more severe if banks are risk-loving, that government support helps stabilise the
economy, and that prices and trade quantities are reduced when money is tight.
The paper also highlights the role of the interbank market in spreading individual
default.
However, the majority of papers on the financial crisis take a partial equi-
librium perspective – with a focus on the institutional aspects of ‘shadow banking’
3The innovation that can trigger collapse is the availability of ‘naked’ Credit Default Swaps
(CDS) contracts which allow for insurance against failure, so non-asset holders can ‘short’ invest-
ment in risk assets. So-called ‘naked’ CDS contracts do not require ownership of the assets being
‘insured’.
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in particular. As is typical for banking models, there is a split between those, like
Gary Gorton, who emphasises the role of shocks to liquidity in a setting where
fundamentals are essentially well-founded, and those who focus on structural flaws
in incentives and/or regulatory structure capable of precipitating widespread insol-
vency due to excess risk-taking.
Prudential regulation to check excess risk-taking by highly-leveraged institu-
tions (HLIs) had been widely discussed well before the subprime crisis, as Goodhart
[2011] testifies. A key issue in debate was whether the value at risk (VaR) rules
adopted in Basel II to check risk-taking by individual banks would be sufficient to
guarantee systemic stability; or whether it could be flawed for ignoring externalities.
Danielsson et al. [2001], argued that balance sheet rules, designed to ensure pruden-
tial behaviour at the level of the individual bank, could lead to systemic instability
when common, ‘macroeconomic’ shocks are amplified by ‘pecuniary externalities’ in
the form of asset price changes which affect bank equity in pro-cyclical fashion.
A masterly survey of the literature on the problems posed by such external-
ities is provided by Brunnermeier et al. [2012]. They leave on one side, however,
the issue of distorted incentives due to asymmetric information analysed earlier by
Holmstrom and Tirole [1997] and Hellmann et al. [2000]. How financial innovation
could exacerbate these issues, as high-lighted by Rajan [2006], was emphasised by
Foster and Young [2010] – who showed how financial derivatives could be used by
fund-managers of average ability to mimic the performance of star traders, taking
on tail risks to do so.4 In the context described above, where monitoring of asset
quality had been delegated to unregulated, private-enterprise Credit Rating agencies
(CRAs), Akerlof and Shiller [2015] argued that investment banks had an alternative
strategy for making their investments appear superior: getting them rated as AAA
by compliant agencies. As with mimicry, however, getting high returns involved
taking on significant risk.
Structure of the paper
These topics – externalities, distorted incentives and creditor panic – are
analysed in some detail in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, considering in particular whether
each one could itself be sufficient to cause banking crisis.
The first threat of insolvency examined in Section 3.2 involves the role of
externalities. We focus in particular on the Investment Banking model of Shin [2010]
which emphasises how ‘pecuniary externalities’ can amplify unexpected shocks to the
4This strategy offers the prospect of high returns for some time followed by substantial losses as
tail risks finally materialise.
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quality of investments they hold.5 To check on the robustness of US-style shadow
banking in the face of shocks, we ask: could these externalities prove sufficiently
strong that the simple reversal of ‘good news’ might lead to widespread insolvency
and banking collapse?
The second threat of insolvency examined involves the distorted incentives
for risk-taking in HLIs, particularly after the switch from partnerships to limited
liability in US Investment Banking, as discussed in Akerlof and Shiller [2015]. The
focus here being on the role of asymmetric information in the marketing of and
investment in highly risky assets, we apply the adverse selection approach of Akerlof
[1970] to the marketing of subprime assets. Relaxing the ‘rational expectations’
constraint imposed in that paper allows for risks to be concealed by inflated ratings
issued by CRAs who are ‘mining their reputation’ to secure the fees on offer for
rating subprime loans; and to lead to financial collapse when it is discovered that
these loans were worth a lot less than previously thought.
We note that these two threats are in fact complementary: just as successful
exploitation of asymmetric information to take on excess risk underpinned the credit
boom, so revelation of the risks sub-prime lending really involved was the downside
shock that brought on the crisis.
In Section 3.3, the ‘confidence crisis’ view is discussed and we ask: was the
rise in the cost of insuring subprime assets a matter of mindless panic as suggested
by Gorton? Or was it not due to a realisation of faulty fundamentals?
But what if these various perspectives are high-lighting different aspects of
a complex reality? This may recall the ancient Hindu parable of the blind men and
the elephant, where the former – each guided only by touching a different part of
the animal, be it a tusk, the tail, an ear, or a leg – give a series of correct but partial
characterisations of the noble beast. The conclusion in the Rigveda, cited above,
namely that Reality is one, though wise men speak of it variously, tempts one to
ask: should these seemingly conflicting accounts not be combined? For an answer
we turn not to theory, nor to econometric tests of theory, but to the evidence of
law courts and the actions of policy-makers in the Fed and Treasury. What did the
extraordinary policy actions taken by these agencies reveal about the nature of the
crisis? Did those charged to dispense justice find evidence of misbehaviour sufficient
to prosecute the players involved?
To balance these three perspectives – and to see whether in practice they
proved complementary – Section 3.4 summarises key official policy actions taken
5Such externalities are sometimes discussed under the heading of contagion. See for example
Allen and Carletti [2012].
41
in response to the crisis; and subsequent findings in the law courts against both
CRAs and Investment Banks.6 In some versions of the parable a sighted observer
appears to reconcile the various conflicting perspectives. In this sprit, the view-
with-hindsight of the current chair of the Federal Reserve, as expressed at Jackson
Hole 2017, is also cited.
After a brief account of possible steps to increase risk-sharing in housing
finance, section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The risk of insolvency - two views
3.2.1 Insolvency with Value-at-Risk: common shocks and ‘pecu-
niary externalities’
In this section, the Investment Banking model of Shin [2010] and Adrian and Shin
[2010] is used to examine the contention7 that VaR based regulation is no guarantee
of systemic stability. We find by simulation that the representative Investment Bank
could become insolvent when a significant upgrade in risky asset quality is followed
by a subsequent reversal.
In what, for convenience, will be referred to simply as the Shin model, there
are two groups of investors; (1) risk averse agents with mean-variance preferences,
who do not use leverage to finance investments such as pension funds and mutual
funds; and (2) risk neutral investors, who can finance investments with leverage
subject to a Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint. For present purposes, we will treat the
latter as homogenous and highly-leveraged investment banks. But, in reality, such
active leveraged investors include hedge funds and foreign banks, as well as U.S.
investment banks.
There are two assets: (1) a riskless bond with its rate of return normalised to
0; and (2) a risky asset with random payoff Q, uniformly distributed over [q−z, q+z]





Both types of investors are endowed with initial equity equal to e. Investors’
portfolio payoff (end of period wealth) is W = Qy + (e − py), where y represents
6Why the legal settlements have taken the form of ‘deferred prosecution agreements’ with the
companies involved, rather than the criminal prosecution of high-level individuals, is also discussed.
7Made by Shin and others in “An academic response to Basel II”, Danielsson et al. [2001].
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quantity of the risky asset holdings and p is the price of the risky asset.
Passive investors
As they do not borrow to finance their investments, risk averse investors are
categorised as passive. Their ‘mean-variance’ preferences are described by:
U(W ) = E(W )− 1
2τ
σ2W
where τ represents risk tolerance and, since their portfolios comprise of only
riskless bonds and risky asset, portfolio variance is σ2W =
y2z2




qy + (e− py)− y
2z2
6τ
The demand function of passive investors becomes:
yp =
 3τZ2 (q − p) if q > p0 if otherwise (3.1)
Note that because of the assumption on mean-variance preferences, the de-
mand for risky asset by the passive investors is independent of their wealth.8
Active investors: Investment Banks
Risk neutral investors are active as they use leverage to finance their invest-





s.t. V aR = (p− (q − z)) ≤ e
where E(W ) = (q − p)y + e and the VaR constraint implies the borrowing is no
greater than the worst realised payoff on the risky asset, py − e ≤ (q − z)y.
[In a more general case where the distribution of Q has unbounded support,
the VaR constraint becomes probabilistic: i.e., Prob(V aR = (p − Q)y ≥ e) ≤ α,
where α is the probability of losing the entire equity. Under this modified VaR con-
8In Shin’s model, the specific formulation of VaR implies no default ex post as the distribution
of Q has bounded support. However, if the support of Q is not bounded, ex post default is possible;
so the wealth of the passive investors may be affected. But with these mean-variance preferences,
the determination of equilibrium asset prices is not affected.
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straint and the limited liability, the expected payoffs of the active investors become:
E(W ) = (1 − α)[(q − p)y + e]. However, the active investors can purchase Credit
Default Swaps(CDS) to insure against the tail risks associated with losses beyond
the VaR and so avoid bankruptcy. Let the cost of CDS be β and the CDS is used to
insure against Q falls below q − z, then the VaR constraint in the text is restored,
and the expected payoffs of active investors now become: E(W ) = (q− p)y+ e− β.
So in the presence of CDS, the formulation used in the text can also apply to the
case even if the support of Q is unbounded.]
Since E(W ) is linear in y, then for q > p, so long as the VaR constraint is
binding, the demand for risky asset by investment banks becomes:
yA =
 ep−(q−z) if > p0 if otherwise (3.2)
Market clearing
For q > p and assuming that aggregate supply of risky assets is fixed and
equal to 1, the market clearing condition yP + yA = 1 gives the equilibrium price:














For a given supply of risk assets (normalised to one) on the horizontal axis,
various market equilibria are illustrated in Figure 3.2, calibrated broadly using fig-
ures gleaned from Shin [2010], as shown in Table 3.1, using the formulae provided in
Appendix C.1. The construction is that the demand by passive investors, measured
from the right-hand axis, lies below the mean, with a slope that reflects their degree
of risk aversion; while the demand curve for active investors is measured from the
left hand axis. The kink reflects their initial equity e and the downward slope indi-
cates, not risk aversion, but the effect of the VaR rule: a fall in price allows more
assets to be held as there is less risk per asset, measured as p− (q−z), to be covered
by their equity. Equilibrium is where total demand matches supply. The outcome
shown in the middle of the diagram is labelled L to indicate the Low quality risk as-
sets available; that on the right, labelled H to indicate a much higher quality, shows
the considerable expansion of holdings by investment banks triggered thereby; the
outcome on the left, where Investment Banks go out of business, is labelled I for
insolvency.
The low quality of assets available at L refers to a downside risk of 0.13
relative to an expected payoff of 1.06 which gives the minimum payoff of q − z =
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0.93 indicated by the dashed red line near the foot of the figure. The demand
schedule from Investment banks, subject to VaR with equity of 0.024, has a kink
at ez = 0.024/0.13 = 0.18 and descends as a rectangular hyperbola towards 0.93 as
its lower asymptote. It intersects the demand from passive investors at a price just
above unity, giving investment banks a market share of about 30%.
What if, for reasons to be discussed below, there is an unanticipated increase
in the quality of risk assets, known to all participants, which narrows the downside
risk substantially to only 0.06, lifting the minimum payoff to q−z = 1.0 (as indicated
by the dashed line near the middle of the Figure 3.2). The reduction of perceived
risk will increase the demand by mean/variance investors, as shown by the clockwise
rotation of their demand schedule. The demand from investment banks will increase
for two reasons. First because, with lower downside risk per unit, the initial equity
can cover the risk on a larger quantity of assets; and second because, with mark to
market accounting, capital gains from the price rise for risky assets on their balance
sheets will raise their equity value. The combined effect is a marked shift to the right
in demand curve for Investment Banks operating under the VaR rules, as shown by
the upper rectangular hyperbola in the figure.
Given the parameter values indicated, market-clearing equilibrium is at H,
with the price lying very close to the top of the narrow ‘ band’ of 6% between q and
q − z , and with the lower downside risk fully covered by the higher equity. In this
case, meant to represent pre-crisis boom, demand by the risk-neutral Investment
banks, holding about two thirds of the risky assets with a leverage ratio of almost
20, has virtually eliminated the risk-premium q − p on these assets.9
9In line with Crockett’s dictum, that ‘risk exposure is built up in the boom but is only manifest
in the bust’.
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Figure 3.2: Market clearing price of risky assets: three cases
Table 3.1: Parameters used in calibration
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Table 3.2: Simulation results
Notwithstanding the absence of a risk premium, the boom equilibrium is
distinctly fragile. Consider, for example, another possible shock - a write-down
of the expected payoff, q, which ceteris paribus will shift both schedules vertically
downwards. It might seem that a write-down of 6% is can be handled by the equity
provisions made; but this is without taking account of the pecuniary externality
– that the equity base of the banks is endogenous, and will fall as the price falls
given ’mark to market’ accounting. Allowing for the financial accelerator that this
implies, which forces the highly-levered banks to contract their holdings as they sell
risky assets into the market, it turns out that their initial equity can only stand a
write-down of 4%.
Factors mentioned by Shin that might cause such parametric shocks to the
mean return include – on the upside - a macroeconomic improvement lowering the
probability that the borrowers would default on their loans; and a decline in the
quality of mortgage borrowers as the market expands – on the downside. Miller and
Zhang [2015] discuss the possibility that an initial probability upgrade may turn out
to be mistaken; and Carlin and Soskice [2014] point explicitly to CRAs as a possible
source of such mis-rating, with positive up-gradings later reversed. Danielsson et al.
[2001], had earlier argued that “heavy reliance on CRAs is misguided as they have
been shown to provide conflicting and inconsistent forecasts of individual clients’
creditworthiness. They are unregulated and the quality of their risk estimates is
largely unobservable.” The conflict of interest that gave CRAs the incentive to issue
erroneous ratings are considered in the next section; but meantime, as a test of
robustness, consider a ratings upgrade that is later reversed.
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A test of robustness: a reduction in downside risk, later reversed
To check the robustness of shadow banking in the Shin model, we first intro-
duce a significant reduction in perceived risk; and then, when the equity base has
expanded, a reversal of this ‘good news’. The unexpected increase in asset quality
that results in perceived risk reduction10 could correspond to the highly favourable
pre-crisis ratings given by rating agencies: while the reversal of this good news could
reflect the subsequent sharp rise in the cost of insurance signalled by the ABX-HE
indices, discussed below. The time-line of events is outlined below.
Figure 3.3: Timeline of events
In the first stage, with the downside risk parameter z and investment bank
equity e, the equilibrium price p is determined along with y, the share of the risky
asset held by active investors. This corresponds to point L in the figure. After
markets have cleared on the assumption of an unchanging future distribution of
asset returns, however, ‘good news’ on asset quality arrives: downside risk has fallen
to z′ < z. This unanticipated but welcome development leads to an increase in the
price of risky assets; and the holdings of active investors also increase, as indicated
by point H in Figure 3.2.
By marking assets to market at these higher prices, investors are effectively
assuming no change in the future distribution of asset returns. They will, however,
be disappointed, if ‘bad news’ arrives that downside risk z′ has reverted back to
10Narrowing the ‘downside’, z, of risky asset’s payoff, leaving the expected payoff unchanged at
q as in Figure 3.2
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what it was in the first stage, namely z.11
Given the original payoff distribution, but starting now from the higher eq-
uity base (e′) achieved at stage 2 - with larger holdings financed by higher borrowing
(p′y′ − e′) - the question arises: how much will asset prices have to fall as active
investors contract their balance sheets to meet the now-tighter VaR requirements;
and will their equity be sufficient to take the hit?
Insolvency
Though news shocks that are reversed need not lead to insolvency, they
can do so. The most obvious case is when the good news ‘narrows the band’ of
downside risk enough to exclude the initial equilibrium price p0 (i.e. q − z′ > p0).
If, for example, from an initial equilibrium at L in Figure 3.2 (with z = 0.13) the
’good news’ was that the downside risk had fallen to z = 0.06 then a reversal will, of
course, take equilibrium ‘outside the band’ involving losses larger than the maximum
sustainable; so the entire equity of the banks will be wiped out by the ‘bad news’.
In the context of a model with uniformly-distributed, bounded risk, this
would be classified as a ‘zero probability event’, an outcome that takes prices lower
than the worst the banks expect given the downside risk as perceived at H. Should
it therefore be discounted? No, for two reasons. First because the design of the
VaR regime was flawed in that externalities that could drive the system outside
the bounds expected by individual banks were not checked by Pigouvian regulation;
so the exaggerated impact of common shocks will be unexpected. Second because
Shin’s model may be expanded to allow for unbounded downside risk together with
the availability of insurance to cover tail risk, as discussed above. In which case,
moral hazard would play a role – and the insuring agency take a hit.
The example portrayed in Figure 3.2, however, is rather more subtle. It
demonstrates that, even where a return to the initial equilibrium price would be
sustainable (i.e. where p0 > q − z′, a reversal of good news may trigger insolvency
nonetheless. In the figure, reducing perceived down-side risk from 0.13 to 0.06 shifts
equilibrium from L to H; and, as L remains within the ‘narrow band’ it might appear
that a reversal is sustainable. But the asymmetry of capital gains (applied to initial
holdings at L) and the capital losses (applied to expanded holdings at H) is sufficient
to wipe out the equity of the active investors, leading to the equilibrium at point I
where all risk assets are in the hands of mean-variance investors.
That such widespread insolvency was a possible outcome is supported by
11If the distribution of Q has unbounded support, we assume that the cost of CDS for insuring
against the tail risks beyond q-z and q-z’ are the same.
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David Stockman’s account of the financial crisis Stockman [2013, p. 543], where he
asserts bluntly that, in the absence of Fed intervention: “Every single investment
bank, including Goldman, Morgan Stanley, and the embedded hedge funds at J P
Morgan, Citibank and Bank of America would have been rendered instantly insol-
vent and dismembered under court and FDIC protection.”12
Catastrophic’ behaviour
The tendency of the system to ‘overshoot’ its initial equilibrium (on the way
down) when a quality upgrade is reversed depends on asset prices being ‘marked
to market’. This accounting practice makes endogenous the level of risk-taking by
firms which keep their balance sheets at the limits set by VaR: but it operates
asymmetrically. While the good news has a positive amplification effect applied
to the initial level of equity at A, the rescinding of this good news has a negative
amplification effect applied to the equity level at B, boosted by the earlier good
news.13
Clearly accounting rules can have a marked effect on the dynamic response
of the system to exogenous shocks; and, for large enough shocks, it appears that the
price of risky assets can exhibit what Zeeman [1974] and Arnold [1984] refer to as
‘catastrophic’ behaviour – highly asymmetric responses to symmetric movements in
exogenous forces. In the paper referenced, Christopher Zeeman sought to explain the
gradual rise in equity prices in a boom followed by the sharp fall in the subsequent
crash by the difference in behaviour between ‘bulls and bears’ – a psychological
explanation that Arnold [1984] criticised as rather ad hoc. In the case we are
discussing, however, the dynamics are derived explicitly from the ‘rules of the game’
– VaR rules sanctioned by Basel II to check moral hazard on the one hand; and
market accounting regulations (FAS 157 in particular) designed to ensure fair asset
pricing on the other.
The Shin model as analysed here appears to sustain the three charges made
against BASEL II in Danielsson et al. [2001], namely that:
• VaR can destabilise and induce crashes when they would not otherwise occur
• Heavy reliance on CRAs is misguided
• Financial regulation is procyclical
12Something that he advocated, as he believed that the outcome would not have affected Main
Street.
13If assets were not marked to market, however, the effects would be symmetric.
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It should be noted that the results rely on the VaR constraint being con-
tinuously binding following the assumption that active investors are risk neutral.
Indeed, the equity of active investors is just enough to cover losses in the case of the
worst possible payoff of the risky asset. In other words, the active investors spend
all they can afford to buy risky assets. If, however, they are willing to hold not
only risky assets but also riskless bonds (i.e. the VaR constraint is not binding), the
riskless bonds will be a buffer to withstand the asymmetric price adjustment given
the reversal of shocks. Although the active investors can tolerate more if prices fall,
insolvency is still possible if the shocks are large enough. The obvious weakness
in the account so far provided is that it is driven by a sequence of unanticipated,
exogenous quality shocks. Altering the common knowledge assumption, as in the
next section, helps to make the sequence of shocks endogenous, however.
A different approach to making the shocks endogenous has been explored
by Aymanns et al. [2016], in a Minsky-like extension of Shin’s model. For them
asset quality is judged, not by ratings, but from time-series estimates of downside
risk made in a stochastic setting. As time moves on and the last crisis moves into
the distant past, these assessments become progressively more rosy, and the system
more risk prone – leading to another crisis. In fact, they derive an ever-repeated
cycle of boom and bust which, they claim, is consistent with the operation of the
BASEL II rules on prudential regulation.
3.2.2 Sourcing the shocks: asymmetric information with adverse
selection
In Phishing for Phools, Akerlof and Shiller [2015] discuss how, with asymmetric
information, markets may misallocate risk and resources; and claim they that struc-
tural flaws in US Investment Banking industry, and in the agencies that provided
ratings for the products it dealt in, are a case in point. The switch from partnerships
to limited liability, prior to the subprime crisis, gave the banks much greater willing-
ness to take risks: but the degree of risk involved was grossly understated, as rating
agencies – skilled in assessing repayment prospects for the debt of corporations and
sovereigns – were paid by the banks to give favourable ratings to complex financial
products whose properties defied conventional analysis.
Shin’s Investment Banking model assumes common knowledge as to the qual-
ity of risk assets on the market; but the possibility of Investment Banks getting
favourable ratings for assets known to be high-risk challenges this assumption. The
reversal of ‘good news’ comes about when the mis-rating comes to light. As [Ak-
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erlof and Shiller, 2015, p. 36] put it: ‘The mortgage-backed securities may have
been rated very highly; but they were largely backed by subprime loans with a high
chance of default. When it was discovered that these loans were worth a lot less
than previously thought, the investment banks were bankrupt.’
Financial developments over the course of 2008 seem to support this perspec-
tive. For, as summarised succinctly in [Sorkin, 2009, p. 529] and indicated in Table
3.3 below: ‘Each of the former Big Five investment banks failed, was sold, or was con-
verted into a bank holding company. Two mortgage giants and the world’s largest
insurer were placed under government control. And in early October, with the
stroke of the president’s pen, the Treasury – and by extension, American taxpayers
– became part-owners in what were once the nation’s proudest financial institutions.’
Adverse selection and the securitisation of subprime assets
As well as holding asset backed securities on their balance sheets, Investment
Banks played a key role in the growth of securitisation that is portrayed above
in Figure 3.1. The dual involvement of the banks contradicts the ‘hot potato’ –
originate and distribute – version of events, as Shin [2010] argues. So what if the
securitisation process made it difficult for investors to assess the quality of their
investments?
To help analyse to the role of investment banks and the rating agencies in
packaging and marketing MBS, we apply the adverse selection model of Akerlof
[1970] under various assumptions about information as to quality. First we describe
the inefficient low-trade equilibrium that Akerlof’s analysis predicts given asymme-
try of knowledge of quality as between buyers and sellers (but common knowledge
as to the parameters of the quality distribution). This being so inefficient relative
to the outcome with symmetric knowledge, the question posed is whether the credit
rating agencies (CRAs) succeeded in restoring informational symmetry by delivering
true quality ratings; or whether, as argued by Akerlof and Shiller, there was ‘mining
of reputation’ by the CRAs who inflate the ratings so as to please the Investment
Banks. In the latter case, we show how ‘rating inflation’ allows sellers to collect
more than the assets are worth in a cheating equilibrium. However, if ratings lose
all credibility when buyers discover evidence of mis-rating – and if buyers also lower
their belief as to the lower bound of asset quality - the result could be market col-
lapse, as indicated in Figure 3.1 above.
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Asymmetric information
Let there be a pool of risky assets, each indexed by θ , a measure of ‘quality’.14
Assume that the price of risky assets is determined by risk-averse investors in a
competitive market. With full information, we normalise the price of asset θ to be
θ.
In what follows, we characterise pricing in competitive equilibrium under
asymmetric information. The information structure is that the support and the
distribution of is common knowledge to both the banks and the investors, but
only the banks know the quality of any given risky asset. The risky assets are
“packaged” and held or sold on by Investment Banks who assign reservation values
to these assets denoted r(θ) where r(θ) < θ.
The pool of the risky assets available constitutes a set [θ; θ], with the measure
of quality below θ represented by a cumulative distribution function F (θ). Given
the asymmetry of information as to quality, there will be a single price reflecting
the average riskiness of assets made available at that price. Let this price be p.
As banks will only supply these assets if the market price covers their reser-
vation value, Θ(p), the amount of risky assets supplied at any given price, is defined
as:
Θ(p) = {θ : r(θ) ≤ p}
A competitive equilibrium is a price p∗ and a set Θ∗ of risky assets such that:
Θ∗(p) = {θ : r(θ) ≤ p∗}
and
p∗ = E[θ | θ ∈ Θ∗]
which together imply that the competitive price must satisfy:
p∗ = E[θ | r(θ) ≤ p∗]
i.e. that it matches the expected value of the assets which have reservation values
less than the equilibrium price. (Those with higher value are withdrawn.)
An illustration
Let the pool of the risky assets be uniformly distributed in [θ; θ], with reser-
vation values of r(θ) = αθ < θ. The equilibrium price may be determined as follows.
14Thus if all risky assets have the same expected returns but differ in their standard deviations,
the parameter θ would represent the inverse of the standard deviation.
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Assume the equilibrium price to be p, then the set of risky assets offered by banks
is:
Θ(p) = {θ : r(θ) ≤ p} = {θ : αθ ≤ p}
If this is the set of risky assets sold in the market, the conditional expectation
of the quality of assets can be determined as:









The equilibrium price is within the lowest and the average quality of asset if
α ∈ {12 , 1} and α ≥ 12(1 + θθ ).
With p∗ as the equilibrium price, the highest quality asset sold in the market
is θH =
p∗
α . So the set of assets in equilibrium is Θ(p
∗) = {θ : θ ≤ θ ≤ θH}.
In the presence of asymmetric information, only lower quality assets are sold in
equilibrium.
Note that when θ = 0 then p∗ = 0 so only assets which have no reservation
value are available in the market. Note also that the smaller is , the higher would be
the equilibrium price. So decreasing increases the set of assets sold in equilibrium.
The competitive equilibrium in this case is illustrated in Figure 3.4. For
prices falling between the lowest and highest ‘reservation values’ r(θ) and r(θ), the
expected quality will lie on the schedule labelled BT running from the lower bound θ
at B to the mean θ˜ at T . Equilibrium, where the price matches the expected quality,
is at E, where BT crosses the 45 degree line. This is the ‘rational expectations’
equilibrium of Akerlof [1970] where the price is, on average, justified by quality. As
only lower quality assets are put on the market, it is clearly inefficient relative to the
symmetric information case, where price matches quality on each and every asset
and all MBS will be on the market, as indicated by the dashed section of the 45
degree line between θ and θ.
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Figure 3.4: Market equilibria with asymmetric and aymmetric information
Faking the ratings
For sellers to bundle loans into ‘buckets’ of similar quality would seem to
offer obvious efficiency gains. In the limit, if the grading is fine enough, Pareto
efficient equilibrium might be achieved where all loans are traded and average quality
rises to θ˜.15 Given the asymmetry of information, however, there is an obvious
temptation for sellers to indulge in ‘grade inflation’. Hence the case for third party
authentication, by Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) in particular.
With collusion between the sellers of MBSs and the CRAs – if the latter are
prepared to upgrade quality ratings in order to retain business – then the grade
inflation will not be checked. A sequence of events consistent with a rise in price of
securitised assets followed by market collapse (as indicated earlier in Figure 3.1) is
illustrated in what follows.
Given that the spread of quality is uniformly distributed in [θ; θ], and equi-
librium with adverse selection at E, correct authentication could add to the average
value of MBS traded and, in principle, deliver mean quality of θ˜. But, with collusion
between the sellers and the CRAs, buyers can be misled as to the quality. Assume
15as in the symmetric information case just described.
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for example that with ‘grade inflation’ the lower bound remains unchanged, but the
upper bound apparently increases to θ
′
, where θ
′ − θ = 2(θ − θ) i.e. the spread
has doubled, so the apparent quality range of authenticated assets on the market
now has a mean value at θ, the high end of the actual distribution. The dashed
line labelled MM in Figure 3.5 shows graphically how buyers are being misled, with
the slope of less than 45 degrees indicating how the price/quality relationship is
being distorted (as the overstating of product quality increasing as actual quality
rises). If these distorted ratings are taken at face value, all assets will be traded but
prices will systematically exceed actual quality (except at the very bottom). The
average price paid will be p˜, as indicated on the horizontal axis, which will exceed
the average quality shown as θ˜ on the vertical axis, with ‘overpayment’ averaging
p˜− θ˜, as indicated by the bracket in the figure.
With buyers being systematically misled as to quality, this is no ‘rational
expectations’ equilibrium. Differential information is actively being exploited to
the advantage those who know the true quality of the MBS that they are mis-
selling. In this in this respect it differs from models such as that of Tella [2017],
where intermediaries have known incentives to ‘steal’ but markets adjust so that, in
equilibrium, there is no stealing. In choosing between such different perspectives,
subsequent legal findings can play a crucial role, as discussed below. What happens
when the music stops and buyers discover that many of the loans are not, in fact,
worth what they were led to expect? It seems self-evident that the ratings will lose
credibility and buyers become more wary of subprime than before. Let us assume,
specifically, that the ratings are totally disregarded, with prices determined as for
equilibrium with adverse selection. Assume also that buyers also shift their beliefs
to the detriment of MBS: while willing to credit that the upper support is θ, they
now believe the lower support is zero. With sellers and buyers differing in respect of
the parameters of the quality distribution, the equilibrium will not have the ‘rational
expectations’ feature of Akerlof [1970].
What will the equilibrium be? Despite the quality being as originally spec-
ified, with bounds θ > θ > 0, the jaundiced beliefs of the buyers, with bounds
θ > θ′ = 0, now implies the schedule of expected quality (from the viewpoint of
the buyers) is as shown as B’T’ in Figure 3.6. As this lies below the 45 degree
line showing actual quality except at the origin, sellers will find their asset quality
systematically undervalued. So the market will collapse with no trade in assets of
any quality in what is the no-trade equilibrium of Akerlof [1970], arrived at here by
excessively pessimistic beliefs.
The behavioural phenomenon which Gennaioli et al. [2012] have dubbed ‘ne-
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Figure 3.5: Cheating: market equilibrium with inflated ratings
glected risk’ – the tendency of investors to ignore certain possible outcomes – also
supports the ‘phishing’ perspective.
“The key insight is that bankers will create securities that are vulnerable only
to those neglected risks. ... For, example, if investors convince themselves
that house prices throughout the country cannot fall by 10 percent or more,
then bankers will create securities that retain their value in every scenario
except when house prices throughout the country fall by 10 percent or more.
Because these securities look riskless to investors, they will be produced in
abundance. This large expansion in the supply of securities that look riskless
will fuel an asset bubble by allowing optimists to buy even more expensive
homes. When house prices do in fact fall by more than 10 per cent, the result
is catastrophic.” Mian and Sufi [2015, p. 13-14]
In addition, Foote et al. [2012] uses empirical evidence to argue that the
decline in house price during the crisis might have been entirely neglected scenario
rather than being considered with low probability ex-ante.
The account derived from the presence of asymmetric information – and its
57
Figure 3.6: Despair: downside revision of sellers’ distribution, leading to collapse.
exploitation by banks working in collusion with the rating agencies to whom pru-
dential regulation had effectively been delegated – generates a boom/bust sequence
much like that in the previous section. But the ‘shocks’ on asset quality becomes
endogenous. This does not imply that the financial accelerator that Shin empha-
sises is irrelevant: the impact of developments, both positive and negative, on the
equity base of the banks involved will amplify their effects on industry equilibrium,
rendering implosion more likely.
If ‘reality is one, though wise men speak of it variously’, one may be tempted
to ask whether – and how – these seemingly conflicting accounts might be com-
bined. An ingenious exercise along these lines, Zhang [2017], involves applying the
Shin model to determine Demand for risk assets by active and passive investors
(based on common but less-than-complete knowledge as to quality), and Akerlof’s
approach to determine Supply. The latter will depend on the level of participation
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by those securitising risk assets, who have full information about quality – where a
distribution of downside risk provides the basis for distinguishing risk assets on the
basis of quality. Adding the assumption of a given quantity distribution of risk assets
(e.g. a quantity of each quality), generates the Supply curve. Aggregate demand
by active and passive investors for bundles of MBS securities – who estimate quality
by the unconditional mean of the distribution – gives the Demand for risky assets.
So market clearing, where demand matches supply, provides one way of combining
the two approaches.
Such an equilibrium – where the quality assumed on the demand side will
exceed the mean quality on offer – has the virtue of showing that the rationality of
equilibrium in Akerlof [1970] is not a necessary feature of a model with asymmetric
information; and comparative statics will involve both amplification and endogenous
supply. But evidence from subsequent legal prosecutions and fines indicates that
simply conflating these two approaches omits a key aspect stressed by Akerlof and
Shiller [2015], namely the incentive for those with superior information to turn it
to their advantage. In practice, it seems, Suppliers turned to ‘manipulation and
deception’, as discussed above.
If the subprime crisis merits the description of a perfect storm, it is because
it involves so many contributory factors. The two models examined above highlight
particular features – the challenges to financial market efficiency and stability coming
from asymmetric information and from pecuniary externalities. How these may best
be combined is left as unfinished business. For, like the elephant in the parable,
reality is undeniably complicated. In the next section, we turn to another aspect –
the idea of creditor panic, a bank run.
3.3 Illiquidity: mindless panic or realistic reassessment?
The ‘insolvency’ views discussed in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 focus on the poor quality
of bank assets and the excessive leverage and risk-taking involved. The ‘liquidity
crisis’ view by contrast emphasises:
“excessive reliance on short-term borrowing and the resulting maturity mis-
match, the weakness of ‘mark to market’ accounting rules...and the panic
withdrawal of short-term funding that created wide-spread market illiquidity,
resulting in undervaluation of assets and the dislocation of money markets
where banks normally borrow short term.” [Milne, 2009, p.18-19].
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Indeed Gorton [2010], one of the leading proponents of this view, titled the
paper on the subprime crisis presented to central bankers and academics at Jackson
Hole, as ‘The Panic of 2007’.16
The principal piece of evidence Gorton refers to is the cost of insuring against
losses on subprime mortgages, as measured by the ABX-HE indices. From January
2006 onwards these indices were constructed to price traded insurance contracts,
each contract providing cover on repayments of a bundle of Mortgage Backed Secu-
rities for a period of five years.17 Figure 3.7 shows the movements in the BBB and
AA versions of this ABX index, reflecting the cost of purchasing investment-grade
tranches of twenty major MBS products.
While both indices initially stood at par, the relatively riskier ABX-BBB
index began to fall at the beginning of 2007; and both indices began to fall sharply
after August 2007 - the date the Panic began, according to Gorton. Continued
precipitous decline took the BBB down to about 5c in late 2008; by which time even
the less risky ABX-AA index was down to 20c, implying up-front insurance costs of
80c in the dollar.
Figure 3.7: US House prices, ABX indices, and share prices of global banks.
Source: [Milne, 2009, p.201].
16This paper was later incorporated in his monograph on the subprime market, Gorton [2010].
17Thus a price of 80 for a particular AAA contract on a given date means that the protection
buyer must pay 20% of the par value of the AAA index to get protection for the next five years.
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Reasons for panic: opacity or product design?
For [Gorton, 2010, p.209]the main reason for panic was the ‘loss of infor-
mation’ involved in securitisation and the consequent ‘opacity’ of MBS securities
in terms of their asset backing. He states specifically that ‘House price declines
and foreclosures do not explain the Panic’. But, in commenting on Gorton’s paper,
[Holmstrom, 2008, p.201] argued to the contrary:
The problem with sub-prime related securities was not the lack of transparency
as such... the real problem was the sensitivity of the MBSs to a fall in the
average house price. ... The dynamic credit enhancement model only worked
as long as house prices were rising, a point that seems obvious in retrospect.
For there was a catch to the ‘dynamic credit enhancement’ on offer: the fi-
nance provided when house prices were rising would cease when house prices stopped
rising, or began to fall. When those who had been lent the funds found no refinanc-
ing was available, they would be unable to avoid the scheduled step-up in rates
(possibly doubling); and, if house prices were falling, they would need to post more
collateral or pay down the loan: otherwise, they could become homeless as their
homes were repossessed.
That the banks involved were aware of this emerged from subsequent legal
investigation. An email from Angelo Mozilo, co-founder of Countrywide to other
Countrywide bank executives, dated August 1, 2005, warned explicitly that:
“when the loan resets in five years there will be enormous payment shock and
the borrower is not sufficiently sophisticated to truly understand the conse-
quences, then the bank will be dealing with foreclosure in potentially a deflated
real-estate market. This would be both a financial and reputational catastro-
phe.”
In circumstances when house prices were already high by historical stan-
dards18, aggressive marketing of such loans looks to have two undesirable conse-
quences (a) to push house prices yet higher; (b) to leave as homeless those who
were unaware of how and when the finance would effectively be withdrawn when
the bubble burst. In the process, homeowners may well have been deceived by the
mortgage lenders. [Mian and Sufi, 2015, p.149] note that: ‘Home owners mistakenly
18As [Gorton, 2010, p. 202] himself notes: ‘it was widely understood that house prices were likely
a bubble’.
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believed that house prices would rise forever. Perhaps this was a silly belief, but the
image of a sophisticated home owner gaming lenders and the government is wrong.
If anything, sophisticated lenders may have taken advantage of na¨ıve home owners
by convincing them that house prices would continue to rise.’19
As the Case-Shiller index of House Prices plotted in Figure 3.7 above indi-
cates, property prices in main US cities peaked in the third quarter of 2006, and
went on to decline by about 30% over the next two and a half years. This – the
timing of house price declines – supports Holmstrom’s analysis.
The evolution of house prices in the US over the long run also supports the
idea that house prices had been experiencing a ‘bubble’ in the years when subprime
lending had widened access to house purchase (with Private Label Securitisation low-
ering credit standards). Figure 3.8 shows the index constructed by Robert Shiller
giving U.S. house prices in real terms since 1880, where the spike that developed in
the early years of this century is clearly visible; and the other series shown suggest
that it was not related to underlying fundamentals.
Contagion
Holders of the ‘liquidity crisis’ view argue that, by retaining only super-
senior tranches on their books, investment banks were immune from insolvency risks.
But, as [Shin, 2010, Chapter 8] points out, the prevalence of interbank lending and
borrowing provides a channel for contagion: the liquidity shock suffered by a bank
with good assets may be the consequence of withdrawals by another bank suffering
equity losses from poor asset quality (causing it to reduce its balance sheet). In
other words, one bank’s liquidity shock could reflect another’s solvency shock.
19In fact, as indicated below when discussing the fines on investment banks, ‘part of the settlement
requires Bank of America to pay down mortgages for certain home owners; reduce tax payments
for others’.
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Figure 3.8: U.S. Real home prices in the long run.
Source: R. Shiller(2008, p.33).
3.4 Policy actions and legal evidence
Liquidity provision by the Fed
For Gorton, the opacity of the products created to securitise loans to sub-
prime households leading to creditor panic in 2007 was a key factor in the financial
crisis. There is, of course, no question that the banks were exposed to liquidity
risk: ‘the use of overnight repos became so prevalent that, at its peak, Wall Street
investment banks were rolling over a quarter of their balance sheets every night’,
[Shin, 2010, p. 156].
Action was, moreover, taken by the Fed to help provide liquidity. Thus in
March 2008 the Fed created a Primary Dealer Credit Facility making it easier to
lend to security firms by widening the range of eligible collateral. Further, when
Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs – both “enthusiastic practitioners of the new
Wall Street model that combined sky-high leverage with heavy reliance on short-
term borrowing” – faced a debilitating loss of credit in September 2008, they were
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granted the status of Bank Holding Companies” thereby pulling the two beleaguered
companies inside the Fed’s safety net. That stopped the runs.” [Blinder, 2013,
p. 153-154].
But this action to extend the safety net was taken in what Blinder calls
‘The Panic of 2008’, when the structural problems of subprime lending described by
Holmstrom were already apparent; in other words, it was a liquidity crisis driven
by bad fundamentals. This confirms that the mercurial nature of investment bank
liabilities left them prone to creditor panic – so called ‘silent bank runs’ where cred-
itors fail to rollover their investments; but it hardly supports Gorton’s thesis - that
a pure liquidity crisis based on opacity , ‘The Panic of 2007’, was the primary driver
of the financial crisis. In the words of Yellen [2017], “the deterioration from early
2007 until early September 2008 was a slow trickle compared to the tidal wave that
nearly wiped out the financial sector that September”.
Capital injections by the US Treasury: official purchase of preference
shares
For Shin, the wholesale take-up of low-quality subprime assets by highly-
leveraged banks at a time when measured risks seemed low was the key factor,
leaving them exposed to insolvency as and when ‘bad news’ arrived.
“As balance sheets expand, new borrowers must be found. Someone has to
be on the receiving end of the new loans. When all prime borrowers have a
mortgage, but balance sheets still need to expand, then banks have to lower
their lending standards in order to lend to subprime borrowers. When the
downturn arrives, the bad loans are either sitting on the balance sheets of the
large financial intermediaries or they are on special purpose vehicles that are
sponsored by them. This is so, since the bad loans were taken on precisely in
order to utilise the slack in their balance sheets caused by the apparent lull in
measured risks. Although final investors such as pension funds and insurance
companies will suffer losses, too, the large financial intermediaries are more
exposed in the sense that they face the danger of seeing their capital wiped
out.” [Shin, 2010, p. 156-157].
This perspective, that the ‘fair weather’ expansion strategy posed the risk of
insolvency when storm clouds appeared, finds support in the action taken by the US
Treasury in October 2008. As Blinder notes: ‘most banks were presumably under-
capitalised on a mark-to-market basis at the time. They needed capital desperately,
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and most of them could not raise it on the dire circumstances of October 2008. ...
Equity injections would improve banks’ capital positions directly’.
Alongside losses and write-downs totalling $344b incurred in 2007/8, the ta-
ble provides details of the principal capital injections20 made by the US Treasury
using TARP funds, running to a total of almost $100b for the banks in the table. For
a pure liquidity crisis, where the investments of the banks are not in question, such
capital support is not necessary. But in this case, when house prices were already
falling, subprime insurance had become prohibitively expensive, the MBS market
had essentially closed down and losses amounted to a third of a trillion dollars, such
solvency support was considered essential.
Phishing for Phools?
As noted above, the asymmetric information account of Akerlof and Shiller
stands in sharp contrast to the ‘common knowledge’ perspective of Shin, where active
banks compete with patient lenders to supply funds to risky borrowers, maximising
profits in a regulatory regime facing exogenous ‘news shocks’ amplified by VaR-
based financial accelerators. What is offered, instead, is an analysis based explicitly
on ‘the economics of manipulation and deception’. Investment banks can make high
returns by taking on ‘tail risk’, concealing this by getting the investments rated as
first class; they can further increase their profits by selling the magic elixir to others,
while hedging their own exposure by purchasing CDS. On this account, the risks
to which the shadow banking system is exposed are the consequence of exploiting
information asymmetry for profit.
Although Akerlof and Shiller make only passing reference to legal measures,
substantial support for their perspective comes from legal decisions subsequent to
the crisis, as indicated in Table 3.3.
20Enforced purchases of preference shares.
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Table 3.3: Big five investment banks and survivors of the big eight: losses, capital
injection, and fines.




First there are ‘fines’ on the Investment Banks themselves - settlements
agreed to with Federal and/or State prosecutors for having misled other investors
as to the quality of the MBS they sold. The sums paid by investment banks and the
big commercial banks such as Bank of America, J P Morgan and Citigroup amount
to $45b, as shown in the Table (of which $8b were levied on the two surviving in-
vestment banks, and $20b on the big banks that had taken over Bear Sterns and
Merill Lynch).
The largest fines – and some of the most chilling evidence – comes from the
case against Bank of America which, in addition to acquiring Merill Lynch, had
earlier taken over Countrywide Financial, the largest lender of subprime mortgages
in the US. At a press conference where the settlement against Bank of America was
announced, Eric Holder, the U.S. attorney general, is on record as saying:
“These financial institutions knowingly, routinely, falsely, and fraudulently
marked and sold these loans as sound and reliable investments. Worse still,
on multiple occasions – when confronted with concerns about their reckless
practices – bankers at these institutions continued to mislead investors about
their own standards and to securitise loans with fundamental credit, compli-
ance, and legal defects.”
The fines were for misleading investors as to the quality of the mortgages that
had been securitised and sold on. But what about the homeowners who had been
persuaded to take out loans which might well fail? In the case of Bank of America
‘part of the settlement requires Bank of America to pay down mortgages for cer-
tain home owners; reduce tax payments for others; and pay to demolish abandoned
homes in certain neighborhoods to reduce urban blight’. In addition, it appears,
‘the bank has also set aside $37.3 billion to buy back bad mortgages from investors’.
(Guardian newspaper report).21
Collusion with CRAs?
The allegation of collusion between Credit Rating Agencies and investment
banks has also been the subject of court proceedings; with fines imposed on the two
major agencies as follows. In February, 2015 SP settled for a fine of $1.5b – and it was
21It would be interesting to see how these redress procedures compare with those set by the Fi-
nancial Conduct Authority for UK banks who had mis-sold interest rate swaps to small and medium
enterprises, as described on www.the-fca.org.uk/consumers/interest-rate-hedging-products.
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reported that ‘SP executives admitted that they made decisions about testing and
rating CDOs based at least partly on the effect they might have on relationships
with the banks issuing them’. In January of 2017, Moody’s settled for a sum of
$0.9b. Both credit rating agencies have thus agreed to pay substantial settlements
for mis-rating; with SP admitting what Akerlof and Shiller allege, namely that the
ratings were influenced by the incentives to retain the business.
For Gorton the main reason for panic was the ‘opacity’ of MBS securities
in terms of their asset backing leading to a collective ‘loss of confidence’ hitting
the investment banks when the housing bubble burst. But the legal proceedings
and fines imposed indicate that the investments did not deserve confidence that
they had enjoyed. According to evidence from the courts, mortgage originators had
sold financial products to low-income households without explaining the downside
risk; and investment banks had mis-sold bundles of the resulting mortgages to other
financial institutions, keeping super-senior tranches on their balance sheets. So cred-
itor panic could be understood as a reaction to discovering the business model of
subprime lending was seriously flawed.
Summary overview
In previous sections we have presented various insights offered by seasoned
observers on reasons for crisis – be it the powerful momentum effects of VaR-based
banking, the irresistible temptation to conceal risks faced by many financial opera-
tives, or the quick-silver nature of the liabilities financing much of the risky lending.
Each of these factors, it seems, could alone lead to financial disaster. But the actions
taken by those holding the levers of monetary and fiscal policy at the time, together
with the legal determinations made subsequently by prosecutors in US courts of law,
show that, in reality, the crisis had multiple contributory causes.
How evidence from policy action and the law courts supports such a multi-
faceted perspective is indicated in Figure 3.9
That the investment banks were hit with liquidity shocks is clear enough.
For Gorton [2010], who endorses the soundness of their business model, there was a
pointless panic in 2007, stemming- from a ’lack of transparency’, see the area labelled
(1). His view was challenged by Holmstrom, who pointed the finger at fundamentals;
and it was in 2008, after Lehman’s went bankrupt, that the Fed gave banking status
to Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley – the only remaining independent Investment
Banks – and supplied them with plentiful liquidity, pending subsequent support from
the Treasury. So there was a liquidity shock, but not without good reason.
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Figure 3.9: Illiquidity, insolvency and asymmetric information, as indicated by pol-
icy action and legal proceedings
For banks, of course, risk of insolvency is a key driver of creditor sentiment:
and for investment banks who had invested in subprime, solvency was surely at risk:
why else did the US Treasury have to step in to provide equity for them with TARP
funds? Shin’s iconic analogy of the Millenium Bridge suggests that the threat of
insolvency could be attributed to some unanticipated, exogenous ‘bad news’ greatly
amplified by ‘pecunuiary externality’. In this case, no illiquidity nor asymmetric
information need be involved, as for the area labelled (2) in the Figure.
The evidence of legal decisions, however, confirms that world-leading invest-
ment banks and rating agencies exploited asymmetric information to market sub-
prime assets as high-quality investments for private profit, as alleged by Akerlof and
Shilller. Insolvency involving asymmetric information could lie in the areas labelled
(3) and (4), depending on the impact of liquidity shocks.
From policy actions to support the institutions involved – and the fines sub-
sequently imposed upon them – one is led to conclude that the shaded area (4) in
the Figure – ‘triangulated’ by the three views just discussed – gives the best im-
pression of the nature of the crisis. More discussion about the figure with regard to
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the interaction between illiquidity and insolvency is also provided in Chapter 1. Its
heart of the crisis lay in the betrayal of trust by institutions that were the very pil-
lars of the financial system. That revelations of this could trigger price effects that
could have wiped out their equity base is hardly surprising. For these were hardly
exogenous ‘bad news’ shocks; more like evidence - to be borne out subsequently in
courts of law - that key players had their hands in the till!
In her speech a decade after the crisis began, the current chair of the Federal
Reserve endorsed a multi-faceted approach, noting that: “the vulnerabilities within
the financial system in the mid-2000s were numerous and, in hindsight, familiar
from past financial panics”. As she went on to observe:
“In response, policymakers around the world have put in place measures to
limit a future build up of similar vulnerabilities, ...Preeminent among these do-
mestic and global efforts have been steps to increase the loss-absorbing capac-
ity of banks, regulations to limit both maturity transformation in short-term
funding markets and liquidity mismatches within banks, and new authorities
to facilitate the resolution of large financial institutions and to subject system-
ically important firms to more stringent prudential regulation.” Yellen [2017]
Legal evidence – why “deferred prosecution agreements”?
To help establish asymmetry of information, we have appealed to the ‘fines’
imposed on banks and rating agencies for mis-selling and mis-rating. But the courts
have been criticised on the grounds that, in contrast to what happened in previous
crises – that of savings-and-loan associations in the 1980s and the accounting frauds
of the 1990s, for example – ‘not a single high-level executive has been successfully
prosecuted in connection with the recent financial crisis’, Rakoff [2014]. In the article
cited, retired Judge Rakoff notes that there has, in fact, been a shift from prosecut-
ing high-level individuals to prosecuting companies. In order to change ‘corporate
culture’, the policy pursued is to secure “deferred prosecution agreements” (DPAs)
in which the company, under threat of criminal prosecution, agrees to pay a fine
and to take remedial measures to prevent future wrong-doing.
As the Department of Justice has argued, it is indeed difficult to prove fraud-
ulent intent on the part of high-level management of the banks and companies in
cases that involve the mis-selling of innovative financial products.22 While the prod-
uct itself may provide welfare improvement from better risk-sharing, its complexity
22Making successful criminal prosecution is a great deal more costly than securing a DPA, an
important factor if, as some allege, the relevant Federal agencies were being starved of funds.
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not only gives room for sellers to manipulate the quality being offered to investors,
but also proves to be a ‘grey area’ for court cases. The very complexity allows bank
executives to argue that they have the same beliefs about the quality of MBS as
they describe to investors, for example.23 As Kay [2017] notes, however, ‘the very
prevalence of such [DPA] settlements is an indication that their deterrent effect is
small. Senior executives appear not to mind paying out large amounts of sharehold-
ers’ money to escape any personal liability for their actions, or the actions of those
whom they ostensibly supervise’.
Improving the prospects for prosecution may involve reducing the ‘grey areas’
arising from the complexity of innovative financial products. This will not only assist
in pursuit of fraud, but, by reducing product opacity, should restore confidence in
the market. It will also require more funding for the purpose.
Interestingly enough, a recent proposal by [Mian and Sufi, 2015, Chapter 12]
is that appropriate financial innovation may be the key to preventing a recurrence.
They argue that standard mortgage contract, which ‘forces the borrower to bear the
full burden of a decline in house prices until his equity is completely wiped out, be
replaced by Shared-Responsibility Mortgages (SRM). An SRM has two important
differences: (1) the lender offers downside protection to the borrower; and (2) the
borrower gives up 5 percent capital gain to the lender on the upside’. The risk-
sharing involved in such contracts keeps the loan-to-value ratio stable even when
house prices fall: it should also make lenders more cautious about lending into the
boom – and so limit house price volatility.24
Insofar as the subprime experiment was designed to give marginal borrowers
access to housing, it must be judged a spectacular failure. Far better to provide ex-
plicit subsidies; e.g. government matching of down-payments by new homebuyers as
[Calomiris, 2009, p. 29] suggests; or to promote the introduction of SRM contracts
as Mian and Sufi and David Miles recommend.
Banking regulation after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008
In responses to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has introduced the Basel III involving the revi-
sion of banking capital adequacy and liquidity. On bank capital, one of the key
focuses is to ensure that banking sector take into account the macro-financial en-
23In the circumstances, rather than individual banks ‘phishing for phools’ it might be more
appropriate to talk of ‘market phishing’, to borrow the terminology of Akerlof and Shiller [2015].
24The UK experiment with a 20% ‘shared equity loan’ available under the Government’s ‘Help
to buy’ programme launched in 2013 is analysed in Miles [2015], who argues that even such limited
risk-sharing could have substantially mitigated the Great Recession in the UK.
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vironment associating with its business. As a result, the countercyclical buffer has
been introduced to achieve the broader macroprudential objective in ensuring safe
and soundness of banking sector from excessive credit growth period that usually
supports the build-up of system-wide risks. In fact, by forcing banking sectors to in-
ternalise the externalities they may pose to the economy, the countercyclical nature
of the measure also helps in containing the amplification effect of financial systems
in exacerbating financial cycles and, thus, in alleviating the risk of squeeze in the
supply of credit during the downturn.
On liquidity, the main components in Basel III include the introduction of
the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) and the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). Both
measures, to ensure the soundness of banking sector, emphasise the need to set lim-
its on maturity transformation, which lies at the heart of banking business given
its role in reconciling the preferences of savers and investors. However, by imposing
fixed requirements over the cycle, these new liquidity measures could compromise
the macroprudential objective of the Basel III due to the interaction between matu-
rity transformation and leverage of banking system. In fact, leverage would not be
profitable without maturity transformation. In the environment where the funding
is cheap and the market-wide perception of risk is low, inexpensive maturity trans-
formation encourages banks to leverage more and to expand their balance sheets.
However, when the downturn arrives, a liquidity problem on the liabilities side of
financial institutions’ balance sheet could lead to fire sale on the asset side as dis-
cussed in Chapter 1. In this sense, excessive maturity transformation could pose
risks and make the system more vulnerable to a shock. As a result, there are good
reasons to regulate system-wide maturity transformation by taking into account its
cyclical variation in a similar manner as countercyclical capital buffer.
3.5 Conclusion
Given mark-to-market accounting and the usual VaR conventions, highly-leveraged
investment banks could, it seems, face insolvency due solely to exogenous common
shocks to fundamentals: a simple reversal of ‘good news’ on the perceived quality
of risky assets could be sufficient. We have argued, however, that the shocks were
in practice endogenous – due to the mis-selling of subprime assets by investment
banks, assisted by excessively favourable assessments on the part of rating agencies.
Rather than some ‘rational expectations’ equilibrium with common knowledge, the
legal evidence is of temporary cheating equilibrium leading to crisis when the truth
emerges.
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That financial institutions who nightly need to roll over a quarter of their
balance sheets are exposed to creditor panic is uncontroversial. What is controversial
is to maintain that the subprime crisis was caused by unreasoning panic based on
product opacity rather than fear based on bad news about the business model.
The three views we have focussed on provide plausible threats to financial
stability coming from differing factors – from externalities, cheating, or balance
sheet fragility. So one may be tempted to ask: which one is correct? As the
parable of the elephant suggests, however, each may provide a partial perspective
of a complex reality that involves all of them. The actions of policy-makers and the
courts supports this conclusion, as does the ex post assessment of the current chair
of the US Federal Reserve.
That these threats to stability should be complements and not substitutes
is more than a point of technical interest. What is being described is how radically
the US financial system was exposed to failure. The emergency actions of policy-
makers was, however, to provide unprecedented liquidity and capital support to
world-leading banking institutions soon to be found guilty of serious malfeasance.
Rating agencies, upon whom the Basel Committee had seen fit to rely for ensuring
the quality of bank risk assets, were likewise found by top prosecutors to be complicit
in deception.
Acemoglu and Robinson [2013] have famously argued that a nation’s prospects
for successful long-run growth depend essentially on the quality of its institutions:
and the US is typically cited as an example of best practice. That the US financial
system and its key institutional pillars should be so injury-prone must throw some





Endogenous Risk, and Crash
4.1 Introduction
Three key features lie at the heart of many financial crises, including the global
financial crisis of 2009: optimism, leverage, and default. Bhattacharya et al. [2015]
use a formal model to show that agents become more optimistic about the future
prospects for an economy after a prolonged period of good news because they up-
date their expectations over time according to previously realised good outcomes.
This contributes to the severity of the crisis. Indeed, after a number of good expec-
tations have been realised, new expectations grow; agents increase their leverage,
and find it more profitable to shift their portfolios to projects that are on average
riskier, thus making their portfolios more vulnerable to shocks. As a result, when
a downturn occurs, the ensuing financial crisis turns out to be more severe. The
study also highlights default as a source of pecuniary externality when investors fail
to internalise the subsequent impact of their decision to take risk and the prospect
of default into account.
Indeed, the default occur when the borrower’s promised payment exceeds
the value of collateral, and the lender receives the collateral. The fragility of asset
or collateral value is usually built during the good time. From this perspective,
the recent global financial crisis also highlights the importance of different beliefs of
investors in pushing asset prices up during the boom times, especially when optimists
in the economy can leverage their view by buying assets, that are then vulnerable
to subsequent collapses in asset prices.
The build-up and subsequent crash in asset prices could be attributed to the
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introduction of financial innovations, as shown in Fostel and Geanakoplos [2012].
Their study suggested that even without asymmetric information, leverage and fi-
nancial innovations can have major effects on asset prices if markets are incomplete.
In particular, the sequential introduction of these financial innovations was, in and
of itself, enough to cause boom and bust. The study shows that, in a general equi-
librium model of competitive markets, where investors have heterogeneous beliefs,
leveraged lenders can raise the value of securitised assets; moreover, if the risky asset
is ‘tranched’, given the availability of covered credit default swap (CDS) contract
backed by a risky asset, this will lead to an asset bubble. The innovation that can
potentially trigger collapse is the introduction of naked CDS contracts backed by a
crash in asset prices. Instead of being an insurance against failure, naked CDS act
as a vehicle for optimists and pessimists to leverage their views. As a result, the
availability of such naked CDS contracts is enough to burst the bubble. (For further
detail and discussion, see Appendix D.1.)
In fact, even without the sequential introduction of financial innovations, the
crash in asset prices could also be explained by the leverage cycle, as suggested
by Geanakoplos [2010], which studies the binomial model with endogenous leverage
using the general equilibrium analysis of collateralised lending and asset prices.
Although the baseline model in his analysis shows the crash in asset prices when
some optimists whose equity is wiped out have to leave the market, it exhibits no
default; loans are collateralised based on the worst payoff of assets and the promise
rules out default in equilibrium. This idea of no default in the binomial framework
is formalised and emphasised in Fostel and Geanakoplos [2015], which proposes a
‘Binomial No-Default Theorem’ suggesting that with a single financial asset serving
as collateral in a static binomial model, we can assume without loss of generality
that there is no default.
To allow for risky loans and default in equilibrium, Simsek [2013] uses a
continuum of states to analyse the effect of disagreements of belief in fundamentals
between two types of traders involving assets and financial contracts. This study
(extending Geanakoplos [2003], which is closely related to Geanakoplos [2010]) sug-
gests that belief disagreement affects asset prices and leverage altogether, and that
investors disagree on asset prices to a greater extent than their level of disagreement
on fundamentals.
In contrast to Simsek [2013], Yan [2017] shows that belief heterogeneity af-
fects the relationship between asset prices and leverage. Indeed, changes in market
average beliefs, rather than belief disagreement itself, determine the co-movement
of leverage and the price of an underlying asset that serves as collateral for loans.
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The study also shows that the asset prices are above their fundamental value when
collateral constraints are binding. However, the default in this model arises when
the realisation of collateral value is less than the face value of debt.
This chapter studies reversibility in a general equilibrium model of compet-
itive markets with heterogeneous beliefs. The analysis in this chapter is related
to the literature on heterogeneous beliefs (as discussed above), and on default (as
summarised in Chapter 1). The main contribution of this chapter is to show that a
simple reversal of shocks in terms of unanticipated increases in the quality of risky
assets,1 could lead to widespread insolvency and collapse; this is because the shocks
are amplified by the interaction between asset prices and heterogeneous beliefs, re-
sulting in asymmetric adjustment of risky asset prices.
The model setup in this chapter is akin to the binomial framework as in Fostel
and Geanakoplos [2012]. However, there are two key modifications: first, investors
are risk averse, and they only value consumption in the last period. This ensures
that investors prefer strictly positive consumption in both states of the world as
long as their beliefs on the probability attached to both states are not zero. This
implies that the borrowing constraints of those investors are not binding. Indeed,
the key determination of investors’ borrowing is their wealth, which greatly relies on
asset prices, rather than on borrowing constraints. Second, to study the adjustment
of risky asset prices in equilibrium, the model introduces the reversal of an unan-
ticipated increase in the quality of a risky asset. [One of the main shortcomings in
this setting is that, in contrast to Bhattacharya et al. [2015], the probability agents
attach to the states of nature are fixed. In addition, investors could be interpreted
as perfectly myopic agents, who totally neglect changes in the quality of a risky
asset. These could be the key improving areas of the model.]
There are three consequences of these modifications: first, the shock is am-
plified by an interaction between asset prices and heterogeneous beliefs due to the
allocational effect among optimists and pessimists through asset prices. Thus an
unanticipated improvement as to asset quality raises the equilibrium price of the
asset. As a result, the optimists, who currently hold the asset, become wealthier
with capital gains that stems from the increase in asset price. With such a gain, this
group of optimists, who highly value the asset, are willing to increase borrowing to
obtain more assets, pushing the asset price to increase further. The system is prone
to subsequent crash even the positive shock is reversed to the initial level because
1The foundation of unanticipated news shock is motivated by ‘neglected risk’, a behavioural
phenomenon mentioned in Gennaioli et al. [2012] as discussed in Chapter 1. The approach in
applying unanticipated shocks is similar to the one used in Chapter 3 in analysing the role of
externalities in Shin’s model.
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the asset holdings are concentrated in a small group of highly leveraged optimists.
Second, the default occurs if, given the reversal of positive shock, the asset price
drops below the worst-possible payoff of risky asset as perceived before the shock.
The sharp drop in asset price could be attributed to low-valuation buyers when the
optimists choose to reduce their holdings of the asset in response to the reversal of
the shock, while the pessimists find this an opportunity for investment. Third, this
default is systemic when some optimists, who provide high valuation on the risky
asset, default at the same time, and those optimists must exit the market.
Section 4.2 describes the model setting of a two-period economy with hetero-
geneous beliefs. Collateral and financial contracts are also specified in this section.
Section 4.3 characterises the basic equilibrium without leverage, provides numerical
examples, and gives analysis and discussion. Section 4.4 characterises the equilib-
rium, where leverage is allowed for all agents, and analyses the possibility of default
with the use of numerical examples. Finally, Section 4.5 sums up all analyses, and
concludes the paper.
4.2 Two-period economy with heterogeneous beliefs
In this general equilibrium model with collateral, there are two dates, t = 0, 1.
Uncertainty is represented by two states of nature, at t = 1, S1 ∈ {U,D} (a tree).
There are two types of assets, which produce consumption goods, at t = 1. The safe
or risk-free asset, W , generates consumption goods of 1 in both states, U and D.
The risky asset, Y , generates consumption goods of 1 and R, where R < 1, in states
U and D, respectively. The payoffs of both assets are described in Figure 4.1.
There is a continuum of risk-averse agents, h ∈ [0, 1], who are not impatient
and only value consumption at t = 1. Agents are different due to heterogeneous
beliefs in the probability attached to the states of the economy, qhU and q
h
D. The
height of optimism of the agents is thus denoted by their indexes h. Their utility
is characterised by a neoclassical utility function (increasing, strictly concave, twice
continuously differentiable) of consumption goods, C at t = 1. The agents maximise
their expected utility:





where, qhU is continuous and strictly monotonically increasing in h. For numerical
purposes, let us assume U(C) = ln(C), qhU = h, and q
D
U = 1 − h. In addition, each








t = 0 t = 1
Figure 4.1: Risk-free and risky asset payoffs
4.2.1 Collateral and financial contracts
Suppose, agents can trade financial contracts at t = 0. The financial contracts
is a non-state contingent, and backed by collateral, which is the sole enforcement
mechanism for repayment. In other words, this ‘no recourse’ loan contract allows
the lender to seize the collateral, but, in the case of default, the lender cannot
receive any further compensation. Suppose that only the risky asset Y is eligible as
a collateral. As a result, in order to make a promise, the borrower must hold the
risky asset Y , at t = 0.
In the usual theory, the supply-equals-demand equation determines the equi-
librium interest rate in the loan market. However, when taking into account the
collateral, it might be unclear which equation should determine the equilibrium
level of collateral until Geanakoplos [2010] sheds light in solving this endogenous
collateral problem. The financial contract is specified by pairing promise and col-
lateral. Thus, the same promise with different collateral should be considered a
different market, and should correspond to different interests rates. In other words,
each level of interest rate corresponds to a specific contract, a pair of (promise, col-
lateral). The borrowing amount b (or we can call it the price of the contract) thus
has a one-to-one relationship with gross interest rate r determined in equilibrium.
Then, b (or r) together with the risky asset price p determines the loan-to-value
(LTV ) ratio and the margin requirement defined as 1 − LTV . The reciprocal of
the margin requirement represents equilibrium leverage. In sum, the equilibrium
with endogenous collateral could be characterized by equilibrium leverage. In equi-
librium, the LTV ratio, margin requirement, and leverage are thus simultaneously
determined by asset price p and the price of financial contract b (or interest rate r).
With a single financial asset serving as collateral in static binomial model,
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we can assume without a loss of generality using the Binomial No-Default Theorem
(Fostel and Geanakoplos [2015]) that the maximum-minimum debt contract is the
only debt contract actively traded, and there is no default. The maximum-minimum
contract is a non-state-contingent promise that corresponds to the worst-case payoff
of the collateral R. As a result, there is no actual default. The borrowing constraint
and agent’s ‘no default’ condition becomes b ≤ Ryh, where, R and y represent a
promise and collateral, respectively. Here, and in what follows, it is clear that the
maximum possible amount of b in the economy is R < 1. This guarantees that the
supply of loans is always greater than demand, given (as we will see) that an agent
will not borrow until the safe asset is used up. Taking into account that agents are
not impatient, and that these agents do not value consumption before the end of
the period, the interest rate r become zero.
Note that b > 0 implies that an agent is borrowing by selling a promise, while
b < 0 means that an agent is lending by buying a promise. Lending will reduce the
budget of an agent at t = 0, but enable him to consume more at t = 1. Actually, a
lending agent will need to be indifferent between holding a safe asset and buying a
promise given r equals zero.
4.2.2 Budget Set
The risk-free asset W can be considered as a numeraire in this model by normalising
the price of the risk-free asset at t = 0.The price of consumption in each state
U andD equals one. Thus, we can possibly consider W as analogous to cash.
Now, suppose, agent h, who is currently holding (endowed with) a portfolio
containing whe and y
h
e units of risk-free and risky assets, respectively. The current
borrowing of the agent is bhe . A positive value of b
h implies borrowing, while a
negative value implies lending. Given the risky asset price p, and zero interest rate,
each agent h optimises his portfolio by choosing, at t = 0, his cash holding wh,
holding of risky asset yh, and the amount of loan bh, in order to maximise the
expected utility in Eq(4.1). The budget constraint is then:
wh + pyh − bh ≤ whe + pyhe − bhe
Notice that the right-hand side of the budget constraint represents the net
worth of agent h at the beginning of the period, while the left-hand side shows his
net worth given his portfolio choice wh, yh, and bh. Since the interest rate is zero,
the problem can be simplified by defining net borrowing as ωh = wh−bh.. The agent
is also subject to the borrowing constraint, bh ≤ yhR, and short-selling constraints
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wh and yh ≥ 0. The consumption plan of each agent (chU , chD) could be described as:
cU = w
h + yh − bh
cD = w
h +Ryh − bh
4.2.3 Equilibrium
There exist a risky asset market and a loan market for agents at t = 0. As mentioned
earlier, in this zero-interest rate economy without default, the price of a loan is equal
to the promise. Thus, the equilibrium is described by the price of risky asset p, the
cash holdings of each agent wh, the asset purchase of each agent yh, financial contract
trade bh, and the consumption plans of all agents,((p), (wh, yh, bh, chU , c
h
D))h∈(0,1) ∈
(R+)× (R+ ×R+ ×R×R+ ×R+)H , such that all markets are clear:∫ 1
0
whdh = 1∫ 1
0




This section considers the reversibility of shocks to asset quality in the economy
when borrowing and lending are not allowed, and no promise can be made. First,
the initial equilibrium is determined, followed by the equilibrium with good news,
where agents re-optimise their allocations given unanticipated positive shocks. This
resembles the situation during the subprime boom when there was a series of credit
upgrades in subprime-related securities. However, the impressive ratings were down-
graded afterward following the introduction of the ABX Index when the fundamental
price of these securities seems to have been discovered. The subsequent legal evi-
dence on fines of banks and credit-rating agencies (shown previously) clearly depicts
the collusion between investment banks and rating agencies in rating manipulation.
Finally, the equilibrium when the good news shock is reversed is described at the
end of this section. Figure 4.2 illustrates the timeline of events. It is also important
to note that, in this model, the ‘rational expectations’ assumption is relaxed because
the shocks are unanticipated. This is consistent with the behavioural perspective,
or so-called ‘neglected risk’, as in Gennaioli et al. [2012]. The neglected risk phe-
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nomenon indicates the tendency of investors to ignore certain unlikely outcomes.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the phenomenon could partly explain why many crises
surprise the market.
Figure 4.2: Timeline of events
In the absence of leverage, agents can only trade risk-free asset W and risky
asset Y . They cannot use those assets as collateral for borrowing, and no promise
can be made. In addition, we also assume that short selling is not allowed in
this economy. An agent will maximise the expected utility subject to the budget
constraint and short-selling constraints. Suppose, at the beginning of the period,
agent h is endowed whe and y
h
e units of risk-free and risky assets, respectively. The
agents optimise their portfolios by choosing their holdings of risk-free asset wh and
risky asset yh.
Appendix D.2.1 shows the private decision of an agent. In this economy,
there will be three types of agents: (1) extreme optimists with h ≥ hb = (p−R1−R)(1p),
who provide higher valuation to the risky asset than others in the economy, will
hold only Y ; (2) cautious optimists with p−R1−R = hs ≤ h < hb = (p−R1−R)(1p) who
will have portfolios containing a combination of W and Y ; and (3) pessimists with
h ≤ hs = (p−R1−R) who prefer fully insured consumption and hold only W . Figure 4.3










Figure 4.3: Agent types in no-leverage equilibrium
Given the private decision, we can identify the marginal optimist hb, who
is indifferent in holding W (he is also the most optimistic agent that is indifferent
between W and Y ), and the marginal pessimist hs, who will be indifferent in holding
Y (he is also the least optimistic agent that is indifferent between W and Y ). The














e ) if hb > h ≥ hs
0 if h < hs
(4.2)











e ) if hb > h ≥ hs
whe + py
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The initial endowment for all agents is whe = 1 and y
h
e = 1. Each agent’s demand
function for risky asset is yh followed by Eq(4.2). The characterisation of equilibrium
can then be presented below. This is followed by the numerical example at the end.
Due to strictly monotonicity and continuity of interior solution (cautious
optimists) of yh in h and the connected set of heterogeneous agents h ∈ [0, 1],
there will be a unique marginal buyer hm, who will be indifferent between buying
and selling Y , and who will not participate in the asset market because he finds
his endowment optimal; that is, yhm = y
h
e . In equilibrium, extreme optimists with
h > hb, who, among all the agents give the highest valuation to Y , will buy all they
can afford of Y (i.e. selling all W ). Cautious optimists hb > h > hs will hold a
combination of W and Y . Pessimists h < hs prefer perfectly insured consumption,
and will sell all their endowment of Y for durable consumption good W .
To describe the system of equations that characterises equilibrium, I deter-
mine the initial equilibrium as the system of two equations below. Eq(4.5) demon-
strates the market-clearing condition, which equates supply and demand for risky
asset Y . The marginal optimist hb and marginal pessimist hs are described in
Eq(4.4). The right-hand side of Eq(4.5) shows aggregate selling revenue by agents
who lie below the marginal buyer hm. The first term represents the revenue of
cautious optimists, who prefer to reduce their holdings of Y . The second term rep-
resents the revenue of pessimists, who sell all their endowment of Y . The left-hand
side shows aggregate buying expenditure by agents who lie above the marginal buyer
hm. The first term represents the expenditures by cautious optimists, who prefer to
acquire more Y . The second term represents the expenditures by extreme optimists,
who spend all of their W endowment for Y . For the equilibrium price of Y , note












Eq(4.6) represents the valuation of unique marginal buyer hm, a cautious
optimist who is indifferent between buying and selling Y . The left-hand side of the
equation shows demand for Y of the marginal buyer; this demand needs to be equal
to his endowment of 1.
((1−R)hm − (p−R))(1 + p)
(1− p)(p−R) = 1 (4.6)
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With a system of equations above with two equations and two unknowns,
we can solve for the risky asset price p and the marginal buyer hm. We can then
determine the marginal optimist hb and the marginal pessimist hs, accordingly. For
R = 0.2, we get, p = 0.570, hm = 0.589, hb = 0.811, and hs = 0.462. Figure 4.4
describes the allocation of Y in the economy as well as the consumption plan of each
agent.2
(a) Distribution of risky asset holdings
(b) Consumption plans in U(Green) and
D(Red), and expected consumption (Black)
Figure 4.4: No leverage economy - an initial equilibrium
4.3.2 Equilibrium with unanticipated good news
Suppose, there is an unanticipated positive shock to asset quality in which the
common belief of risky asset payoff in state D is shifted from R to R′, where R <
R′ < 1. This situation could be thought of as an unanticipated credit upgrade on
subprime mortgage securities. All agents re-optimise their allocations given this
new information arriving the market. However, the initial equilibrium provides
heterogeneity in cash holdings wh, and asset holding yh as shown in Figure 4.4a.
Given the unanticipated good news, the demand functions for the risky asset of the
agents, y′h, could be explained by Eq(4.2) where whe = wh and yhe = yh. We can
then show the characterisation of equilibrium below; this is followed by a numerical
example at the end.
The good news results in an increase in the risky asset price to p′ as, in
equilibrium, wealth is being transferred to optimistic agents h > hm who previously
2A detailed simulation result is provided in Appendix D.2.3.
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bought Y and then, given good news, increase demand for acquiring more Y . The
demand from this group of optimists increases for two reasons: first, the worst
risky asset is believed to be improved to R′ by all the agents. Second, with ‘mark to
market’ accounting, capital gains from the price rise for risky assets on their balance
sheets will raise their equity and wealth. In addition, the price will be raised further
simply because these optimistic agents, who become richer, value the risky asset
more than others do.
Given that y′h is increasing in h, there exists the unique marginal buyer





Eq(4.2), we can easily observe that agents’ wealth after re-distribution, wh + p′yh,
is increasing with h as yh is increasing in h for h ∈ (hs, hb). Figure 4.6 provides
a numerical example of the re-distribution of wealth. Indeed, the marginal buyer
will shift up to h′m as the asset price increases because, given that he is indifferent
between buying and selling Y , it’s clear that the marginal buyer will determine the
asset price in equilibrium.
Unanticipated good news also raises the marginal pessimist to h′s (see proofs
in Appendix D.2.2). This implies that there will be a larger group of pessimists
because the price of the risky asset is now too expensive from their point of view.
With an increasing number of pessimists, there will be more disagreement in the
economy. This also implies that the marginal buyer, h′m will be agent who was
previously a cautious optimist h ∈ (hs, hb), given that former extreme optimists
h > hb cannot acquire more Y because they have already spent all their wealth on
Y in the initial equilibrium. However, the marginal optimists h′b can be above or
below hb depending on the price of Y . If the price is too high, some of the former
extreme optimists could become cautious optimists by reducing their holdings of
Y . From their point of view, these assets are too expensive. In this scenario, the
marginal optimists h′b will shift up to be above hb. However, if the price is not so
expensive relative to the improvement in R, some cautious optimists will evolve into
extreme optimists by spending all their wealth on Y . In this scenario, the marginal
optimist will lie below hb, and there will be more extreme optimists in the economy.
The equilibrium is, thus, determined by the system of two equations, Eq(4.7)
and Eq(4.9), below. Eq(4.7) demonstrates the market-clearing condition, which
equates supply and demand for a risky asset. The right-hand side shows aggregate
revenue. The first term represents the revenues of cautious optimists h′s < h <
h′m, who are reducing their holding of Y as, in their views, it is too expensive
relative to fundamental improvement. The second term represents the revenues for
pessimists hs < h < h
′
s, who previously were cautions optimists, but turn out to be
85
pessimists by selling all their holdings of Y . The left-hand side shows the aggregate
expenditure. The first term represents the expenditure of cautious optimists h′m <
h < h′b, who choose to increase their holding of Y . The second term represents the

































Eq(4.9) represents marginal buyer h′m who is a cautious optimist indifferent
between buying and selling of Y, and who will not participate in the market be-
cause he finds his current holding optimal; that is, y′h′m = yh′m . The left-hand side
represents y′h′m , while the right-hand side representsyh′m .
(h′m(1−R′)− (p′ −R′))



















From a system of equations above with two equations and two unknowns,
we can solve for the risky asset price, p′ and the marginal buyer h′m. We can then
determine the marginal optimist, h′b, and the marginal pessimist, h
′
s, accordingly.
For R′ = 0.7, we get p′ = 0.873, h′m = 0.624, h′b = 0.660, and h
′
s = 0.576. Figure
4.5a shows the allocation of Y across agents. Figure 4.5b shows consumption plans
in U and D of all agents. It is also interesting to see the re-distribution of wealth
after the good news, as shown in Figure 4.6.3
3A detailed simulation result is provided in Appendix D.2.3.
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(a) Distribution of risky asset holdings
(b) Consumption plans in U(Green) and
D(Red), and expected consumption (Black)
Figure 4.5: No leverage economy - a good news equilibrium
Figure 4.6: No leverage economy - wealth re-distribution with good news
4.3.3 Equilibrium with the reversal of good news
Suppose, the common belief about the risky asset quality is later discovered, and that
its worst payoff is equal to R′′ where R′′ < R′. This is, to some extent, similar to the
situation when the credit default swap (CDS) agreements were introduced into the
market, and the market prices of mortgages backed the securities being discovered.
Observing the sharp drop in the ABX Index in 2007, investors started to lower their
valuation of a mortgage-backed security (MBS). Initially, as the investors had little
information about a given MBS quality, they needed to rely on ratings provided by
CRAs. The ratings were then shown to have been inflated, and, subsequently, these
were revised down. As a rating usually indicates the level of risk attached to a given
security, we can think of the rating in terms of the worst possible payoff of a risky
asset, which could represent R in this model.
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As shown in Figure 4.5a, the ‘good news’ equilibrium re-allocates the holdings
of cash and of risky assets to be w′h and y′h, respectively. As a result, the demand
functions for risky assets, given the arrival of bad news (or the reversal of good
news), y′′h, could be explained by Eq(4.2), where, whe = w′h and yhe = y′h. We can
then show the characterisation of equilibrium below; this is followed by numerical
example at the end.
Bad news results in a drop in the risky asset price to p′′ as, in equilibrium,
wealth is being transferred to less optimistic agents, h < h′m, who previously sold Y
given good news. In response to a drop in asset quality and a lower risky asset price,
there is a group of optimists who want to reduce their holdings of risky assets, and to
supply Y into the market, while a group of less-optimistic agents, who preserve cash
given good news ,are willing to acquire more Y . This less-optimistic group finds a
drop in price of Y to be an opportunity for investment. The low valuation provided
by these less-optimistic buyers exacerbates risky asset prices further in equilibrium.
There exists the unique marginal buyer h′′m, who is indifferent between buying
and selling Y , that is, y′′h′′m = y′h′′m . From Eq(4.2), it can be shown that the agents’
wealth after re-distribution w′h + p′′y′h is decreasing with h for h ∈ (h′s, h′b). This is
because the risky asset demand (and supply) given good news y′h− yh is increasing
(and decreasing) with h. The numerical example of re-distribution of wealth is
provided in Figure 4.8. In this case, although the price of Y drops, the marginal
buyers shift up further to h′′m because the agents below h′′m will be buying Y , while
the agents above h′′m will be reducing their holdings of Y . The agent h′m < h < h′′m
will be acquiring additional Y .
A similar logical argument, as in Appendix D.2.2, can be applied to show that
unanticipated bad news will lower the marginal pessimist to h′′s < h′s. Intuitively,
lower marginal pessimist implies that less-optimistic agents are more willing to hold
Y as, from their point of view, the risky asset is relatively cheap compared to the
drop in its worst payoff. However, the marginal optimists h′′b can be above or below
h′b depending on p
′′.
The equilibrium is determined by the system of two equations, Eq(4.10)
and Eq(4.11) below. Eq(4.10) demonstrates the market-clearing condition, which
equates supply and demand for risky assets. The left-hand side shows aggregate
revenue. The first terms represent revenues of agents who were previously extreme
optimists h′b < h < h
′′
b ,, who become cautious optimists by selling parts of Y . The
second term represent cautious optimists h′′m < h < h′b who are reducing their
holding of Y as, in their views, its price is too expensive. The right-hand side shows
aggregate expenditure. The first term represents expenditure of cautious optimists
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h′s < h < h′′m, who are increasing their holdings of Y . The second terms represent
the expenditures by new cautious optimists h′′s < h < h′s, who see bad news as an























Eq(4.11) represents marginal buyer h′′m, who is indifferent between buying
and selling Y , and who will not participate in the market because he finds his current
holding optimal that is y′′h′′m = y′h′′m . The left-hand side of the equation represents
y′′h′′m , which is given by applying Eq(4.2) to this equilibrium where the marginal
buyer’s wealth is represented by w′h′′m + p′′y′h′′m . The right-hand side represents
y′h′′m .
(h′′m(1−R′′)− (p′′ −R′′))












−R′ − p′′(1 +R′(−2 +R′′)) +R′′ + p′(1− p′′R′ + (−2 + p′′ +R′)R′′)
(p′ − p′′)(−1 +R′)(−1 +R′′)
From a system of equations above with two equations and two unknowns,
we can solve for the risky asset price p′′ and the marginal buyer h′′m. We can then
determine the marginal optimist h′′b and the marginal pessimist h
′′
s , accordingly. For
R′′ = R = 0.2, we get p′′ = 0.565, h′′m = 0.626, h′′b = 0.807, and h
′′
s = 0.456. Figure
4.7a shows allocation of Y across agents. Figure 4.7b shows consumption plans in
U and D of all agents. It is also interesting to see the re-distribution of wealth after
the good news, as shown in Figure 4.8. Figure 4.9 summarises the distribution of
agents in all equilibria of the non-leverage economy.4
The reversal of good news leads to new allocations of Y across agents, and to
a drop in the price of Y . The impact on wealth will be perceived most by the agents
who bought the risky asset given good news. Indeed, the price of Y becomes even
4A detailed simulation result is provided in Appendix D.2.3.
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lower than the price in the initial equilibrium, though the asset quality is reversed to
the same quality, as in the initial equilibrium. This amplification mechanism arises
mainly from the risk-averse assumption as the downward sloping supply curve is
exhibited by the optimists who need to reduce their holdings of Y , even though a
lower price will affect their wealth and lessen their incentive to hold Y .
(a) Distribution of risky asset holdings
(b) Consumption plans in U(Green) and
D(Red), and expected consumption (Black)
Figure 4.7: No-leverage economy - a ‘good news’ reversal equilibrium
Figure 4.8: No-leverage economy - wealth re-distribution with ‘good news’ reversal
4.4 Leverage economy
In this economy, agents can borrow to finance their investment of risky assets. As
a result, the agents who were extreme optimists in the previous economy without
leverage, who would like to consume more in U , but were constrained by their



















Figure 4.9: No-leverage economy - agent types in three equilibria
Given: R=0.2; R’=0.7; R”=0.2
additional Y . In particular, borrowing expands the interior set of agents, who can
equalise their marginal utility of cash and of risky asset. As we shall see later, all
agents except the pessimist can obtain their optimal solution with equalised marginal
utility because (1) risk-averse agents always prefer strictly positive consumption in
D as long as their belief on the probability attached to D is not zero, and (2)
borrowing with constraint bh ≤ yhR allows them to vary their consumption in D
down to zero when the constraint is binding (all Y payoff in D will be paid as a
promise). The implication here is that the the borrowing constraint for agents will
not be binding except for the top optimist h = 1, who believes with certainty that
the risky asset payoff will be 1, and who will discard all consumption in D. Since
borrowing provides more cash in hand for optimists, who give high valuation to the
risky asset, the price will increase more than had been the case in the economy
without leverage.
In terms of the welfare implication, the market is still incomplete and inef-
ficient. Agents can only move their consumption from D to U by borrowing that
is backed by risky asset Y . However, they cannot transfer their consumption from
U to D. Thus, only optimists can price in (though imperfectly) their willingness to
buy risky assets, while pessimists have no mechanism to shift their consumption to
D, and cannot price in their willingness to lower consumption further in D. As a
result, the price is inflated due to market incompleteness. Fostel and Geanakoplos
[2012] show that financial innovations to complete the market could lead to a crash
once the economy shifts from a ‘tranching’ economy to an Arrow-Debreu economy.
Suppose, agent h is currently holding (endowed with) a portfolio containing
whe and y
h
e units of risk-free W , and risky asset Y , respectively. The current bor-
rowing of the agent is supposed to be bhe . A positive value of b
h implies borrowing,
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while a negative value implies lending. The agent h maximises his expected util-
ity by choosing a portfolio containing risk-free asset wh and risky asset yh, and by
borrowing amount bh. The problem can be simplified by defining net borrowing,
ωh = wh− bh. For simplicity, we further assume that an agent will not borrow until
a safe asset is used up; that is, an agent will borrow (bh > 0) iff ωh < 0.
Appendix D.3.1 shows a private decision of an agent. In this leverage econ-
omy, there will be three types of agents: (1) extreme optimists with h ≥ (p−R1−R)(1p),
who will buy all they can afford for Y , and sell a promise to (borrow from) the other
groups of agents; (2) cautious optimists with p−R1−R ≤ h < (p−R1−R)(1p), who will hold a
combination of Y and W , and will not participate in borrowing; and (3) pessimists
with h ≤ (p−R1−R), who prefer fully insured consumption and will sell all their holdings
of Y . Only durable consumption good W will be in the pessimists’ portfolio.
Now, we can identify the marginal optimist hb, who will be indifferent in
holding W and in borrowing. (It should be noted that cash and borrowing are
perfect substitutions given an interest rate equal to zero.) The marginal pessimist
hs will be indifferent in holding Y . The demand function for risky assets given










e ) if h ≥ hs
0 if h < hs
(4.12)
The ω could be described by Eq(4.13) below. It should be noted that for
extreme optimists, h > hb, −yhR ≤ ωh < 0, as they hold only Y , and also sell a
promise in equilibrium. For cautious optimists and for pessimists, h < hb, ω
h > 0,
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This section describes initial equilibrium in the leverage economy, in which agents
are allowed to borrow by selling a promise. The initial endowment for all agents
is whe = 1 and y
h
e = 1. Each agent’s demand functions for risky asset y
h follow
Eq(4.12). The characterisation of equilibrium can then be presented below; this is
followed by a numerical example at the end.
Given the endowment and demand function as described in Eq(4.12), we can
easily see that there will be a unique marginal buyer hm, who will be indifferent
between buying and selling risky assets, and who will not participate in the market
because he finds his endowment optimal; that is, yhm = y
h
e = 1. In equilibrium, all
agents h < hs prefer perfectly insured consumption, and will sell all their endowment
of Y for durable consumption good W . All agents h > hs will hold a positive amount
of risky asset yh, which is increasing with h. In addition, there is a marginal buyer
h, who is indifferent in holding W and in borrowing, where, hb =
p−R
1−R . All agents
hb > h > hs will hold a combination of W and Y without borrowing. Agents with
h > hb, who among all agents give highest valuation to Y , will buy all that they can
afford, including borrowing to buy Y .
The initial equilibrium is thus characterised by the system of two equations
below. Eq(4.15) equates supply and demand for risky asset Y , and demonstrates the
market-clearing condition. The marginal optimist hb and the marginal pessimist hs
are described in Eq(4.14). The right-hand side shows aggregate selling revenue by
agents who lie below the marginal buyer hm. The first term represents the revenue
of cautious optimists, who prefer to reduce their holdings of Y . The second term
represents the revenue of pessimists, who sell all their endowment of Y . The left-
hand side shows aggregate buying expenditure by cautious optimists who lie above
the marginal buyer hm.∫ 1
hm







Eq(4.16) represents unique marginal buyer hm, who is indifferent between
buying and selling Y . The left-hand side of the equation shows demand for Y of the
marginal buyer, which needs to be equal to his endowment of 1. We can also see
that hm is increasing in p. Compared to the non-leverage equilibrium, the leverage
economy should evidence higher hm as p is higher.
((1−R)hm − (p−R))(1 + p)
(1− p)(p−R) = 1 (4.16)
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With a system of equations above with two equations and two unknowns,
we can solve for the risky asset price p and the marginal buyer hm. In equilibrium,
the market-clearing price p ∈ (1, R) is increasing with R and could be described by
Eq(4.17). The marginal buyer hm could also be specified by Eq(4.18). We can then
determine the marginal optimist hb, and the marginal pessimist hs, accordingly. For
R = 0.2, we get p = 0.600, hm = 0.625, hb = 0.833, and h
′
s = 0.5. Figure 4.10a shows
the allocation of Y across agents. Figure 4.10b shows the consumption plans in U
and D of all agents.5 Compared to the non-leverage economy, the leverage economy
evidences higher hm, meaning that risky asset holding is more concentrated in group
of top optimists, and hm corresponds to a higher p.












(a) Distribution of risky asset holdings
(b) Consumption plans in U(Green) and
D(Red), and expected consumption (Black)
Figure 4.10: Leverage economy - an initial equilibrium
4.4.2 Equilibrium with unanticipated good news
The initial equilibrium has allocational effects, and provides heterogeneity in cash
holdings wh and asset holding yh. The allocation of Y after the initial equilibrium
is shown in Figure 4.10a. The demand functions for risky assets of the agents y′h
could thus be explained by Eq(4.12), where whe = w
h and yhe = y
h. We can then
show the characterisation of equilibrium below, followed by a numerical example at
the end.













Figure 4.11: Leverage economy - extreme optimists’ balance sheet with good news
With an unanticipated positive shock to asset quality, where R is shifted to
R′ and R < R′ < 1, it is obvious that risky asset prices will rise in response to good
news about asset quality. Suppose, the price rises to p′. This improves the wealth of
the optimists with h > hm, who previously bought Y in initial equilibrium, and who
are willing to acquire more Y given good news. Again, the demand from these group
of optimists increases for two reasons: first, the worst risky asset payoff is believed by
all agents to be improved to R′. Second, with ‘mark to market’ accounting, capital
gains from the price rise for risky assets on their balance sheets will raise their equity
value. The extreme optimists will also borrow more to buy the risky assets. Figure
4.11 illustrates the increase in borrowing that leads to balance-sheet expansion. In
addition, the price will rise further simply because these optimistic agents, who
become richer, and who value risky assets more than others do. However, with
leverage allowing an agent to borrow more to buy risky assets, the price could be
so high that the number of extreme optimists will be squeezed, and the number of
marginal optimists will grow. This scenario is shown later in the numerical examples.
The system is prone to default because there are only few extreme optimists with
extremely high leverage; this makes the price skyrocket.
Given y′h is increasing in h, there exists the unique marginal buyer y′hm , who
is indifferent between buying and selling Y ; that is, y′hm = yhm . From Eq(4.12),
we can easily observe that the agents’ wealth after re-distribution, wh + p′yh, is
increasing with h as yh is increasing in h for h ∈ (hs, hb). The numerical example
of a re-distribution of wealth is provided in Figure 4.13. Indeed, the marginal buyer
will shift upwards to h′m as price increases because, given that the marginal buyer
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is indifferent between buying and selling Y , it’s clear that the marginal buyer will
determine the asset price in equilibrium.
Unanticipated good news also raises the marginal pessimist to h′s. The proof
is shown in Appendix D.2.2. With an increasing number of pessimists, there will
be more disagreement in the economy. The marginal optimist h′b can be above or
below hb depending on the price of Y . If the price is too high, some formerly extreme
optimists could become cautious optimists by reducing their holdings of Y for W .
In the leverage economy, it is also possible that the marginal buyer h′m lies above
h′b, where the demand for Y comes only from formerly extreme optimists who are
wealthier and borrowing more in order to acquire additional Y . In this scenario,
agent h ∈ (h′b, hb) will sell some Y in order to reduce the borrowing, thus, increasing
consumption in D. In equilibrium, h > h′m will buy additional risky assets. Agents
hs < h < h
′
m will sell part of their risky assets.
The equilibrium is thus determined by the system of two equations, Eq(4.19)
and Eq(4.21), below. Eq(4.19) equates supply and demand for risky assets and
demonstrate the market-clearing condition. The right-hand side shows the aggregate
revenue, which comes from the pessimists and the cautious optimists who lie below
the marginal buyer h′m. It should be noted that as hs increases, there are agents
h ∈ (hs, h′s), who were previously cautious optimists, but become pessimists as the
asset price rises to a level that is too high for them. Also, it is also possible that h′m
lies above h′b, implying that the extreme optimists with h
′
b < h < h
′
m still borrow
to buy Y , but just decrease their borrowing and holdings of Y . The left-hand side
shows aggregate expenditure, which could come purely from the extreme optimists
given h′m > h′b.∫ 1
h′m











Eq(4.21) represents a unique marginal buyer who is indifferent between buy-
ing and selling risky assets. As explained in the previous section, we should expect
much higher marginal buyer when compared to non-leverage economy due to bor-
rowing and hm is increasing in p.
(h′m(1−R′)− (p′ −R′))





(1− p)(p−R) (1 + p) (4.21)
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From a system of equations above with two equations and two unknowns,
we can solve for the risky asset price p′ and the marginal buyer h′m. We can then
determine the marginal optimist h′b and the marginal pessimist h
′
s, accordingly. For




Note that, in this case, h′m > h′b > hb. Figure 4.12a shows allocation of Y
across agents. Figure 4.12b shows consumption plan in U and D of all agents. It is
also interesting to see the re-distribution of wealth after the good news as shown in
Figure 4.13.
(a) Distribution of risky asset holdings
(b) Consumption plans in U(Green) and
D(Red), and expected consumption (Black)
Figure 4.12: Leverage economy - a ‘good news’ equilibrium
Figure 4.13: Leverage economy - wealth re-distribution with ‘good news’
4.4.3 Equilibrium with the reversal of good news
In this section, we consider the situation in which the common belief on risky asset
quality is revised down to from R′ to R′′, where R′′ < R′. As previously shown
6A detailed simulation result is provided in Appendix D.3.3.
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in Figure 4.12a, the ‘good news’ equilibrium re-allocates the holdings of cash and
of risky assets to be w′h and y′h, respectively. As a result, given bad news (or the
reversal of good news), the demand functions for risky assets of the agents y′′h could
be explained by Eq(4.12), where, whe = w
′h, and yhe = y′h. We can then show the
characterisation of equilibrium below; this is followed by a numerical example at the
end.
Bad news results in a drop in the risky asset’s price to p′′ as, in equilibrium,
wealth is being transferred to less-optimistic agents h < h′m, who previously sold
Y given good news. Similar to the situation a non-leverage economy, in response
to a drop in the asset quality and the lower risky asset price given bad news, there
is a group of optimists who want to reduce their holdings of risky asset, and to
supply Y into the market, while a group of less-optimistic agents who preserve cash
given good news are willing to acquire more of Y . These groups of agents see the
drop in the price of Y as an opportunity for investment. Low valuation provided by
these less- optimistic buyers exacerbates the risky asset price further in equilibrium.
However, we should expect a lower equilibrium price in a leverage economy because
the balance sheet mechanism is allowed to work.
There exists the unique marginal buyer y′′hm , who is indifferent between
buying and selling of Y , that is, y′′hm = y′hm . From Eq(4.12), it can be shown that
the agents’ wealth after re-distribution, w′h+p′′y′h, is decreasing with h, for h > h′s.
This is because, given a good news, the risky asset demand (supply) by these group
of agents, y′h − yh, is increasing (decreasing) with h. As a result, loss is increasing
in h while equity is decreasing in h, for h > h′s, as leverage allows these agents to
aggressively buy Y given good news. Thus, summarising the above statements, the
extent of loss and equity corresponds to the amount of Y they bought given good
news. The numerical example of re-distribution of wealth is provided in Figure
(4.15). In this case, although the price of Y drops, the number of marginal buyers
shifts up further to h′′m because agents below h′′m will be buying Y while the agents
above h′′m will be reducing their holdings of Y . The agents h′m < h < h′′m will be
acquiring additional Y .
A logical argument, similar to the one applied in Appendix D.2.2, can again
be applied to show that the unanticipated bad news will lower the number of
marginal pessimists to h′′s < h′s. Intuitively, the lower number of marginal pessimists,
given the news reversal, implies that some agents who were formerly pessimists will
become cautious optimists who are willing to hold Y because, from their point of
view, the risky asset is now cheap, even when there is a drop in its quality. However,
the number of marginal optimists h′′b can be above or below h
′
b, depending on p
′′.
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In contrast to the situation in a non-leverage economy, in a leverage economy
it is possible that the reversal of risky asset quality back to the initial quality R
could potentially lead to bankruptcy and default. The default will occur if and only




(p′ − p′′)(1−R′) , 1
]
(4.22)
The equilibrium is thus characterised by the system of two equations below.
Now, agents h > h′′m will be selling Y while h′′s < h < h′′m will be instead of buying
Y because the price is so attractive for them. Eq(4.23) equates supply and demand
for risky assets, and demonstrates the market-clearing condition. The left-hand side
shows aggregate revenue, which comes from default optimists, whose risky assets
will be seized and liquidated, and from some agents who were previously extreme
optimists, who find that they need to reduce their holdings because of drop in asset
quality and their wealth. These groups of agents lie above the marginal buyer h′′m. It
should be noted that as the number of marginal buyer is increasing further, there are
agents h ∈ (h′′m, h′′d), who were previously extreme optimists, but become cautious
optimists by selling some Y . The right-hand side shows aggregate expenditure by
all agents h′′s < h < h′′m, who have safe asset and see investment opportunities in





p′′(y′ − y′′)dh =
∫ h′′m
h′′s





Eq(4.25) represents marginal buyer h′′m, who is indifferent between buying
and selling Y and will not participate in the market because he finds his current hold-
ing optimal, that is, y′′h′′m = y′h′′m . Based on Eq(4.12), the left-hand side represents
yh
′′
















−R′ − p′′(1 +R′(−2 +R′′)) +R′′ + p′(1− p′′R′ + (−2 + p′′ +R′)R′′)
(p′ − p′′)(−1 +R′)(−1 +R′′)
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From a system of equations above with two equations and two unknowns,
we can solve for the risky asset price p′′ and the marginal buyer h′′m. We can then
determine the marginal optimist h′′b , the marginal pessimist h
′′
s , and the default
threshold h′′d, accordingly. For R
′′ = R = 0.2, we get p′′ = 0.574, h′′m = 0.875,
h′′b = 0.814, h
′′
s = 0.467, and h
′′
d = 0.941.
7 Figure 4.14a shows allocation of Y across
agents. Figure 4.14b shows consumption plans in U and D of all agents. It is also
interesting to see the re-distribution of wealth after the good news, as shown in
Figure 4.15. Figure 4.16 summarizes distribution of agents in all equilibria of the
leverage economy.
(a) Distribution of risky asset holdings
(b) Consumption plans in U(Green) and
D(Red), and expected consumption (Black)
Figure 4.14: Leverage economy - a ‘good news’ reversal equilibrium
Figure 4.15: Leverage economy - wealth re-distribution with ‘good news’ reversal




















Figure 4.16: Leverage economy - agent types in three equilibria
Given: R=0.2; R’=0.7; R”=0.2
4.5 Discussion and conclusions
This paper’s analysis shows insolvency and defaults in a heterogeneous beliefs frame-
work. In particular, we introduced unanticipated ‘good news’ by raising the worst
payoff of the risky asset, which results in increasing the asset price and in redis-
tributing wealth from the pessimists to the optimists. Expansions in the equity
base of the optimists encourage them to take more risk by buying more assets for
their portfolios. However, the unexpected reversal of good news shows the asymme-
try of capital gains and losses, which may trigger insolvency and defaults. Several
key takeaways from this paper merit emphasis:
First, in contrast to Geanakoplos [2010], and to Fostel and Geanakoplos
[2012], this paper’s assumption related to risk aversion provides interesting insights.
First, the assumption allows the effect of pecuniary externalities to work, leading to
the amplification of the reversal shocks, as well as the asymmetry of capital gain and
loss. Equity-based expansions of the ranks of the optimists encourage them to take
on excessive risk by acquiring additional risky assets for their portfolios. By contrast,
the pessimists are, however, risk averse and, so their demand is price sensitive (not
perfectly elastic). This also leads to fragile disagreement (or ‘scary good news’) when
the risks are highly concentrated in the portfolio of the optimists.8 The numerical
examples provided in Section 4.3.2 regarding the no leverage economy, in which
borrowing is not allowed indicate that the top 43 percent of the agents hold all the
risky assets in the economy. When leverage is possible in the leverage economy, as
shown in the example provided in Section 4.4.2, only 18 percent of the agents in the
economy hold all the risky assets. However, the reversal of good news leads optimists
8Geanakoplos [2010] emphasized the role of scary bad news in causing higher asset volatility.
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to adjust their portfolios by reducing their asset holdings, while the pessimists who
preserve cash in the ‘good news’ equilibrium see low asset prices as opportunities
for investment.
Second, if the reversal of good news takes the price lower than the worst
payoff that agents had expected when good news arrived p′′ < R′, then the default
is unavoidable. The defaults involve negative equity of the optimistic defaulting
borrowers.9 This is in contrast to the Binomial No-Default Theorem (as in Fostel
and Geanakoplos [2015]), which suggests the ‘no default’ outcome in the economy
with a single financial asset serving as collateral in a static binomial model. The
assumption of unanticipated shocks as a ‘zero probability event’, supported by the
‘neglect risk’ phenomenon (as in Gennaioli et al. [2012]), plays a role for the defaults
in this model.
Third, this paper provides the default outcomes that endogenise the extent
of systemic defaults. The size of a group of agents who default in this model is
endogenously determined by the asset price in responses to the reversal of good
news. In particular, the numerical results show that the number of systemic defaults
is larger with bigger shocks. For example, the shock of R′ − R = 0.6 − 0.2 = 0.4,
results in default for top 2.7 percent of agents. If, however, the shock increases
to R′ − R = 0.7 − 0.2 = 0.5, as provided in the numerical results above, the top
6 percent of agents will default. These examples could reflect the credit rating
agencies’ highly favourable pre-crisis ratings, which were subsequently revised, as
signaled by the ABX-HE indices. The same size of systemic defaults in the pre-crisis
US subprime mortgage securitisation markets could have been amplified further with
various spillover mechanisms within the financial system; this situation contributed
to the Great Recession.
9Although Geanakoplos [2010] also gave the results of the disappearance of optimists given bad
news, such disappearance doesn’t directly affect the lenders. This is because, in these circumstances,
the collateral will be seized and the equity of those optimists are just wiped out as the loan traded





A.1 Amplification mechanism and endogenous risks
There are various mechanisms within the financial system that could amplify a small
shock into a major event. Such amplification mechanisms could lead to boom-bust
cycles. In good times, excessive risk taking usually manifests itself as an increase
in asset prices, allowing institutions to take additional risks thanks either to an
endogenous increase in equity and net worth, or to relaxed asset price-dependent
constraints imposed either by regulators (who may set capital requirements) or by
the institutions themselves (who may set borrowing constraints). With heightened
ability to borrow, such institutions will increase leverage and expand their balance
sheets.1
Additional risks taken during good times leads, in bad times, to a sharp
drop in asset prices when the deleveraging process begins, especially in an economy
characterised by limited access to external finance and an incomplete insurance mar-
ket. A powerful amplification mechanism of shocks is usually propelled by ‘feedback
loops between prices and distress selling of assets’. As mentioned in Shim and Von
Peter [2007], this distress selling could be triggered either by insolvency shocks as
a result of excessive risk taking, or by liquidity shocks. Distress selling emphasises
the role of pecuniary externalities as an engine of amplification, in which the effects
of correlated actions on price are not internalised in the private decision within a
1During the expansionary phase of the financial cycle, financial intermediaries choose to have
common exposure on credit and liquidity risks (or to correlate their risks) due to ‘strategic com-
plementarities’; that is, their payoff from holding common risks increases with the number of other
agents taking the same strategies.
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competitive market framework.
On the seller’s side, various mechanisms could generate asset fire sales, includ-
ing forced selling due to liquidity needs, idiosyncratic financial constraints, mainte-
nance costs (e.g., Moore [2013]), or even the agent’s preference to liquidate assets
for consumption (e.g., Davila and Korinek [2017]). A survey of the substantial lit-
erature on amplification mechanisms is provided in the survey of financial frictions
by Brunnermeier et al. [2012]. Another fast-growing branch of the literature, ly-
ing between detailed partial equilibrium models of banking and ‘institution-free’
general equilibrium, focuses on adding ‘financial frictions’ to dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models cast in the Gali/Woodford tradition of modern
macroeconomics.2
On the buyer’s side, there are many ways to generate the usual downward-
sloping demand curve for risky assets. In an economy with uncertainty, the intro-
duction of a risk-averse buyer who demands a greater risk premium to hold more
risky assets, could result in a sharp drop in asset prices (e.g., Shin [2010]). In a
model with uncertainty and heterogeneous beliefs, agents who have different valua-
tions of risky assets can also generate a downward sloping curve, even if the agents
are risk neutral. The disappearance of the most optimistic agents when given bad
news results in an equilibrium price determined by investors whose valuation of the
asset is low (e.g., Geanakoplos [2010]).3 In an economy without uncertainty, the
imperfectly elastic demand curve could be generated simply by buyers’ access to
a concave technology (e.g., Davila and Korinek [2017]). While there is an exten-
sive corpus of literature on amplification and asset fire sales, the key early studies
contributing to the area include Bernanke and Gertler [1990], Shleifer and Vishny
[1992], and Kiyotaki and Moore [1997].
With these amplification mechanisms, it would appear that the price of risky
assets can exhibit what Zeeman [1974] and Arnold [1984] refer to as ‘catastrophic’ be-
haviour: highly asymmetric responses to symmetric movements in exogenous forces.
Zeeman sought to explain the gradual rise in equity prices in a boom, followed by
the sharp fall in the subsequent crash by the differences in behaviours between ‘bulls
and bears’.
2We make no attempt to analyse these contributions; but, for a good illustration, with a concise
summary of other papers in this burgeoning field, the reader may be referred to Coimbra and Rey
[2017].
3In Geanakoplos [2010]), most optimistic agents disappear because their equity is wiped out in
a bad state of the world, as these agents prefer zero consumption and borrow to buy risky assets by
promising all their wealth in the bad state. However, there is no default in this model, as lenders
still receive the full promise from these optimistic agents.
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A.2 Pecuniary externalities and inefficiency
Although the amplification of shocks as a result of pecuniary externalities and dis-
tress selling manifests itself in bad times, the endogeneity of asset prices also applies
in normal or good times. This is because agents take prices as a given and do not
internalise either collective effects or joint behaviour. Market outcomes are therefore
not welfare efficient, as asset fire sales normally result in indirect wealth transfer via
price mechanisms from more productive agents to less productive agents. Geanako-
plos and Polemarchakis [1986] discuss the constrained inefficiency of an economy
with incomplete markets; this has led to a recently growing body of literature in
this area.
In particular, Davila and Korinek [2017] illustrate two different mechanisms
of pecuniary externalities leading to constrained inefficient allocations. The first
mechanism, the so-called ‘distributive externality’, emerges when agents have dif-
ferent marginal rates of substitution (MRS), which could be a result of binding
constraints or incomplete markets in which the privately optimal allocation is not
possible, given the availability of asset span in the economy. The second mecha-
nism, the so-called ‘collateral externality’, emerges when the price-dependent finan-
cial constraints (e.g., borrowing constraints, regulatory capital requirements, Value
at Risk, and incentive-compatible constraints) are binding. While the distribu-
tive externality mechanism can exhibit either over- or under-investment depending
on differences in MRS across agents, the collateral externality mechanism always
shows over-investment. For both mechanisms, the ex-post constrained Pareto im-
provements could be achieved by ex-ante redistribution of resources among agents
to allow ex-post wealth transfer through price changes, thus providing a room for
government intervention with a view to achieve welfare improvement.
Various studies emphasise the role of distributive externality in leading to
constrained inefficiency. Lorenzoni [2008] demonstrates that, in an economy with
uncertainty, competitive financial contracts with limited levels of commitment by
lenders can result in excessive borrowing ex-ante and excessive volatility ex-post due
to incomplete insurance contracts. In particular, excessive borrowing causes exces-
sive contraction in investment and risky asset pricing. Subsequently, Moore [2013]
points out that uncertainty and financial contracts are not necessary for generating
constrained inefficiency. The need to maintain capital by paying maintenance costs
using proceeds from selling assets can also trigger fire sales and can lead to market
failure. In both examples, a simple ex-ante transfer between two groups of agents
can bring about a Pareto improvement. Caballero and Krishnamurthy [2003], Ko-
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rinek [2010], and Stein [2012] are among the other studies that show over-borrowing
can lead to excessive leverage, resulting in constrained inefficiency.
A further strand of literature emphasises the role of collateral externalities.
Greenwald and Stiglitz [1986] show that the competitive equilibrium of an economy
with asymmetric information also exhibits constrained inefficiency in a setting in
which agents are subject to price-dependent constraints. Bianchi [2011] shows over-
borrowing as a result of collateral externalities, occurring when borrowers are subject
to collateral constraints that depends on an endogenous price. It could be that these
two mechanisms of externalities interact with each other, as shown in Korinek and
Simsek [2016].
As a key driver of market failures, pecuniary externalities create a role for
government intervention aimed at welfare improvement. Moreover, the potential
for market failure also justifies macro-prudential regulation, a subject widely dis-
cussed after the subprime crisis. While micro-prudential regulation is necessary to
ensure individual stability, or to lessen the extent of the principal agent problem,
it is not sufficient for the maintenance of system-wide stability, and it may have
unintended consequences. The key channels of such unintended consequences work
through pecuniary externalities. Various policy tools aiming at lessening the extent
of amplification and buoyant asset prices include debt-to-income (DTI) ratios, loan-
to-value (LTV) ratios, countercyclical capital buffers, and capital surcharges based
on systemic risk contribution. In particular, Goodhart et al. [2013] discuss various






B.1 Equilibrium without aggregate uncertainty
In this appendix, we assume that each consumer can have access to both short-term
and long-term assets.
Efficient Solution
Let us assume that the planner has complete information about the economy.
In particular, the planner knows exactly who is an early consumer, and who is a
late consumer. The planner chooses the allocation between short-term and long-




λU(C1) + (1− λ)U(C2) (B.1)
subject to:
λC1 ≤ y
(1− λ)C2 ≤ (1− y)R+ (y − λC1)
As it is never optimal to carry over any of short-term assets from date 1 to
date 2, the constraints are binding and become λC1 = y and (1− λ)C2 = (1− y)R.







λ and C2 =
(1−y)R
1−λ
Given that R > 1 and U ′′(C) < 0, the optimality condition implies C2 > C1.
An individual’s consumption will be higher or lower, depending on whether he is
early or late consumer. This also allows us to relax the assumption that the planner
knows exactly who is an early consumer, and who is a late consumer because there
is no incentive for a late consumer to withdraw early. The solution is incentive
compatible.
Another interesting insight is that λ disappears from the optimality condi-
tion. This is because, from the planner’s point of view, the effect of an increase
in λ on the marginal rate of substitution, in which the planner will place greater
value on an early consumer’s consumption, is offset by the cost of satisfying early
consumer by giving up the return from holding long-term assets resulting in lower
consumption for a late consumer. The left term of the equation below shows the
marginal rate of substitution of the planner, and the right term shows the ratio of







(1− λ)U ′(C2 =
λR
(1− λ)
Another interpretation of the disappearance of λ in the optimality condition
is that the increase in λ results in the increasing marginal utility of liquidity, which
is cancelled out by the increasing marginal cost of liquidity. Since both constraints
are binding, the planner will always provide return from short-term assets to early
consumers, and returns from long-term assets to late consumers. At optimality, the
marginal utility of liquidity (or short-term assets) needs to be equal to the marginal
cost of liquidity which is forgone return that results in less consumption for late
consumers. The left term of the equation below refers to the marginal benefit of
liquidity (or early consumption), while the right term refers to the marginal cost of







λU ′(C1) = λRU ′(C2)
Note that, when U(C) = ln(C), R plays no role in determining the optimal
liquidity because binding constraints imply that the optimal allocation doesn’t re-
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quire each asset’s returns to be shared between both types of consumers. In other
words, returns from short-term assets will be delivered to early consumers, and the
returns from long-term assets will be delivered to late consumers. The left-hand side
of the equation below shows that R obviously plays no role in the marginal benefit
of liquidity as long as R > 1. In addition, for the marginal cost of liquidity, the
right-hand side points out that the effect of R is also cancelled out. This is because
while an increase in R raises the opportunity cost of liquidity when a late consumer
has to forgo the payoff of long-term assets, it increases the marginal utility of late










) = −((1− λ) (1− λ)





As each consumer is unable to trade assets, and has to consume the returns
generated by his portfolio, a consumer’s problem is:
max
y
λU(C1) + (1− λ)U(C2) (B.2)
subject to:
C1 ≤ y
C2 ≤ y + (1− y)R
Both constraints are binding because there is no incentive for a consumer to
hold a short-term asset from date 1 to date 2, and because a consumer consumes
all the return of long-term asset at date 2 due to the assumption of the neoclassical






If we assume the risk aversion is equal to 1 in the standard CRRA function,




R−1 , (1− λ)R)
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Market
A consumer now can trade at date 1. Once the uncertainty is revealed, the
market allows an early consumer to sell long-term assets in exchange for consumption
at date 1, and it allows a late consumer to buy long-term assets in exchange for




λU(C1) + (1− λ)U(C2) (B.3)
subject to:
C1 ≤ y + P (1− y)
C2 ≤ ((1− y) + y
P
)R
It is obvious that both constraints are binding. In equilibrium, P = 1 because
if P > 1, the long-term asset dominates the short-term asset at date 0, and no one
wants to hold short-term assets. As a result, P = 0 which contradicts P > 1. If
P < 1, the short-term asset dominates long-term asset at date 0, and no one wants
to hold long-term assets at date 0. As a result, consumers will bid price up to P =
R. This again cannot be an equilibrium as P = R contradicts P < 1.
At this price, a consumer is indifferent between long- and short-term assets
at date 1, and the consumer’s portfolio choice is irrelevant. The consumer’s con-
sumption will be (C1, C2) = (1, R). There are multiple equilibria as they can be
anything, as long as the aggregate liquidity or short-term asset in the economy is
equal to λ (eg. equlibrium when the λ fraction of consumers hold only short-term
assets in their portfolios, and the (1− λ) fraction of consumers hold only long-term
assets; or equilibrium when each consumer has the same portfolio choice, which is
the λ fraction of his endowment invested in short-term assets and the (1−λ) fraction
invested in long-term assets.
Bank
Given that there is only uncertainty about the time preference of consump-
tion of the consumer, the banking solution is efficient and similar to the planner’s
solution.
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B.2 Proof of efficient allocation
The efficient allocation is characterised by considering the problem of a planner
who seeks to maximise utility of the representative consumer by making investment
decision on short- and long-term assets at date0, and to distribute the proceeds
from investments to consumers who value consumptions at date 1 and date 2. The
investment decision of the planner is given y and 1−y, which represent units of short-
term assets and long-term assets, respectively, invested per a unit of good that is the
endowment of consumer at date 0. Consumption bundle of representative consumer





λHC1H = y (1− λH)C2H = (1− y)R
λLC1L ≤ y (1− λL)C2L = (1− y)R+ (y − λLC1L)
Note that the constraint at date 2 is always binding because U(.) is strictly
concave; therefore, all proceeds from investment will be used up. In addition, the
constraint at date 1 in state H is always binding. Let me assume that the constraints
in both states are binding. Given the optimal holding of liquidity, y, the efficient
allocation across time provides C1H < C1L and C2H > C2L as λH > λL. Then, if
C1L < C2L, the consumption bundle becomes C1H < C1L < C2L < C2H . If C1L ≥
C2L, the consumption bundle becomes C1H < C1L = C2L < C2H as the consumer
will be better off by postponing consumption from date1 to date2 until C1L = C2L.
In the latter case, the constraints is not binding in state L, and consumers receive
a fully insured consumption bundle regardless of consumers’ types equal to the
expected consumption y + (1 − y)R. Therefore, the efficient allocation across time
ensures binding constraints in state H, while whether the constraint in state L is
or is not binding depends on the optimal C1L and C2L. The result is intuitive
because it has never been optimal for the planner to carry forward liquidity from
date 1 to date 2 in both states; the planner can do better by allocating more goods
into long-term assets. and thereby can enjoy higher returns and higher expected
consumption. Also, the efficient solution, where C2S ≥ C1S , provides an incentive-
compatible outcome in the sense that there is no incentive for a late consumer to
pretend to be early consumer. Therefore, we can relax the assumption that the
planner needs to know investors’ types. The solution can be summarised as follows:
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First, let me consider the efficient allocation across time for a given value of
y. The Lagrangian is;
L = pi(λHU(C1H)+(1−λH)U(C2H))+(1−pi)(λLU(C1L)+(1−λL)U(C2L))+µ( y
λL
−C1L)
FOC w.r.t. C1L; (1− pi)λL(U ′(C1L)− U ′(C2L))− µ = 0 , C1L > 0
FOC w.r.t. µ; y − λLC1L ≥ 0 , µ ≥ 0
Case1 µ = 0, y − λLC1L > 0 U ′(C1L)− U ′(C2L = 0 and y − λLC1L > 0
Case2 µ > 0, y − λLC1L = 0 (1− pi)λL(U ′(C1L)− U ′(C2L) = µ and y − λLC1L = 0
Therefore, the first-order conditions to the problem that are necessary and
sufficient can be written as:
U ′(C1L)− U ′(C2L) ≥ 0
with the complementary slackness condition:
[U ′(C1L)− U ′(C2L)][y − λLC1L] = 0
Note that U ′(C1L) ≥ U ′(C2L) implies C1L ≤ C2L. As a result, the
incentive constraint is automatically satisfied. In particular, case1 implies that
C1L = C2L = y + (1 − y)R, and that the budget constraint at date 1 in state L is






that the budget constraint is binding. Therefore, the optimality of the consumption







C1L = min{ y
λL
, y + (1− y)R} C2L = max{(1− y)R
1− λL , y + (1− y)R}
Second, let us consider the efficient allocation across state to obtain the






) + (1− λH)U( (1− y)R
(1− λH)))
+ (1− pi)(λLU(min{ y
λL
, y + (1− y)R}) + (1− λL)U(max{(1− y)R
1− λL , y + (1− y)R}))
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Since the objective function in continuous and U(.) is strictly concave, we
can obtain y∗, and it is unique. The solution to the planner’s problem consists of a
portfolio choice of y∗ and consumption bundle C∗ = {C∗L, C∗2L, C∗1H , C∗2H} such that
optimal holding of liquidity y∗ is given by:
piU ′(C1H) + (1− pi)U ′(C1L)
piU ′(C2H) + (1− pi)U ′(C2L) = R










, y + (1− y)R} C∗2L = max{
(1− y)R
1− λL , y + (1− y)R}





2(R−1) if R ≤ Rˆ
piλH + (1− pi)λL if R > Rˆ
where
Rˆ ≡ (1− λL)(piλH + (1− pi)λL)
λL(1− (piλH + (1− pi)λL))
represents the critical long-term asset return such that if R is lower than the critical
value, C1L = C2L, and C1L ≤ C2L otherwise. In the latter case, the optimal holding
of liquidity in the economy is equal to the expected probability of being an early








y∗ + (1− y∗)R if R ≤ Rˆy∗
λL
if R > Rˆ
C∗2L =
y∗ + (1− y∗)R if R ≤ Rˆ(1−y∗)R
(1−λL) if R > Rˆ
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B.3 Comparative statics in equilibrium without run (for
R = 2; pi = 0.35; λH = 0.85; λL = 0.80; U(C) = ln(C))
Figure B.1: Illustration of relationship between the characterisation of equilibrium
without run (PH , PL, P0, ρ) and parameters (R, pi, λH , λL)
Figure B.2: Illustration of relationship between bank’s choices (yS , yR, dS , dR) and
parameters (R, pi, λH , λL)
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2L) and parameters (R, pi, λH , λL)







2L) and parameters (R, pi, λH , λL)
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B.4 Comparative statics in equilibrium with run (for
R = 2; pi = 0.35; λH = 0.85; λL = 0.80; U(C) = ln(C))
Figure B.5: Illustration of relationship between the characterisation of equilibrium
with run (PH , PL, P0, ρ) and parameters (R, pi, λH , λL)
Figure B.6: Illustration of relationship between bank’s choices (yS , yR, dS , dR) and
parameters (R, pi, λH , λL)
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2L) and parameters (R, pi, λH , λL)







2L) and parameters (R, pi, λH , λL)
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Appendix C
Subprime Assets and Financial
Crisis: Theory, Policy and the
Law
C.1 Effect of exogenous shocks raising asset quality
How to determine the ultimate effect taking these externalities into account? To
derive this formally, note first how, with mark-to-market gains following an improve-
ment in asset quality, the previously binding VaR constraint is relaxed and the new
equity level of active investors is given by:
e′ = p′y − (q − z)y (C.1)
where p′y denotes assets revalued at new prices and (q − z)y is pre-existing level of
borrowing. The increased equity value allows active investors to take more risky as-
sets onto their balance sheets. These expand until VaR constraint is again binding,
so:
e′ = p′y′ − (q′ − z′)y′ (C.2)
where y′ denotes the new optimal holdings of risky assets held by active investors,
and the improved asset quality is indicated by q′ > q, z′ < z.
For the holding of risky assets by active portfolio managers, equations Eq(C.1)






(q′ − q)− (z′ − z)
p′ − q′ + z′
)
or
y′A − yA = yA












Endogenous Risk, and Crash
D.1 The sequence of financial innovation and the Great
Recession
Fostel and Geanakoplos [2012], hereafter F&G, put forward the possibility that the
mortgage boom and bust crisis of 2007-2009 might have been caused by financial
innovation. They suggest that that ‘the astounding rise in subprime and Alt A
leverage ... together with the remarkable growth of securitization and tranching...
raised the prices of underlying assets such as houses and mortgage bonds ... [and]
that the introduction of Credit Default Swaps(CDS) in 2005, and 2006 brought those
prices crashing down.’
By contrast, in this section of our paper, we use the Foster and Geanako-
plos heterogeneous beliefs approach to provide a general equilibrium perspective,
where the ‘good news’ corresponds to an increase in optimism, and the ‘bad news’
corresponds to the introduction of CDS swaps which allow for shorting of the risky
asset.
F&G assumed an endowment economy populated by risk-neutral agents with
identical endowments, but heterogeneous beliefs, who can trade their initial (equal)
holdings of a safe and a risky asset (whose payoffs in the ‘up’ state and ‘down’ states
are specified as (1,1) and (1,R < 1), respectively) in a competitive general equilib-
rium. The focus is on how financial innovations that affect trading possibilities will
alter the price of the risky asset.
Given their heterogeneous prior beliefs about the probability q of the good
outcome for the risky asset, participants can be ordered in terms of increasing op-
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timism, where 0 ≤ h ≤ 1 denotes the ‘height’ of optimism, so q = h; for example,
or perhaps, q = 1− (1−h)2. Without leverage, the solution for the market-clearing
price, p, of the risky asset, conditional on any given degree of optimism, is given
by equating the revenue from sales of the asset to the aggregate expenditure by the
more optimistic agents:
p = (1− h)(1 + p) so p = (1− h)/h
as shown by the schedule NN in Figure D.1. The reason that the market-clearing
price is negatively related with h comes from the fact that only agents to the right
of the NN schedule hold the risky asset. So, the same amount of risky assets has to
be held by a smaller fraction of the population as h increases.
However, the assumed heterogeneity of beliefs implies a positive relationship
between the beliefs of the marginal investor and the market price. Specifically,
assuming that the market price of the risky asset, p = q + (1 − q)R, reflects the
beliefs of the marginal investor, which defines the schedule labelled as Marginal
Buyers Valuation in the Figure. If, for example, q = h, then the schedule is simply:
p = (1− h) + hR
As shown in Figure D.1, The intersection of this schedule with NN at EN
identifies the marginal holder of the risky asset, and determines the equilibrium
price for the no-leverage economy.
Thus, the story in F&G begins in an equilibrium without leverage (EN)
when the pessimists sell all the risky assets to the optimists and hold all cash, with
total payoffs in both ‘up’ and ‘down’ states being shared by the optimists and the
pessimists. But then, with leverage, the pessimists sell their risky assets to optimists
and hold all cash, with the optimists consuming more in the ‘up’ state.
Formally, with leverage, ‘expenditure’ on the risky asset by the more-optimistic
agents only has to cover the downside risk, so the market-clearing equation becomes:
p−R = (1− h)(1 + p)
This increases the price conditional on any given degree of optimism, as
indicated by the schedule LL; and in the new equilibrium EL the price of the risky
assets will increase as a smaller number of optimists will be able to hold them all.
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Figure D.1: Four equilibria in Fostel-Geanakoplos model, assuming q = h
F&G went on to determine the impact that ‘tranching’ the risky asset will
have. They argued that giving the risky asset holders the ability to sell the ‘down
tranche’ effectively gives the most-optimistic participants access to an Arrow security
for the ‘up’ state (where the risk assets have high return), while the pessimists who
buy it gain access to an Arrow security for the ‘down state’ (where the risky assets
have low return R).1 The effect is to raise the price of the risky asset to pT , as shown
by the upper dashed line in the figure. Tranching, they argued, enriches the set of
securities on offer; but with access tied to asset ownership, as it distorts the asset
price.
By the way of contrast, the price of Arrow securities themselves, are assumed
to be freely available and enforceable without collateral, which implies the much
lower ‘complete markets’ price pC for the risky asset, which is indicated by the
lower dashed line in the figure.2 Indeed – and this was the nub of their argument –
F&G argued that, where tranching is already available, introducing CDS contracts
(which can be used to insure against losses when the risky asset ‘fails’) had the effect
of completing the market.3 The curve CC in Figure D.1 shows market clearing for
1Note that, for F&G, ‘tranching’ refers to the ex-ante creation of Arrow securities, while in
normal parlance ‘tranching of MBS’ (into senior, junior, etc.) refers to the ex-post allocation of
losses. The equivalent of a ‘senior tranche’, which delivers consumption in both states, and would
require holding both the Arrow securities.
2[Razin, 2014, Chapter 7] provides further discussion of this ‘complete markets’ outcome.
3It is as if the full complement of the Arrow securities were available for purchase in desired
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the ‘down’ tranches plus CDS contracts issued by the optimists and purchased by
the pessimists. In the resulting Arrow/Debreu equilibrium at EA, the risky assets
are held by a larger fraction of the population; and the price falls to EA to reflect
the lower valuation of the marginal buyer.
It should be noted that with the introduction of CDS contracts, the optimists
hold all the endowments of both risky assets and cash; and they sell insurance
contracts to the pessimists. This allows the optimists to consume all the payoffs in
the ‘up’ state while the pessimists consume all the payoffs in the ‘down’ state, just
as in the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. The asset price crash that their model predicts
arises because optimists sell ‘naked’ insurance to the pessimists (i.e. CDS contracts
collateralised by cash), raising the demand for cash, and lowering the price of risky
assets.
One could perhaps interpret the ‘bad news’ shock in the investment banking
model of Shin as the impact of introducing CDS contracts, which lowers the price
of risky assets. For R = 0.2, for example, F&G calculated a fall of about a third
as between pT and pC . In reality, however, the fall in the value on MBSs, net of
insurance against failure, was far greater than one-third.
While F&G’s ingenious analysis provides interesting insights, particularly on
the role of heterogeneous beliefs, its application comes with several caveats. Most
strikingly, there is no bankruptcy in their model. This reflects, it seems, to two
strong technical assumptions: first, that all the agents are risk neutral, and second,
that all ‘naked’ CDS contracts are fully collateralised (i.e. with liquid reserves
available to cover all the losses). This would be surprising for unregulated OTC
contracts; and the spectacular failure of AIG, for example, seems to contradict the
assumption.4 The sequence of events depends on financial innovation, but this is
taken to be exogenous.
Unlike the treatment in Allen and Gale [2000], where a distinction is drawn
between a new product and process industries (where diversity of opinion about risk
is likely) and traditional industries (where it is not), and where a cost must be paid to
establish one’s type, there is only one risky investment in the F&G economy that is
assumed; and all the agents know their type ex-ante. They assumed, moreover, that
beliefs are not subject to market manipulation. This is, of course, quite contrary to
the approach taken by Foster and Young [2010] on the gaming of performance fees;
and of Akerlof and Shiller [2015] on collusion between bankers and rating agencies.
We believe legal findings have an important role to play in helping to choose among
quantities with all the contracts fully collateralised.




The approach taken in Curatola and Faia [2016] was to postulate heteroge-
neous tastes for risk-taking rather than the heterogeneous beliefs on outcomes, and
to provide a complementary account of how these tastes evolve over time. What
emerges as a result is a type of Minsky-cycle based on investor psychology rather
than on the forecasting models of investment banks, as in Aymanns et al. [2016].
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D.2 No-leverage equilibrium
D.2.1 Private decision in no leverage economy
Suppose, agent h is holding a portfolio containing whe and y
h
e units of risk-free and
risky assets, respectively. The agents optimise their portfolio by choosing their
holdings of risk-free asset wh and risky asset yh and solve the following problem by:
max
wh,yh
h U(wh + yh) + (1− h) U(wh +Ryh) (D.1)
subject to:




L = qhU(wh + yh) + (1− qh)U(wh +Ryh) + λ(whe + pyhe − wh − pyh)
Using Khun-Tucker conditions, private decisions suggest that there are three
group of agents, which are described as follows:
(1) Extreme optimists will be agents with h > (p−R1−R)(
1








(2) Cautious optimists will be agents with p−R1−R < h ≤ (p−R1−R)(1p) and their















Note that the last term of the equation, whe + py
h
e , represents equity.
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(3) Pessimist will be agents with h ≤ (p−R1−R) and their private decisions would
be:
yh = 0
wh = whe + py
h
e
To describe the system of equations that characterises leverage equilibrium,
there will be the marginal optimist hm, who is indifferent between holding and not
holding the safe asset, and the marginal pessimist hs who is indifferent between
holding and not holding the risky asset. In equilibrium, all the agents h > hb will
sell all W , and hold only Y . All the agents hb ≥ h > hs will hold a combination
of W and Y . All agents h < hs will sell all Y , and hold only durable consumption
good W .
As a result, the demand function for risky assets given unanticipated news














e ) if hb > h ≥ hs
0 if h < hs











e ) if hb > h ≥ hs
whe + py
h













Due to strictly monotonicity and continuity for interior solution (cautious
optimists) of yy in h and the connected set of heterogeneous agents h ∈ [0, 1], there
will be a unique marginal buyer hm, who is indifferent between buying and selling
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(he can be interpreted as being a cautious optimist who spends all his wealth for
risky assets,yh = we+pye1−R
1
p). The marginal pessimist is described by hs = (
p−R
1−R)
(he can be interpreted as being a cautious optimist who spends all the wealth for
risk-free assets, yh = 0).
D.2.2 Marginal optimist hb and marginal pessimist hs given im-
proved asset quality
To prove that hb is decreasing when there is unanticipated good news in which R
shifts up to R′, it gives us the following steps:
hs is increasing with R
Step1
We will show that without allocational effect, hs is increasing with R. From














It should be noted that no arbitrage condition R < p < 1, dpdR is strictly
positive. Plugging Eq(D.3) into Eq(D.2), we shall see that dhsdR is strictly positive


















If we can prove that allocational effect will push up hs further, then we can
be sure that hs is increasing with R. With good news, wealth is being transferred
to optimists who were acquiring Y in the initial equilibrium. As the top group of
optimists, who give high valuation to Y , become richer and are going to acquire
more Y (hm, who determine the asset price, increases), this will raise the price of Y .
Since we know from Eq(4.4) that ∂hs∂p =
1
1−R > 0, we know that allocational effect
also raises hs. Thus, we can be ensured that hs increases with R.
hb is decreasing with R
Step1








Plugging Eq(D.3) into Eq(D.4), we shall see that dhbdR is strictly negative and
the inequalities below are satisfied, given 0 < R < 1 and no arbitrage condition














(1 + p)R < (R+ p(2p−R))
R < p
Step2




p2(1−R) > 0, which implies
that the allocational effect will lead hb to increase. Thus, if the allocational effect
dominates, like in the leverage economy case when R′ = 0.7, hb could be increasing
and the economy is on the edge of a default. We shall see that later, and in this
case the reversal to R could lead to a crash.
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D.2.3 Numerical results
1) Initial equilibrium - Given R = 0.2, the market clearing and numerical results
are described below.
Figure D.2: No-leverage economy - an initial equilibrium’s market clearing
Note: (1) the vertical axis represents price, and (2) the horizontal axis represent
total amount of risky assets, where from the left axis to blue line is the amount of
asset held by agents above hm and from the right axis to yellow line the amount of
asset held by agents above hm
Figure D.3: No-leverage economy - an initial equilibrium’s numerical results
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2) Equilibrium with unanticipated good news - Given R′ = 0.7, the
numerical results is described below.
Figure D.4: No-leverage economy - a good news equilibrium’s numerical results
3) Equilibrium with the reversal of good news - Given R′′ is reversed
to = 0.2, the numerical results is described below.




D.3.1 Private decision in leverage economy
Now, suppose, agent h is currently holding (endowed with) portfolio containing whe
and yhe units of risk-free and risky assets, respectively. The current borrowing of
the agent is bhe . Negative value of b
h implies borrowing while positive value implies
lending. The agent optimises his portfolio by choosing holdings of risk-free asset w,
risky asset y, and borrowing amount b. The problem thus becomes:
max
wh,yh,bh
h U(wh − bh + yh) + (1− h) U(wh − bh +Ryh) (D.5)
subject to:




Note that the right-hand side of the budget constraint represents agent h’
wealth or net worth. We can simplify the problem by defining net borrowing, ωh =
wh − bh. For simplicity, we assume that an agent will not borrow until a safe asset
is used up; that is, an agent will borrow (bh < 0) iff ωh < 0 (remember, the interest
rate is equal to zero). This group of agents who borrow in equilibrium is optimistic
about the economy, and would like to shift their consumption from D to U , by
borrowing to have additional investment in risky assets. If state D is realized, they
will need to return their promises to a lender by using risky asset payoff. The
problem can then be written as:
max
ωh,yh
h U(ωh + yh) + (1− h) U(ωh +Ryh) (D.6)
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subject to:




L = qhU(ωh + yh) + (1− qh)U(ωh +Ryh) + λ(ωhe + pyhe − ωh − pyh)
Using Khun-Tucker conditions, the solution to this problem divides the agents into
three groups, which are described as follows:
(1) Extreme optimists, who are using leverage to gain additional risky assets






















(2) Cautious optimists, who are not using leverage and holding a combination






















(3) Pessimist, who are holding only risk free asset in their portfolio, will be





, and their private decisions would be:
yh = 0
ωh = ωhe + py
h
e
To describe the system of equations that characterises leverage equilibrium,
there will be the marginal pessimist hs, who is indifferent in holding Y , and the
least-optimistic agent who is indifferent between W and Y . In equilibrium, all the
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agents h > hs will hold a combination of W and Y . All the agents h < hs will sell
all their holdings of Y , and hold only durable consumption good W .
In addition, since leverage increases the span of the consumption set for
agents (the optimists in particular), in equilibrium there will be the marginal opti-
mist hb, who is indifferent between the leverage buying and cash buying of Y . All
agents h > hb will sell a promise to finance their buying of Y . All agents hb > h > hs
will hold a combination W and Y .
As a result, the demand function for risky assets in response to unanticipated










e ) if h ≥ hs
0 if h < hs










e ) if h ≥ hs
ωhe + py
h














D.3.2 Existence of a default and a default threshold
As the borrowing constraint of agents is never binding except for the most optimistic
agent with h = 1, for h < 1 we have:
0 < ω′ +R′y′
Given the reversal of good news, a default condition for agent h is described
by negative equity that is,
ω′ + p′′y′ < 0
If p′′ ≥ R′, there will be no default in equilibrium because,
0 < ω′ +R′y′ ≤ ω′ + p′′y′
If p′′ < R′, there will always be a default in equilibrium. Since ω′ + R′y′ is
decreasing in h and ω′+R′y′ = 0 for the top optimist h = 1, there will be agents in
which,
ω′ + p′′y′ < 0 < ω′ +R′y′
And for h = 1, whose borrowing constraint is binding ω′ = −R′y′,
ω′ + p′′y′ = −R′y′ + p′′y′ = (p′′ −R′)y′ < 0
As agent h’s equity ω′+p′′y′ is decreasing in h, there will be a unique default
threshold hd that satisfies, ω









1) Initial allocation - Given R = 0.2, the market clearing and numerical results
are described below.
Figure D.6: Leverage economy - an initial equilibrium’s market clearing
Figure D.7: Leverage economy - an initial equilibrium’s numerical results
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2) ‘Good news’ equilibrium - Given R′ = 0.7, the market clearing and
numerical results are described below.
Figure D.8: Leverage economy - a ‘good news’ equilibrium’s market clearing
Figure D.9: Leverage economy - a ‘good news’ equilibrium’s numerical results
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3) ‘good news’ reversal equilibrium’ - Given R′′ is reversed to = 0.2,
the market clearing and numerical results are described below.
Figure D.10: Leverage economy - a ‘good news’ reversal equilibrium’s market clear-
ing
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